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SUSE:SLE-12-SP2:GA
compat-openssl098.503
enable-security-renegotiation.patch
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File enable-security-renegotiation.patch of Package compat-openssl098.503
--- openssl-0.9.8j/Configure.orig 2011-08-03 16:02:27.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/Configure 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> # SHA512_ASM sha512_block is implemented in assembler # AES_ASM ASE_[en|de]crypt is implemented in assembler +# Minimum warning options... any contributions to OpenSSL should at least get +# past these. +my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED"; + my $x86_gcc_des="DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL"; # MD2_CHAR slags pentium pros @@ -154,7 +158,8 @@ my %table=( "debug-ben", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown):::::bn86-elf.o co86-elf.o", "debug-ben-openbsd","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::", "debug-ben-openbsd-debug","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::", -"debug-ben-debug", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::::", +"debug-ben-debug", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -O2 -pipe::(unknown)::::::", +"debug-ben-debug-noopt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -pipe::(unknown)::::::", "debug-ben-strict", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::", "debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}", "debug-bodo", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -DPEDANTIC -g -march=i486 -pedantic -Wshadow -Wall -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}", --- openssl-0.9.8j/apps/s_cb.c.orig 2007-08-12 18:58:59.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/apps/s_cb.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -621,6 +621,9 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int c extname = "server ticket"; break; + case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate: + extname = "renegotiate"; + break; default: extname = "unknown"; --- openssl-0.9.8j/apps/s_client.c.orig 2008-12-20 17:04:08.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/apps/s_client.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void) BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - request certificate status from server\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); #endif + BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT @@ -286,7 +287,7 @@ int MAIN(int, char **); int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) { - int off=0; + int off=0, clr = 0; SSL *con=NULL,*con2=NULL; X509_STORE *store = NULL; int s,k,width,state=0; @@ -535,6 +536,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) #endif else if (strcmp(*argv,"-serverpref") == 0) off|=SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE; + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-legacy_renegotiation") == 0) + off|=SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-legacy_server_connect") == 0) + { off|=SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; } + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_legacy_server_connect") == 0) + { clr|=SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; } else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cipher") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; @@ -709,6 +716,9 @@ bad: SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,SSL_OP_ALL|off); else SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,off); + + if (clr) + SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, clr); /* DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-( * Setting read ahead solves this problem. */ @@ -1511,6 +1521,8 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s EVP_PKEY_bits(pktmp)); EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); } + BIO_printf(bio, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n", + SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(s) ? "" : " NOT"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP comp=SSL_get_current_compression(s); expansion=SSL_get_current_expansion(s); --- openssl-0.9.8j/apps/s_server.c.orig 2008-12-20 17:04:08.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/apps/s_server.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void) BIO_printf(bio_err," not specified (default is %s)\n",TEST_CERT2); BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n"); #endif } @@ -921,6 +922,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) } else if (strcmp(*argv,"-serverpref") == 0) { off|=SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE; } + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-legacy_renegotiation") == 0) + off|=SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cipher") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; @@ -2002,6 +2005,8 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con) con->kssl_ctx->client_princ); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n", + SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ? "" : " NOT"); return(1); } --- openssl-0.9.8j/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod.orig 2007-08-23 22:53:57.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME -SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_get_options, SSL_get_options - manipulate SSL engine options +SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_clear_options, SSL_clear_options, SSL_CTX_get_options, SSL_get_options, SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support - manipulate SSL options =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -11,26 +11,41 @@ SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SS long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options); long SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, long options); + long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options); + long SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, long options); + long SSL_CTX_get_options(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_get_options(SSL *ssl); + long SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(SSL *ssl); + =head1 DESCRIPTION +Note: all these functions are implemented using macros. + SSL_CTX_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ctx>. Options already set before are not cleared! SSL_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ssl>. Options already set before are not cleared! +SSL_CTX_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B<options> +to B<ctx>. + +SSL_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ssl>. + SSL_CTX_get_options() returns the options set for B<ctx>. SSL_get_options() returns the options set for B<ssl>. +SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() indicates whether the peer supports +secure renegotiation. + =head1 NOTES The behaviour of the SSL library can be changed by setting several options. The options are coded as bitmasks and can be combined by a logical B<or> -operation (|). Options can only be added but can never be reset. +operation (|). SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() affect the (external) protocol behaviour of the SSL library. The (internal) behaviour of @@ -201,6 +216,93 @@ When performing renegotiation as a serve (i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial handshake). This option is not needed for clients. +=item SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION + +Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or +servers. See the B<SECURE RENEGOTIATION> section for more details. + +=item SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT + +Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched servers +B<only>: this option is currently set by default. See the +B<SECURE RENEGOTIATION> section for