Libraries for crypto and SSL/TLS protocols

Edit Package mbedtls
https://tls.mbed.org

mbedtls implements the SSL3, TLS 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 protocols. It
supports a number of extensions such as SSL Session Tickets (RFC
5077), Server Name Indication (SNI) (RFC 6066), Truncated HMAC (RFC
6066), Max Fragment Length (RFC 6066), Secure Renegotiation (RFC
5746) and Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN). It
understands the RSA, (EC)DH(E)-RSA, (EC)DH(E)-PSK and RSA-PSK key
exchanges.

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Source Files
Filename Size Changed
project.diff 0000003451 3.37 KB
v2.24.0.tar.gz 0003911881 3.73 MB
Revision 20 (latest revision is 51)
Martin Pluskal's avatar Martin Pluskal (pluskalm) accepted request 837996 from Dirk Mueller's avatar Dirk Mueller (dirkmueller) (revision 20)
- update to 2.24.0:
  * see https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.24.0
  * Fix a vulnerability in the verification of X.509 certificates when matching
  the expected common name (the cn argument of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify())
  with the actual certificate name: when the subjecAltName extension is
  present, the expected name was compared to any name in that extension
  regardless of its type. This means that an attacker could for example
  impersonate a 4-bytes or 16-byte domain by getting a certificate for the
  corresponding IPv4 or IPv6 (this would require the attacker to control that
  IP address, though). Similar attacks using other subjectAltName name types
  might be possible.
  * When checking X.509 CRLs, a certificate was only considered as revoked if
  its revocationDate was in the past according to the local clock if
  available. In particular, on builds without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE,
  certificates were never considered as revoked. On builds with
  MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE, an attacker able to control the local clock (for
  example, an untrusted OS attacking a secure enclave) could prevent
  revocation of certificates via CRLs. Fixed by no longer checking the
  revocationDate field, in accordance with RFC 5280. Reported by yuemonangong
  in #3340. Reported independently and fixed by Raoul Strackx and Jethro
  * In (D)TLS record decryption, when using a CBC ciphersuites without the
  Encrypt-then-Mac extension, use constant code flow memory access patterns
  to extract and check the MAC. This is an improvement to the existing
  countermeasure against Lucky 13 attacks. The previous countermeasure was
  effective against network-based attackers, but less so against local
  attackers. The new countermeasure defends against local attackers, even if
  they have access to fine-grained measurements. In particular, this fixes a
  local Lucky 13 cache attack found and reported by Tuba Yavuz, Farhaan
  Fowze, Ken (Yihan) Bai, Grant Hernandez, and Kevin Butler (University of
  Florida) and Dave Tian (Purdue University).
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