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openSUSE:Leap:15.5:Update
libgcrypt
libgcrypt-jitterentropy-3.4.0.patch
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File libgcrypt-jitterentropy-3.4.0.patch of Package libgcrypt
Index: libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-base.c =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.9.4.orig/random/jitterentropy-base.c +++ libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-base.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ * require consumer to be updated (as long as this number * is zero, the API is not considered stable and can * change without a bump of the major version) */ -#define MINVERSION 3 /* API compatible, ABI may change, functional +#define MINVERSION 4 /* API compatible, ABI may change, functional * enhancements only, consumer can be left unchanged if * enhancements are not considered */ #define PATCHLEVEL 0 /* API / ABI compatible, no functional changes, no @@ -200,29 +200,38 @@ ssize_t jent_read_entropy(struct rand_da tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8); else tocopy = len; - memcpy(p, &ec->data, tocopy); + + jent_read_random_block(ec, p, tocopy); len -= tocopy; p += tocopy; } /* - * To be on the safe side, we generate one more round of entropy - * which we do not give out to the caller. That round shall ensure - * that in case the calling application crashes, memory dumps, pages - * out, or due to the CPU Jitter RNG lingering in memory for long - * time without being moved and an attacker cracks the application, - * all he reads in the entropy pool is a value that is NEVER EVER - * being used for anything. Thus, he does NOT see the previous value - * that was returned to the caller for cryptographic purposes. + * Enhanced backtracking support: At this point, the hash state + * contains the digest of the previous Jitter RNG collection round + * which is inserted there by jent_read_random_block with the SHA + * update operation. At the current code location we completed + * one request for a caller and we do not know how long it will + * take until a new request is sent to us. To guarantee enhanced + * backtracking resistance at this point (i.e. ensure that an attacker + * cannot obtain information about prior random numbers we generated), + * but still stirring the hash state with old data the Jitter RNG + * obtains a new message digest from its state and re-inserts it. + * After this operation, the Jitter RNG state is still stirred with + * the old data, but an attacker who gets access to the memory after + * this point cannot deduce the random numbers produced by the + * Jitter RNG prior to this point. */ /* - * If we use secured memory, do not use that precaution as the secure - * memory protects the entropy pool. Moreover, note that using this - * call reduces the speed of the RNG by up to half + * If we use secured memory, where backtracking support may not be + * needed because the state is protected in a different method, + * it is permissible to drop this support. But strongly weigh the + * pros and cons considering that the SHA3 operation is not that + * expensive. */ #ifndef JENT_CPU_JITTERENTROPY_SECURE_MEMORY - jent_random_data(ec); + jent_read_random_block(ec, NULL, 0); #endif err: @@ -379,6 +388,7 @@ static struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc_internal(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags) { struct rand_data *entropy_collector; + uint32_t memsize = 0; /* * Requesting disabling and forcing of internal timer @@ -405,7 +415,7 @@ static struct rand_data return NULL; if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) { - uint32_t memsize = jent_memsize(flags); + memsize = jent_memsize(flags); entropy_collector->mem = _gcry_calloc (1, memsize); @@ -431,13 +441,19 @@ static struct rand_data entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS; } + if (sha3_alloc(&entropy_collector->hash_state)) + goto err; + + /* Initialize the hash state */ + sha3_256_init(entropy_collector->hash_state); + /* verify and set the oversampling rate */ if (osr < JENT_MIN_OSR) osr = JENT_MIN_OSR; entropy_collector->osr = osr; entropy_collector->flags = flags; - if (jent_fips_enabled() || (flags & JENT_FORCE_FIPS)) + if ((flags & JENT_FORCE_FIPS) || jent_fips_enabled()) entropy_collector->fips_enabled = 1; /* Initialize the APT */ @@ -469,7 +485,7 @@ static struct rand_data err: if (entropy_collector->mem != NULL) - jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem, JENT_MEMORY_SIZE); + jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem, memsize); jent_zfree(entropy_collector, sizeof(struct rand_data)); return NULL; } @@ -511,6 +527,7 @@ JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector) { if (entropy_collector != NULL) { + sha3_dealloc(entropy_collector->hash_state); jent_notime_disable(entropy_collector); if (entropy_collector->mem != NULL) { jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem, @@ -664,6 +681,7 @@ static inline int jent_entropy_init_comm int ret; jent_notime_block_switch(); + jent_health_cb_block_switch(); if (sha3_tester()) return EHASH; @@ -710,6 +728,8 @@ int jent_entropy_init_ex(unsigned int os if (ret) return ret; + ret = ENOTIME; + /* Test without internal timer unless caller does not want it */ if (!