more details. + +=head1 SECURE RENEGOTIATION + +OpenSSL 0.9.8m and later always attempts to use secure renegotiation as +described in RFC5746. This counters the prefix attack described in +CVE-2009-3555 and elsewhere. + +The deprecated and highly broken SSLv2 protocol does not support +renegotiation at all: its use is B<strongly> discouraged. + +This attack has far reaching consequences which application writers should be +aware of. In the description below an implementation supporting secure +renegotiation is referred to as I<patched>. A server not supporting secure +renegotiation is referred to as I<unpatched>. + +The following sections describe the operations permitted by OpenSSL's secure +renegotiation implementation. + +=head2 Patched client and server + +Connections and renegotiation are always permitted by OpenSSL implementations. + +=head2 Unpatched client and patched OpenSSL server + +The initial connection suceeds but client renegotiation is denied by the +server with a B<no_renegotiation> warning alert if TLS v1.0 is used or a fatal +B<handshake_failure> alert in SSL v3.0. + +If the patched OpenSSL server attempts to renegotiate a fatal +B<handshake_failure> alert is sent. This is because the server code may be +unaware of the unpatched nature of the client. + +If the option B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION> is set then +renegotiation B<always> succeeds. + +B<NB:> a bug in OpenSSL clients earlier than 0.9.8m (all of which are +unpatched) will result in the connection hanging if it receives a +B<no_renegotiation> alert. OpenSSL versions 0.9.8m and later will regard +a B<no_renegotiation> alert as fatal and respond with a fatal +B<handshake_failure> alert. This is because the OpenSSL API currently has +no provision to indicate to an application that a renegotiation attempt +was refused. + +=head2 Patched OpenSSL client and unpatched server. + +If the option B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> or +B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION> is set then initial connections +and renegotiation between patched OpenSSL clients and unpatched servers +succeeds. If neither option is set then initial connections to unpatched + +The option B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> is currently set by default even +though it has security implications: otherwise it would be impossible to +connect to unpatched servers (i.e. all of them initially) and this is clearly +not acceptable. Renegotiation is permitted because this does not add any +additional security issues: during an attack clients do not see any +renegotiations anyway. + +As more servers become patched the option B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> will +B<not> be set by default in a future version of OpenSSL. + +OpenSSL client applications wishing to ensure they can connect to unpatched +servers should always B<set> B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> + +OpenSSL client applications that want to ensure they can B<not> connect to +unpatched servers (and thus avoid any security issues) should always B<clear> +B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> using SSL_CTX_clear_options() or +SSL_clear_options(). + +The difference between the B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> and +B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION> options is that +B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> enables initial connections and secure +renegotiation between OpenSSL clients and unpatched servers B<only>, while +B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION> allows initial connections +and renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or servers. + + + =item SSL_OP_NO_TICKET Normally clients and servers will, where possible, transparently make use @@ -217,8 +319,14 @@ not be used by clients or servers. SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() return the new options bitmask after adding B<options>. +SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() return the new options bitmask +after clearing B<options>. + SSL_CTX_get_options() and SSL_get_options() return the current bitmask. +SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() returns 1 is the peer supports +secure renegotiation and 0 if it does not. + =head1 SEE ALSO L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>, @@ -241,4 +349,11 @@ Versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.6c do not inc can be disabled with this option (in OpenSSL 0.9.6d, it was always enabled). +SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() were first added in OpenSSL +0.9.8m. + +B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION>, B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT> +and the function SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() were first added in +OpenSSL 0.9.8m. + =cut --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/Makefile.orig 2008-09-17 17:11:09.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/Makefile 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ LIBSRC= \ ssl_lib.c ssl_err2.c ssl_cert.c ssl_sess.c \ ssl_ciph.c ssl_stat.c ssl_rsa.c \ ssl_asn1.c ssl_txt.c ssl_algs.c \ - bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c + bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c t1_reneg.c LIBOBJ= \ s2_meth.o s2_srvr.o s2_clnt.o s2_lib.o s2_enc.o s2_pkt.o \ s3_meth.o s3_srvr.o s3_clnt.o s3_lib.o s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o \ @@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ LIBOBJ= \ ssl_lib.o ssl_err2.o ssl_cert.o ssl_sess.o \ ssl_ciph.o ssl_stat.o ssl_rsa.o \ ssl_asn1.o ssl_txt.o ssl_algs.o \ - bio_ssl.o ssl_err.o kssl.o + bio_ssl.o ssl_err.o kssl.o t1_reneg.o + SRC= $(LIBSRC) @@ -994,6 +995,27 @@ t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../ t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h t1_meth.o: t1_meth.c +t1_reneg.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/pq_compat.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h +t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h +t1_reneg.o: t1_reneg.c t1_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/d1_both.c.orig 2011-08-03 16:02:27.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/d1_both.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -751,6 +751,24 @@ int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, i p+=i; l=i; + /* Copy the finished so we can use it for + * renegotiation checks + */ + if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) + { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i; + } + else + { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, + s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i; + } + #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16 /* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless * I do this. --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/d1_clnt.c.orig 2008-06-04 18:35:25.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/d1_clnt.