File xsa456-5.patch of Package xen.34726

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File xsa456-5.patch of Package xen.34726

# Commit 954c983abceee97bf5f6230b9ae164f2c49a9aa9
# Date 2024-04-09 16:37:30 +0100
# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
# Committer Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
x86/spec-ctrl: Software BHB-clearing sequences

Implement clear_bhb_{tsx,loops}() as per the BHI guidance.  The loops variant
is set up as the "short" sequence.

Introduce SCF_entry_bhb and extend SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_* with a conditional call
to selected clearing routine.

Note that due to a limitation in the ALTERNATIVE capability, the TEST/JZ can't
be included alongside a CALL in a single alternative block.  This is going to
require further work to untangle.

The BHB sequences (if used) must be after the restoration of Xen's
MSR_SPEC_CTRL value, which must be accounted for when judging whether it is
safe to skip the safety LFENCEs.

This is part of XSA-456 / CVE-2024-2201.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>

# Commit 656ae8f1091bcefec9c46ec3ea3ac2118742d4f6
# Date 2024-04-25 16:37:01 +0200
# Author Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/spec: adjust logic that elides lfence

It's currently too restrictive by just checking whether there's a BHB clearing
sequence selected.  It should instead check whether BHB clearing is used on
entry from PV or HVM specifically.

Switch to use opt_bhb_entry_{pv,hvm} instead, and then remove cpu_has_bhb_seq
since it no longer has any users.

Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Fixes: 954c983abcee ('x86/spec-ctrl: Software BHB-clearing sequences')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ alternative-y := alternative.init.o
 alternative-$(CONFIG_LIVEPATCH) :=
 obj-bin-y += $(alternative-y)
 obj-y += apic.o
+obj-y += bhb-thunk.o
 obj-y += bitops.o
 obj-bin-y += bzimage.init.o
 obj-bin-y += clear_page.o
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * Branch History Injection clearing sequences.
+ *
+ * https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2023, 2024 XenServer.
+ */
+        .file __FILE__
+
+#include <asm/asm_defns.h>
+
+        .section .text.entry, "ax", @progbits
+
+/*
+ * Clear the Branch History Buffer using a TSX Abort.
+ *
+ * Any TSX Abort has a side effect of clearing the BHB, even when TSX is
+ * disabled for e.g. TAA mitigation reasons.
+ */
+ENTRY(clear_bhb_tsx)
+        .byte 0xc7, 0xf8; .long 1f - 0f /* xbegin 1f */
+0:      .byte 0xc6, 0xf8, 0             /* xabort $0 */
+        int3
+1:
+        ret
+
+        .size clear_bhb_tsx, . - clear_bhb_tsx
+        .type clear_bhb_tsx, @function
+
+/*
+ * Clear the Branch History Buffer using the software sequence.
+ *
+ * Clobbers: %eax, %ecx
+ *
+ * This executes a specific number of taken branches, sufficient to displace
+ * all prior entries in the history tracker, therefore removing prior
+ * influence on subsequent BTB lookups.
+ *
+ * Structurally, it looks like this:
+ *
+ *   call 1
+ *     call 2
+ *       ... 5x jmp loop
+ *       call 2
+ *         ... 5x jmp loop
+ *         ... 5x call2's deep
+ *
+ *         ret
+ *       ret
+ *     ret
+ *   ret
+ *
+ * The CALL/RETs are necessary to prevent the Loop Stream Detector from
+ * interfering.  The alignment is for performance and not safety.
+ *
+ * The "short" sequence (5 and 5) is for CPUs prior to Alder Lake / Sapphire
+ * Rapids (i.e. Cores prior to Golden Cove and/or Gracemont).
+ */
+ENTRY(clear_bhb_loops)
+        mov     $5, %ecx
+
+        call    1f
+        jmp     5f
+        int3
+
+        .align 64
+1:      call    2f
+        ret
+        int3
+
+        .align 64
+2:      mov     $5, %eax
+
+3:      jmp     4f
+        int3
+
+4:      sub     $1, %eax
+        jnz     3b
+
+        sub     $1, %ecx
+        jnz     1b
+
+        ret
+5:
+        /*
+         * The Intel sequence has an LFENCE here.  The purpose is to ensure
+         * that all prior branches have executed, before dispatching a
+         * subsequent indirect branch.
+         *
+         * Xen's SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_* blocks have safety LFENCEs at the end when
+         * protections are active, which suffices for this purpose.
+         */
+
+        ret
+
+        .size clear_bhb_loops, . - clear_bhb_loops
+        .type clear_bhb_loops, @function
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
@@ -57,6 +57,18 @@ ENTRY(vmx_asm_vmexit_handler)
             wrmsr
         .endm
         ALTERNATIVE "", restore_spec_ctrl, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM
+
+        /*
+         * Clear the BHB to mitigate BHI.  Used on eIBRS parts, and uses RETs
+         * itself so must be after we've perfomed all the RET-safety we can.
+         */
+        testb $SCF_entry_bhb, CPUINFO_scf(%rsp)
+        jz .L_skip_bhb
+        ALTERNATIVE_2 "",                                    \
+            "call clear_bhb_loops", X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS,      \
+            "call clear_bhb_tsx", X86_SPEC_BHB_TSX
+.L_skip_bhb:
+
         ALTERNATIVE "lfence", "", X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_VMX
         /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
 