(flags & JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER)) ret = jent_time_entropy_init(osr, @@ -732,3 +752,9 @@ int jent_entropy_switch_notime_impl(stru return jent_notime_switch(new_thread); } #endif + +JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC +int jent_set_fips_failure_callback(jent_fips_failure_cb cb) +{ + return jent_set_fips_failure_callback_internal(cb); +} Index: libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-gcd.c =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.9.4.orig/random/jitterentropy-gcd.c +++ libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-gcd.c @@ -113,12 +113,8 @@ int jent_gcd_analyze(uint64_t *delta_his goto out; } - /* - * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 100 for at - * least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments - * in multiples of 100, but not always - */ - if (running_gcd >= 100) { + /* Set a sensible maximum value. */ + if (running_gcd >= UINT32_MAX / 2) { ret = ECOARSETIME; goto out; } Index: libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-health.c =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.9.4.orig/random/jitterentropy-health.c +++ libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-health.c @@ -19,9 +19,24 @@ * DAMAGE. */ -#include "jitterentropy.h" #include "jitterentropy-health.h" +static jent_fips_failure_cb fips_cb = NULL; +static int jent_health_cb_switch_blocked = 0; + +void jent_health_cb_block_switch(void) +{ + jent_health_cb_switch_blocked = 1; +} + +int jent_set_fips_failure_callback_internal(jent_fips_failure_cb cb) +{ + if (jent_health_cb_switch_blocked) + return -EAGAIN; + fips_cb = cb; + return 0; +} + /*************************************************************************** * Lag Predictor Test * @@ -434,5 +449,9 @@ unsigned int jent_health_failure(struct if (!ec->fips_enabled) return 0; + if (fips_cb && ec->health_failure) { + fips_cb(ec, ec->health_failure); + } + return ec->health_failure; } Index: libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-health.h =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.9.4.orig/random/jitterentropy-health.h +++ libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-health.h @@ -20,11 +20,16 @@ #ifndef JITTERENTROPY_HEALTH_H #define JITTERENTROPY_HEALTH_H +#include "jitterentropy.h" + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif +void jent_health_cb_block_switch(void); +int jent_set_fips_failure_callback_internal(jent_fips_failure_cb cb); + static inline uint64_t jent_delta(uint64_t prev, uint64_t next) { return (next - prev); Index: libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-noise.c =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.9.4.orig/random/jitterentropy-noise.c +++ libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-noise.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ * Update of the loop count used for the next round of * an entropy collection. * - * @ec [in] entropy collector struct -- may be NULL + * @ec [in] entropy collector struct * @bits [in] is the number of low bits of the timer to consider * @min [in] is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at * the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value @@ -61,16 +61,13 @@ static uint64_t jent_loop_shuffle(struct * Mix the current state of the random number into the shuffle * calculation to balance that shuffle a bit more. */ - if (ec) { - jent_get_nstime_internal(ec, &time); - time ^= ec->data[0]; - } + jent_get_nstime_internal(ec, &time); /* * We fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many * bits of the time stamp are included as possible. */ - for (i = 0; ((DATA_SIZE_BITS + bits - 1) / bits) > i; i++) { + for (i = 0; (((sizeof(time) << 3) + bits - 1) / bits) > i; i++) { shuffle ^= time & mask; time = time >> bits; } @@ -91,11 +88,11 @@ static uint64_t jent_loop_shuffle(struct * This function injects the individual bits of the time value into the * entropy pool using a hash. * - * @ec [in] entropy collector struct -- may be NULL - * @time [in] time stamp to be injected + * @ec [in] entropy collector struct + * @time [in] time delta to be injected * @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as * number of loops to perform the hash operation - * @stuck [in] Is the time stamp identified as stuck? + * @stuck [in] Is the time delta identified as stuck? * * Output: * updated hash context @@ -104,17 +101,19 @@ static void jent_hash_time(struct rand_d uint64_t loop_cnt, unsigned int stuck) { HASH_CTX_ON_STACK(ctx); - uint8_t itermediary[SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST]; + uint8_t intermediary[SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST]; uint64_t j = 0; - uint64_t hash_loop_cnt; #define MAX_HASH_LOOP 3 #define MIN_HASH_LOOP 0 /* Ensure that macros cannot overflow jent_loop_shuffle() */ BUILD_BUG_ON((MAX_HASH_LOOP + MIN_HASH_LOOP) > 63); - hash_loop_cnt = + uint64_t hash_loop_cnt = jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_HASH_LOOP, MIN_HASH_LOOP); + /* Use the memset to shut up valgrind */ + memset(intermediary, 0, sizeof(intermediary)); + sha3_256_init(&ctx); /* @@ -125,35 +124,54 @@ static void jent_hash_time(struct rand_d hash_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; /* - * This loop basically slows down the SHA-3 operation depending - * on the hash_loop_cnt. Each iteration of the loop generates the - * same result. + * This loop fills a buffer which is injected into the entropy pool. + * The main reason for this loop is to execute something over which we + * can perform a timing measurement. The injection of the resulting + * data into the pool is performed to ensure the result is used and + * the compiler cannot optimize the loop away in case the result is not + * used at all. Yet that data is considered "additional information" + * considering the terminology from SP800-90A without any