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -277,15 +277,43 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + ret=ssl3_check_finished(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + if (ret == 2) + { + s->hit = 1; + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + } +#endif /* Check if it is anon DH */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) { ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + } + else + { + skip = 1; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + } +#else } else skip=1; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; +#endif s->init_num=0; break; @@ -423,6 +451,13 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) } else { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else +#endif + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; } s->init_num=0; @@ -431,6 +466,24 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s) break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: + ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: + ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; +#endif + case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: @@ -541,8 +594,14 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s) buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { + SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) || +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + !sess->session_id_length || +#else + (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || +#endif (s->session->not_resumable)) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) @@ -621,7 +680,15 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s) *(p++)=comp->id; } *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */ - + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } +#endif + l=(p-d); d=buf; --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/d1_srvr.c.orig 2008-09-14 14:02:01.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/d1_srvr.c 2011-08-03 16:08:51.000000000 +0000 @@ -267,7 +267,6 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->new_session = 2; if ( s->d1->send_cookie) s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; @@ -284,6 +283,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) if ( ret <= 0) goto end; s->d1->send_cookie = 0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + s->new_session = 0; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; /* HelloVerifyRequests resets Finished MAC */ @@ -293,11 +293,22 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: + s->new_session = 2; ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->hit) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + { + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + } +#else + if (s->hit) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; +#endif else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; s->init_num=0; @@ -310,10 +321,23 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) { ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + } + else + { + skip = 1; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + } +#else } else skip=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; +#endif s->init_num=0; break; @@ -474,11 +498,34 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) s->state=SSL_ST_OK; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; +#endif else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: + ret=dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: + ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + +#endif + case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: @@ -713,6 +760,8 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s) p+=sl; /* put the cipher */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) + return -1; i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); p+=i; @@ -726,6 +775,14 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s) *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } +#endif + /* do the header */ l=(p-d); d=buf; @@ -1145,3 +1202,116 @@ int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } + + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) + { + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) + { + unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; + int len, slen; + unsigned int hlen, msg_len; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; + HMAC_CTX hctx; + SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char key_name[16]; + + /* get session encoding length */ + slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); + /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is + * too long + */ + if (slen > 0xFF00) + return -1; + /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as + * follows 12 (DTLS handshake message header) + + * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session + * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). + */ + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) + return -1; + senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); + if (!senc) + return -1; + p = senc; + i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); + + p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); + HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); + /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present + * it does all the work otherwise use generated values + * from parent ctx. + */ + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) + { + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, + &hctx, 1) < 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(senc); + return -1; + } + } + else + { + RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); + memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); + } + l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); + /* Skip ticket length for now */ + p += 2; + /* Output key name */ + macstart = p; + memcpy(p, key_name, 16); + p += 16; + /* output IV */ + memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); + p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); + /* Encrypt session data */ + EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); + p += len; + EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); + p += len; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + + HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); + HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + + p += hlen; + /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ + /* Total length */ + len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data); + /* Ticket length */ + p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4; + s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p); + + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num= len; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; + s->init_off=0; + OPENSSL_free(senc); + + /* XDTLS: set message header ? */ + msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data, + SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, msg_len); + + /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ + dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ + return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } +#endif --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/s3_both.c.orig 2005-04-26 16:02:39.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/s3_both.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ #include <limits.h> #include <string.h> +#include <assert.h> #include <stdio.h> #include "ssl_locl.h" #include <openssl/buffer.h> @@ -168,6 +169,23 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, in p+=i; l=i; + /* Copy the finished so we can use it for + renegotiation checks */ + if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) + { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i; + } + else + { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, + s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i; + } + #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16 /* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless * I do this. @@ -232,6 +250,23 @@ int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int goto f_err; } + /* Copy the finished so we can use it for + renegotiation checks */ + if(s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT) + { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i; + } + else + { + OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i; + } + return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/s3_clnt.c.orig 2009-01-07 10:48:23.