Sign Up
Log In
Log In
or
Sign Up
Places
All Projects
Status Monitor
Collapse sidebar
home:dirkmueller:acdc:as_python3_module
bind.34939
bind-9.16-CVE-2024-1975.patch
Overview
Repositories
Revisions
Requests
Users
Attributes
Meta
File bind-9.16-CVE-2024-1975.patch of Package bind.34939
commit 7504413e9eeec6d72bbe99a5409a977aae88acc0 Author: Nicki Křížek <nicki@isc.org> Date: Wed Jul 24 11:51:02 2024 +0000 [9.16] [CVE-2024-1975] Backport of isc-private/bind9!690 Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#4480 Merge branch '4480-drop-sig0-support-bind-9.16' into 'bind-9.16' See merge request isc-projects/bind9!9174 diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl index 57a72b2a3d..3afaa83169 100644 --- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl +++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl @@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ if (!defined($path)) { exit(1); } +# Enable output autoflush so that it's not lost when the parent sends TERM. +select STDOUT; +$| = 1; + unlink($path); my $server = IO::Socket::UNIX->new(Local => $path, Type => SOCK_STREAM, Listen => 8) or die "unable to create socket $path"; @@ -48,6 +52,7 @@ if ($timeout != 0) { } while (my $client = $server->accept()) { + printf("accept()\n"); $client->recv(my $buf, 8, 0); my ($version, $req_len) = unpack('N N', $buf); diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/clean.sh b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/clean.sh index 1da63ab3fe..1cbdd99794 100644 --- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/clean.sh +++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/clean.sh @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ rm -f ns1/_default.tsigkeys rm -f */named.memstats rm -f */named.conf rm -f */named.run -rm -f authsock.pid +rm -f authsock.log authsock.pid rm -f ns1/core rm -f nsupdate.out* rm -f ns*/named.lock diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh index 7c938ef78b..9a7157b5eb 100644 --- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh +++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ status=$((status+ret)) echo "I:testing external update policy (CNAME) with auth sock ($n)" ret=0 -$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 > /dev/null 2>&1 & +$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 >authsock.log 2>&1 & sleep 1 test_update $n testcname.example.nil. CNAME "86400 CNAME testdenied.example.nil" "testdenied" || ret=1 n=$((n+1)) @@ -130,18 +130,20 @@ n=$((n+1)) if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi status=$((status+ret)) -echo "I:testing external policy with SIG(0) key ($n)" +echo "I:testing external policy with unsupported SIG(0) key ($n)" ret=0 -$NSUPDATE -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <<END > /dev/null 2>&1 || ret=1 +$NSUPDATE -d -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <<END >nsupdate.out${n} 2>&1 || true +debug server 10.53.0.1 ${PORT} zone example.nil update add fred.example.nil 120 cname foo.bar. send END -output=`$DIG $DIGOPTS +short cname fred.example.nil.` -[ -n "$output" ] || ret=1 -[ $ret -eq 0 ] || echo "I:failed" -n=$((n+1)) +output=$($DIG $DIGOPTS +short cname fred.example.nil.) +# update must have failed - SIG(0) signer is not supported +[ -n "$output" ] && ret=1 +grep -F "signer=key.example.nil" authsock.log >/dev/null && ret=1 +n=$((n + 1)) if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi status=$((status+ret)) diff --git a/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh index 3b0d7b3998..0850ccda5e 100644 --- a/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh +++ b/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh @@ -175,18 +175,21 @@ n=`expr $n + 1` if test -f keyname then - echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 ($n)" + echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 (expected to fail) ($n)" ret=0 keyname=`cat keyname` - $NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <<EOF + # SIG(0) is removed, update is expected to fail. + { + $NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <<EOF server 10.53.0.3 ${PORT} zone example2 update add unsigned.example2. 600 A 10.10.10.1 update add unsigned.example2. 600 TXT Foo send EOF - $DIG -p ${PORT} unsigned.example2 A @10.53.0.1 > dig.out.ns1.test$n - grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n > /dev/null || ret=1 + } >nsupdate.out.$n 2>&1 && ret=1 + $DIG -p ${PORT} unsigned.example2 A @10.53.0.1 > dig.out.ns1.test$n || ret=1 + grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n > /dev/null && ret=1 if [ $ret != 0 ] ; then echo_i "failed"; fi status=`expr $status + $ret` n=`expr $n + 1` diff --git a/doc/arm/reference.rst b/doc/arm/reference.rst index 9b7f60a48d..876432c8d3 100644 --- a/doc/arm/reference.rst +++ b/doc/arm/reference.rst @@ -5596,7 +5596,7 @@ The ``update-policy`` clause allows more fine-grained control over which updates are allowed. It specifies a set of rules, in which each rule either grants or denies permission for one or more names in the zone to be updated by one or more identities. Identity is determined by the key -that signed the update request, using either TSIG or SIG(0). In most +that signed the update request, using either TSIG. In most cases, ``update-policy`` rules only apply to key-based identities. There is no way to specify update permissions based on the client source address. @@ -5653,7 +5653,7 @@ field), and the type of the record to be updated matches the ``types`` field. Details for each rule type are described below. The ``identity`` field must be set to a fully qualified domain name. In -most cases, this represensts the name of the TSIG or SIG(0) key that +most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG key that must be used to sign the update request. If the specified name is a wildcard, it is subject to DNS wildcard expansion, and the rule may apply to multiple identities. When a TKEY exchange has been used to diff --git a/doc/arm/security.rst b/doc/arm/security.rst index 7a76aef44d..4121fc2e52 100644 --- a/doc/arm/security.rst +++ b/doc/arm/security.rst @@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ Limiting access to the server by outside parties can help prevent spoofing and denial of service (DoS) attacks against the server. ACLs match clients on the basis of up to three characteristics: 1) The -client's IP address; 2) the TSIG or SIG(0) key that was used to sign the -request, if any; and 3) an address prefix encoded in an EDNS Client -Subnet option, if any. +client's IP address; 2) the TSIG key that was used to sign the +request, if any; and 3) an address prefix encoded in an EDNS +Client-Subnet option, if any. Here is an example of ACLs based on client addresses: @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ and no queries at all from the networks specified in ``bogusnets``. In addition to network addresses and prefixes, which are matched against the source address of the DNS request, ACLs may include ``key`` -elements, which specify the name of a TSIG or SIG(0) key. +elements, which specify the name of a TSIG key. When BIND 9 is built with GeoIP support, ACLs can also be used for geographic access restrictions. This is done by specifying an ACL diff --git a/lib/dns/message.c b/lib/dns/message.c index 99439c0fba..814467e7d0 100644 --- a/lib/dns/message.c +++ b/lib/dns/message.c @@ -3330,109 +3330,24 @@ dns_message_dumpsig(dns_message_t *msg, char *txt1) { isc_result_t dns_message_checksig(dns_message_t *msg, dns_view_t *view) { - isc_buffer_t b, msgb; + isc_buffer_t msgb; REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg)); - if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL && msg->sig0 == NULL) { + if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL) { return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); } INSIST(msg->saved.base != NULL); isc_buffer_init(&msgb, msg->saved.base, msg->saved.length); isc_buffer_add(&msgb, msg->saved.length); - if (msg->tsigkey != NULL || msg->tsig != NULL) { #ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG - dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1"); + dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1"); #endif /* ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG */ - if (view != NULL) { - return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg)); - } else { - return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL)); - } + if (view != NULL) { + return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg)); } else { - dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT; - dns_rdata_sig_t sig; - dns_rdataset_t keyset; - isc_result_t result; - - result = dns_rdataset_first(msg->sig0); - INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS); - dns_rdataset_current(msg->sig0, &rdata); - - /* - * This can occur when the message is a dynamic update, since - * the rdata length checking is relaxed. This should not - * happen in a well-formed message, since the SIG(0) is only - * looked for in the additional section, and the dynamic update - * meta-records are in the prerequisite and update sections. - */ - if (rdata.length == 0) { - return (ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND); - } - - result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &sig, msg->mctx); - if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - return (result); - } - - dns_rdataset_init(&keyset); - if (view == NULL) { - return (DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED); - } - result = dns_view_simplefind(view, &sig.signer, - dns_rdatatype_key /* SIG(0) */, 0, - 0, false, &keyset, NULL); - - if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - /* XXXBEW Should possibly create a fetch here */ - result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; - goto freesig; - } else if (keyset.trust < dns_trust_secure) { - /* XXXBEW Should call a validator here */ - result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; - goto freesig; - } - result = dns_rdataset_first(&keyset); - INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS); - for (; result == ISC_R_SUCCESS; - result = dns_rdataset_next(&keyset)) { - dst_key_t *key = NULL; - - dns_rdata_reset(&rdata); - dns_rdataset_current(&keyset, &rdata); - isc_buffer_init(&b, rdata.data, rdata.length); - isc_buffer_add(&b, rdata.length); - - result = dst_key_fromdns(&sig.signer, rdata.rdclass, &b, - view->mctx, &key); - if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - continue; - } - if (dst_key_alg(key) != sig.algorithm || - dst_key_id(key) != sig.keyid || - !(dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_DNSSEC || - dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_ANY)) - { - dst_key_free(&key); - continue; - } - result = dns_dnssec_verifymessage(&msgb, msg, key); - dst_key_free(&key); - if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - break; - } - } - if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE) { - result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; - } - - freesig: - if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&keyset)) { - dns_rdataset_disassociate(&keyset); - } - dns_rdata_freestruct(&sig); - return (result); + return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL)); } } diff --git a/lib/ns/client.c b/lib/ns/client.c index 561e629807..72cbdb34d6 100644 --- a/lib/ns/client.c +++ b/lib/ns/client.c @@ -2034,6 +2034,13 @@ ns__client_request(isc_nmhandle_t *handle, isc_region_t *region, void *arg) { ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY, NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "request is signed by a nonauthoritative key"); + } else if (result == DNS_R_NOTVERIFIEDYET && + client->message->sig0 != NULL) + { + ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY, + NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), + "request has a SIG(0) signature but its support " + "was removed (CVE-2024-1975)"); } else { char tsigrcode[64]; isc_buffer_t b;
Locations
Projects
Search
Status Monitor
Help
OpenBuildService.org
Documentation
API Documentation
Code of Conduct
Contact
Support
@OBShq
Terms
openSUSE Build Service is sponsored by
The Open Build Service is an
openSUSE project
.
Sign Up
Log In
Places
Places
All Projects
Status Monitor