entropy. + * + * Note, it does not matter which or how much data you inject, we are + * interested in one Keccack1600 compression operation performed with + * the sha3_final. */ for (j = 0; j < hash_loop_cnt; j++) { - sha3_update(&ctx, ec->data, SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST); - sha3_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&time, sizeof(uint64_t)); + sha3_update(&ctx, intermediary, sizeof(intermediary)); + sha3_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&ec->rct_count, + sizeof(ec->rct_count)); + sha3_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&ec->apt_cutoff, + sizeof(ec->apt_cutoff)); + sha3_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&ec->apt_observations, + sizeof(ec->apt_observations)); + sha3_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&ec->apt_count, + sizeof(ec->apt_count)); + sha3_update(&ctx,(uint8_t *) &ec->apt_base, + sizeof(ec->apt_base)); sha3_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&j, sizeof(uint64_t)); + sha3_final(&ctx, intermediary); + } - /* - * If the time stamp is stuck, do not finally insert the value - * into the entropy pool. Although this operation should not do - * any harm even when the time stamp has no entropy, SP800-90B - * requires that any conditioning operation to have an identical - * amount of input data according to section 3.1.5. - */ + /* + * Inject the data from the previous loop into the pool. This data is + * not considered to contain any entropy, but it stirs the pool a bit. + */ + sha3_update(ec->hash_state, intermediary, sizeof(intermediary)); - /* - * The sha3_final operations re-initialize the context for the - * next loop iteration. - */ - if (stuck || (j < hash_loop_cnt - 1)) - sha3_final(&ctx, itermediary); - else - sha3_final(&ctx, ec->data); - } + /* + * Insert the time stamp into the hash context representing the pool. + * + * If the time stamp is stuck, do not finally insert the value into the + * entropy pool. Although this operation should not do any harm even + * when the time stamp has no entropy, SP800-90B requires that any + * conditioning operation to have an identical amount of input data + * according to section 3.1.5. + */ + if (!stuck) + sha3_update(ec->hash_state, (uint8_t *)&time, sizeof(uint64_t)); jent_memset_secure(&ctx, SHA_MAX_CTX_SIZE); - jent_memset_secure(itermediary, sizeof(itermediary)); + jent_memset_secure(intermediary, sizeof(intermediary)); } #define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7 @@ -184,13 +202,12 @@ static inline uint32_t xoshiro128starsta static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, uint64_t loop_cnt) { - uint64_t i = 0; + uint64_t i = 0, time = 0; union { uint32_t u[4]; uint8_t b[sizeof(uint32_t) * 4]; } prngState = { .u = {0x8e93eec0, 0xce65608a, 0xa8d46b46, 0xe83cef69} }; uint32_t addressMask; - uint64_t acc_loop_cnt; if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem) return; @@ -199,7 +216,7 @@ static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_d /* Ensure that macros cannot overflow jent_loop_shuffle() */ BUILD_BUG_ON((MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT + MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT) > 63); - acc_loop_cnt = + uint64_t acc_loop_cnt = jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT); /* @@ -213,8 +230,10 @@ static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_d * "per-update: timing, it gets you mostly independent "per-update" * timing, so we can now benefit from the Central Limit Theorem! */ - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(prngState); i++) - prngState.b[i] ^= ec->data[i]; + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(prngState); i++) { + jent_get_nstime_internal(ec, &time); + prngState.b[i] ^= (uint8_t)(time & 0xff); + } /* * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not @@ -358,21 +377,21 @@ unsigned int jent_measure_jitter(struct /** * Generator of one 256 bit random number - * Function fills rand_data->data + * Function fills rand_data->hash_state * * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector */ void jent_random_data(struct rand_data *ec) { - unsigned int k = 0, safety_factor = ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR; + unsigned int k = 0, safety_factor = 0; - if (!ec->fips_enabled) - safety_factor = 0; + if (ec->fips_enabled) + safety_factor = ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR; /* priming of the ->prev_time value */ jent_measure_jitter(ec, 0, NULL); - while (1) { + while (!jent_health_failure(ec)) { /* If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement */ if (jent_measure_jitter(ec, 0, NULL)) continue; @@ -385,3 +404,22 @@ void jent_random_data(struct rand_data * break; } } + +void jent_read_random_block(struct rand_data *ec, char *dst, size_t dst_len) +{ + uint8_t jent_block[SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST]; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST != (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8)); + + /* The final operation automatically re-initializes the ->hash_state */ + sha3_final(ec->hash_state, jent_block); + if (dst_len) + memcpy(dst, jent_block, dst_len); + + /* + * Stir the new state with the data from the old state - the digest + * of the old data is not considered to have entropy. + */ + sha3_update(ec->hash_state, jent_block, sizeof(jent_block)); + jent_memset_secure(jent_block, sizeof(jent_block)); +} Index: libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-noise.h =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.9.4.orig/random/jitterentropy-noise.h +++ libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-noise.