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -144,9 +144,6 @@ static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver); static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s); -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id); @@ -855,7 +852,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions*/ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) { @@ -1738,6 +1735,28 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) } memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; + /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion. + * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server + * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal + * client session ID matching to work and we know much + * earlier that the ticket has been accepted. + * + * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the + * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine + * session resumption. + * + * We choose the former approach because this fits in with + * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set + * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the + * ticket. + */ + EVP_Digest(p, ticklen, + s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 + EVP_sha256(), NULL); +#else + EVP_sha1(), NULL); +#endif ret=1; return(ret); @@ -2697,7 +2716,7 @@ static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) +int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) { int ok; long n; --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/s3_pkt.c.orig 2008-10-10 10:41:32.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -1021,6 +1021,25 @@ start: goto start; } + /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't + * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. + * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) + */ + if (s->server && + SSL_is_init_finished(s) && + !s->s3->send_connection_binding && + (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && + (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && + (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && + (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && + !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) + + { + /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ + rr->length = 0; + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + goto start; + } if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; @@ -1050,6 +1069,21 @@ start: s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return(0); } + /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested + * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with + * a fatal alert because if application tried to + * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and + * expects it to succeed. + * + * In future we might have a renegotiation where we + * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. + */ + else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) + { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + goto f_err; + } } else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ { --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/s3_srvr.c.orig 2009-01-07 10:48:23.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -248,6 +248,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; } + else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && + !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) + { + /* Server attempting to renegotiate with + * client that doesn't support secure + * renegotiation. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ret = -1; + goto end; + } else { /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, @@ -952,7 +964,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions*/ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) { --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl.h.orig 2008-08-13 19:44:44.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl.h 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -485,6 +485,8 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG 0x00000001L #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG 0x00000002L +/* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */ +#define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0x00000004L #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L #define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x00000010L #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L @@ -513,6 +515,8 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st /* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */ #define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0x00010000L +/* Permit unsafe legacy renegotiation */ +#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */ #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */ @@ -561,17 +565,25 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st #define SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) +#define SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx,op) \ + SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) #define SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL) #define SSL_set_options(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) +#define SSL_clear_options(ssl,op) \ + SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) #define SSL_get_options(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL) +#define SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx,op) \ + SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL) #define SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL) +#define SSL_clear_mode(ssl,op) \ + SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL) #define SSL_set_mode(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL) #define SSL_get_mode(ssl) \ @@ -579,6 +591,8 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st #define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL) +#define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \ + SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL) void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); @@ -1269,6 +1283,10 @@ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL * #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB 72 #endif +#define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT 76 +#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS 77 +#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE 78 + #define SSL_session_reused(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED,0,NULL) #define SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) \ @@ -1742,9 +1760,11 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157 #define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158 #define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159 +#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 285 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 272 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 215 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 216 +#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 286 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 273 #define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD 160 #define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST 161 @@ -1786,6 +1806,10 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER 184 #define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185 #define SSL_F_SSL_NEW 186 +#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 287 +#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 290 +#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 289 +#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 291 #define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK 270 #define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 275 #define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 276 @@ -1952,6 +1976,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED 190 #define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE 