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SUSE:SLE-12-SP1:Update
openssl
openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch
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File openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch of Package openssl
commit 6f35f6deb5ca7daebe289f86477e061ce3ee5f46 Author: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Date: Thu May 5 11:10:26 2016 +0100 Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic A common idiom in the codebase is: if (p + len > limit) { return; /* Too long */ } Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and limit == p + SIZE "len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS message). The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually undefined behaviour. For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit! Issue reported by Guido Vranken. CVE-2016-2177 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Index: openssl-1.0.1i/ssl/s3_srvr.c =================================================================== --- openssl-1.0.1i.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2016-08-08 16:49:55.399925661 +0200 +++ openssl-1.0.1i/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2016-08-08 16:49:56.387941032 +0200 @@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } - if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) + if ((d+n) - p <= i) { /* not enough data */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; @@ -1147,7 +1147,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) /* compression */ i= *(p++); - if ((p+i) > (d+n)) + if ((d + n) - p < i) { /* not enough data */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; Index: openssl-1.0.1i/ssl/t1_lib.c =================================================================== --- openssl-1.0.1i.orig/ssl/t1_lib.c 2016-08-08 16:49:55.399925661 +0200 +++ openssl-1.0.1i/ssl/t1_lib.c 2016-08-08 17:09:11.541935618 +0200 @@ -937,11 +937,13 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ }; - if (data >= (d+n-2)) + const unsigned char *limit = d + n; + + if (limit - data <= 2) return; data += 2; - if (data > (d+n-4)) + if (limit - data < 4) return; n2s(data,type); n2s(data,size); @@ -949,7 +951,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) return; - if (data+size > d+n) + if (d+n-data < size) return; data += size; @@ -958,7 +960,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); - if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n) + if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) return; if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) return; @@ -969,7 +971,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, { const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - if (data + len != d+n) + if (limit - data != (int)(len)) return; if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) return; @@ -987,6 +989,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *data = *p; int renegotiate_seen = 0; int sigalg_seen = 0; + const unsigned char *limit = d + n; s->servername_done = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = -1; @@ -1004,20 +1007,24 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - if (data >= (d+n-2)) + if (data == limit) goto ri_check; + + if (limit - data < 2) + goto err; + n2s(data,len); - if (data > (d+n-len)) - goto ri_check; + if (limit - data != len) + goto err; - while (data <= (d+n-4)) + while (limit - data >= 4) { n2s(data,type); n2s(data,size); - if (data+size > (d+n)) - goto ri_check; + if (limit - data < size) + goto err; #if 0 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); #endif @@ -1478,6 +1485,9 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, } return 1; +err: + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG @@ -1518,22 +1528,22 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); #endif - if (data >= (d+n-2)) + if ((d + n) - data <= 2) goto ri_check; n2s(data,length); - if (data+length != d+n) + if ((d + n) - data != length) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } - while(data <= (d+n-4)) + while((d + n) - data >= 4) { n2s(data,type); n2s(data,size); - if (data+size > (d+n)) + if ((d + n) - data < size) goto ri_check; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) @@ -2220,30 +2230,32 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { i = *(p++); - p+= i; - if (p >= limit) + if (limit - p <= i) return -1; + p += i; } /* Skip past cipher list */ n2s(p, i); - p+= i; - if (p >= limit) + if (limit - p <= i) return -1; + p += i; + /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ i = *(p++); - p += i; - if (p > limit) + if (limit - p < i) return -1; + p += i; + /* Now at start of extensions */ - if ((p + 2) >= limit) + if (limit - p <= 2) return 0; n2s(p, i); - while ((p + 4) <= limit) + while (limit - p >= 4) { unsigned short type, size; n2s(p, type); n2s(p, size); - if (p + size > limit) + if (limit - p < size) return 0; if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
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