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -2080,38 +2080,43 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations
         /*
          * SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV conditional safety
          *
-         * DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV if used) is an
-         * unconditional WRMSR as the last action.
+         * A BHB sequence, if used, is a conditional action and last.  If we
+         * have this, then we must have the LFENCE.
          *
-         * If we have it, or we're not using any prior conditional mitigation,
-         * then it's safe to drop the LFENCE.
+         * Otherwise, DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV if used) is an
+         * unconditional WRMSR.  If we do have it, or we're not using any
+         * prior conditional block, then it's safe to drop the LFENCE.
          */
-        if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ||
-             !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) )
+        if ( !opt_bhb_entry_pv &&
+             (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ||
+              !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV)) )
             setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_PV);
 
         /*
          * SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR conditional safety
          *
-         * DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV if used) is an
-         * unconditional WRMSR as the last action.
+         * A BHB sequence, if used, is a conditional action and last.  If we
+         * have this, then we must have the LFENCE.
          *
-         * If we have it, or we have no protections active in the block that
-         * is skipped when interrupting guest context, then it's safe to drop
-         * the LFENCE.
+         * Otherwise DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV if used) is an
+         * unconditional WRMSR.  If we have it, or we have no protections
+         * active in the block that is skipped when interrupting guest
+         * context, then it's safe to drop the LFENCE.
          */
-        if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ||
-             (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) &&
-              !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV)) )
+        if ( !opt_bhb_entry_pv &&
+             (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ||
+              (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) &&
+               !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV))) )
             setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_INTR);
 
         /*
          * SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_VMX conditional safety
          *
-         * Currently there are no safety actions with conditional branches, so
-         * no need for the extra safety LFENCE.
+         * A BHB sequence, if used, is the only conditional action, so if we
+         * don't have it, we don't need the safety LFENCE.
          */
-        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_VMX);
+        if ( !opt_bhb_entry_hvm )
+            setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_VMX);
     }
 
     /*
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
@@ -55,5 +55,8 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_ENTRY_HVM,    X86_SY
 #define X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_INTR X86_BUG(17) /* (No) safety LFENCE for SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_INTR. */
 #define X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_VMX X86_BUG(18) /* (No) safety LFENCE for SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_VMX. */
 
+#define X86_SPEC_BHB_TSX          X86_BUG(19) /* Use clear_bhb_tsx for BHI mitigation. */
+#define X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS        X86_BUG(20) /* Use clear_bhb_loops for BHI mitigation.*/
+
 /* Total number of capability words, inc synth and bug words. */
 #define NCAPINTS (FSCAPINTS + X86_NR_SYNTH + X86_NR_BUG) /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #define SCF_verw       (1 << 3)
 #define SCF_ist_ibpb   (1 << 4)
 #define SCF_entry_ibpb (1 << 5)
+#define SCF_entry_bhb  (1 << 6)
 
 /*
  * The IST paths (NMI/#MC) can interrupt any arbitrary context.  Some
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@
  * Some speculative protections are per-domain.  These settings are merged
  * into the top-of-stack block in the context switch path.
  */
-#define SCF_DOM_MASK (SCF_verw | SCF_entry_ibpb)
+#define SCF_DOM_MASK (SCF_verw | SCF_entry_ibpb | SCF_entry_bhb)
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
@@ -285,6 +285,17 @@
     ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=0),         \
         X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV
 
+    /*
+     * Clear the BHB to mitigate BHI.  Used on eIBRS parts, and uses RETs
+     * itself so must be after we've perfomed all the RET-safety we can.
+     */
+    testb $SCF_entry_bhb, %bl
+    jz .L\@_skip_bhb
+    ALTERNATIVE_2 "",                                    \
+        "call clear_bhb_loops", X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS,      \
+        "call clear_bhb_tsx", X86_SPEC_BHB_TSX
+.L\@_skip_bhb:
+
     ALTERNATIVE "lfence", "", X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_PV
 .endm
 
@@ -323,6 +334,13 @@
     ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=1),         \
         X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV
 
+    testb $SCF_entry_bhb, %bl
+    jz .L\@_skip_bhb
+    ALTERNATIVE_2 "",                                    \
+        "call clear_bhb_loops", X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS,      \
+        "call clear_bhb_tsx", X86_SPEC_BHB_TSX
+.L\@_skip_bhb:
+
     ALTERNATIVE "lfence", "", X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_INTR
 .endm
 
@@ -423,6 +441,18 @@
 
 .L\@_skip_msr_spec_ctrl:
 
+    /*
+     * Clear the BHB to mitigate BHI.  Used on eIBRS parts, and uses RETs
+     * itself so must be after we've perfomed all the RET-safety we can.
+     */
+    testb $SCF_entry_bhb, %bl
+    jz .L\@_skip_bhb
+
+    ALTERNATIVE_2 "",                                    \
+        "call clear_bhb_loops", X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS,      \
+        "call clear_bhb_tsx", X86_SPEC_BHB_TSX
+.L\@_skip_bhb:
+
     lfence
 .endm

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