191 #define SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY 192 +#define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION 319 #define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER 193 #define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK 194 #define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX 195 @@ -1979,10 +2004,14 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH 213 #define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE 214 #define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL 298 +#define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG 320 +#define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR 321 +#define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH 322 #define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING 215 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO 216 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO 217 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO 218 +#define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING 324 #define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 224 #define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277 #define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219 @@ -2052,6 +2081,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE 253 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION 254 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE 255 +#define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 323 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 256 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 257 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE 315 --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl3.h.orig 2007-10-12 00:00:30.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl3.h 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ extern "C" { #endif + +/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */ +#define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF + #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002 #define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003 @@ -440,6 +444,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st int cert_request; } tmp; + /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */ + unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char previous_client_finished_len; + unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char previous_server_finished_len; + int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */ } SSL3_STATE; --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_asn1.c.orig 2008-09-14 13:42:40.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_asn1.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION ((unsigned long)os.data[1]<< 8L)| (unsigned long)os.data[2]; } - else if ((ssl_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) + else if ((ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { if (os.length != 2) { @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION ret->cipher_id=id; M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); - if ((ssl_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) + if ((ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) i=SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; else /* if (ssl_version>>8 == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) */ i=SSL2_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_err.c.orig 2008-08-13 19:44:44.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_err.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -171,9 +171,11 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES), "SSL3_WRITE_BYTES"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING), "SSL3_WRITE_PENDING"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK), "SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK), "SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD), "SSL_BAD_METHOD"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST"}, @@ -215,6 +217,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER), "SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE), "SSL_load_client_CA_file"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEW), "SSL_new"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"}, +{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK), "SSL_peek"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"}, {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"}, @@ -384,6 +390,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED),"no private key assigned"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE),"no protocols available"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY) ,"no publickey"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION) ,"no renegotiation"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER) ,"no shared cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK) ,"no verify callback"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX) ,"null ssl ctx"}, @@ -411,10 +418,14 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH),"record length mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE) ,"record too large"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL) ,"record too small"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG),"renegotiate ext too long"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR),"renegotiation encoding err"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH),"renegotiation mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING),"required cipher missing"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cert length not zero"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cert type not zero"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cipher list not zero"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING),"scsv received when renegotiating"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT) ,"serverhello tlsext"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),"session id context uninitialized"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ) ,"short read"}, @@ -484,6 +495,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE),"unknown remote error type"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION) ,"unknown ssl version"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE) ,"unknown state"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED),"unsafe legacy renegotiation disabled"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER) ,"unsupported cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),"unsupported compression algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE),"unsupported elliptic curve"}, --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_lib.c.orig 2008-06-16 16:56:42.