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ unsigned int jent_measure_jitter(struct uint64_t loop_cnt, uint64_t *ret_current_delta); void jent_random_data(struct rand_data *ec); +void jent_read_random_block(struct rand_data *ec, char *dst, size_t dst_len); #ifdef __cplusplus } Index: libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-sha3.c =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.9.4.orig/random/jitterentropy-sha3.c +++ libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-sha3.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ */ #include "jitterentropy-sha3.h" +#include "jitterentropy.h" /*************************************************************************** * Message Digest Implementation @@ -380,3 +381,23 @@ int sha3_tester(void) return 0; } + +int sha3_alloc(void **hash_state) +{ + struct sha_ctx *tmp; + + tmp = jent_zalloc(SHA_MAX_CTX_SIZE); + if (!tmp) + return 1; + + *hash_state = tmp; + + return 0; +} + +void sha3_dealloc(void *hash_state) +{ + struct sha_ctx *ctx = (struct sha_ctx *)hash_state; + + jent_zfree(ctx, SHA_MAX_CTX_SIZE); +} Index: libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-sha3.h =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.9.4.orig/random/jitterentropy-sha3.h +++ libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-sha3.h @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ struct sha_ctx { void sha3_256_init(struct sha_ctx *ctx); void sha3_update(struct sha_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen); void sha3_final(struct sha_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *digest); +int sha3_alloc(void **hash_state); +void sha3_dealloc(void *hash_state); int sha3_tester(void); #ifdef __cplusplus Index: libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-timer.c =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.9.4.orig/random/jitterentropy-timer.c +++ libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-timer.c @@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ int jent_notime_enable(struct rand_data if (jent_force_internal_timer || (flags & JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER)) { /* Self test not run yet */ if (!jent_force_internal_timer && - jent_time_entropy_init(flags | JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER, - ec->osr)) + jent_time_entropy_init(ec->osr, + flags | JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER)) return EHEALTH; ec->enable_notime = 1; Index: libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy.h =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.9.4.orig/random/jitterentropy.h +++ libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy.h @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ ***************************************************************************/ /* - * Enable timer-less timer support + * Enable timer-less timer support with JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER * * In case the hardware is identified to not provide a high-resolution time * stamp, this option enables a built-in high-resolution time stamp mechanism. @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct rand_data * of the RNG are marked as SENSITIVE. A user must not * access that information while the RNG executes its loops to * calculate the next random value. */ - uint8_t data[SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST]; /* SENSITIVE Actual random number */ + void *hash_state; /* SENSITIVE hash state entropy pool */ uint64_t prev_time; /* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */ #define DATA_SIZE_BITS (SHA3_256_SIZE_DIGEST_BITS) @@ -378,28 +379,34 @@ int jent_entropy_init(void); JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC int jent_entropy_init_ex(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags); +/* + * Set a callback to run on health failure in FIPS mode. + * This function will take an action determined by the caller. + */ +typedef void (*jent_fips_failure_cb)(struct rand_data *ec, + unsigned int health_failure); +JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC +int jent_set_fips_failure_callback(jent_fips_failure_cb cb); + /* return version number of core library */ JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC unsigned int jent_version(void); -#ifdef JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER /* Set a different thread handling logic for the notimer support */ JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC int jent_entropy_switch_notime_impl(struct jent_notime_thread *new_thread); -#endif /* -- END of Main interface functions -- */ /* -- BEGIN timer-less threading support functions to prevent code dupes -- */ -struct jent_notime_ctx { #ifdef JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER + +struct jent_notime_ctx { pthread_attr_t notime_pthread_attr; /* pthreads library */ pthread_t notime_thread_id; /* pthreads thread ID */ -#endif }; -#ifdef JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC int jent_notime_init(void **ctx); Index: libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-base-user.h =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.9.4.orig/random/jitterentropy-base-user.h +++ libgcrypt-1.9.4/random/jitterentropy-base-user.h @@ -216,12 +216,12 @@ static inline void jent_get_cachesize(lo ext = strstr(buf, "K"); if (ext) { shift = 10; - ext = '\0'; + *ext = '\0'; } else { ext = strstr(buf, "M"); if (ext) { shift = 20; - ext = '\0'; + *ext = '\0'; } }
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