File U_dri2_integer_overflow_in_ProcDRI2GetBuffers.p... of Package xorg-x11-server.582

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File U_dri2_integer_overflow_in_ProcDRI2GetBuffers.patch of Package xorg-x11-server.582 (Revision 89da32bf8fefd5ba87cc443f62e41fcf)

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Subject: dri2: integer overflow in ProcDRI2GetBuffers()
References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8094
Patch-Mainline: Upstream
Signed-off-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>

ProcDRI2GetBuffers() tries to validate a length field (count).
There is an integer overflow in the validation. This can cause
out of bound reads and memory corruption later on.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
---
 hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
index ffd66fa..221ec53 100644
--- a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
+++ b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
@@ -270,6 +270,9 @@ ProcDRI2GetBuffers(ClientPtr client)
     unsigned int *attachments;
 
     REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDRI2GetBuffersReq, stuff->count * 4);
+    if (stuff->count > (INT_MAX / 4))
+        return BadLength;
+
     if (!validDrawable(client, stuff->drawable, DixReadAccess | DixWriteAccess,
                        &pDrawable, &status))
         return status;
-- 
1.7.9.2

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File U_dri2_integer_overflow_in_ProcDRI2GetBuffers.patch of Package xorg-x11-server.582 (Revision 89da32bf8fefd5ba87cc443f62e41fcf)

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