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -984,8 +984,12 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,v case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return(s->options|=larg); + case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: + return(s->options&=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return(s->mode|=larg); + case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: + return(s->mode &=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return(s->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: @@ -999,6 +1003,10 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,v return larg; } return 0; + case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: + if (s->s3) + return s->s3->send_connection_binding; + else return 0; default: return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg)); } @@ -1085,8 +1093,12 @@ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,l return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return(ctx->options|=larg); + case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: + return(ctx->options&=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return(ctx->mode|=larg); + case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: + return(ctx->mode&=~larg); default: return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg)); } @@ -1283,6 +1295,22 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STAC j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p); p+=j; } + /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise + * add SCSV if not renegotiating. + */ + if (p != q && !s->new_session) + { + static SSL_CIPHER scsv = + { + 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + }; + j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p); + p+=j; +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n"); +#endif + } + return(p-q); } @@ -1293,6 +1321,9 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; int i,n; + + if (s->s3) + s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); if ((num%n) != 0) { @@ -1309,6 +1340,26 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe for (i=0; i<num; i+=n) { + /* Check for SCSV */ + if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) && + (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && + (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) + { + /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ + if (s->new_session) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; + p += n; +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n"); +#endif + continue; + } + c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p); p+=n; if (c != NULL) @@ -1523,6 +1574,10 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; #endif + /* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely + * deployed might change this. + */ + ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ret->client_cert_engine = NULL; --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_locl.h.orig 2009-01-05 14:43:07.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -868,6 +868,7 @@ void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw); long dtls1_default_timeout(void); SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u); +int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s); @@ -885,6 +886,9 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s); int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s); int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s); +#endif int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s); int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s); @@ -968,6 +972,7 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL * int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); + #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 #define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha1 #else @@ -977,6 +982,15 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret); EVP_MD_CTX* ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) ; void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash); + +int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, + int maxlen); +int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, + int *al); +int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, + int maxlen); +int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, + int *al); #endif #endif --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_sess.c.orig 2008-06-04 18:35:27.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_sess.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigne p=buf; l=ret->cipher_id; l2n(l,p); - if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) + if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2])); else ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1])); --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_stat.c.orig 2008-04-29 16:38:26.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_stat.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -198,6 +198,12 @@ case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="SSLv case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2/v3 read client hello B"; break; #endif +/* DTLS */ +case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DTLS1 read hello verify request A"; break; +case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DTLS1 read hello verify request B"; break; +case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DTLS1 write hello verify request A"; break; +case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DTLS1 write hello verify request B"; break; + default: str="unknown state"; break; } return(str); @@ -345,6 +351,11 @@ case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: str="23 case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="23RCHA"; break; case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: str="23RCHB"; break; #endif +/* DTLS */ +case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DRCHVA"; break; +case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DRCHVB"; break; +case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DWCHVA"; break; +case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DWCHVB"; break; default: str="UNKWN "; break; } --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_txt.c.orig 2007-08-12 18:59:03.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_txt.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -91,6 +91,10 @@ int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL s="SSLv3"; else if (x->ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION) s="TLSv1"; + else if (x->ssl_version == DTLS1_VERSION) + s="DTLSv1"; + else if (x->ssl_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + s="DTLSv1-bad"; else s="unknown"; if (BIO_printf(bp," Protocol : %s\n",s) <= 0) goto err; --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/t1_lib.c.orig 2008-09-03 22:13:04.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/t1_lib.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -133,6 +133,11 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex int extdatalen=0; unsigned char *ret = p; + /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ + if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION + && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) + return p; + ret+=2; if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ @@ -169,11 +174,36 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex ret+=size_str; } + + /* Add RI if renegotiating */ + if (s->new_session) + { + int el; + + if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + + if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; + + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); + s2n(el,ret); + + if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + + ret += el; + } if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { int ticklen; - if (s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) + if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; else ticklen = 0; @@ -191,7 +221,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex } } - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) + if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && + s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { int i; long extlen, idlen, itmp; @@ -251,6 +282,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex int extdatalen=0; unsigned char *ret = p; + /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) + return p; + ret+=2; if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ @@ -262,6 +297,31 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex s2n(0,ret); } + + if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) + { + int el; + + if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + + if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; + + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); + s2n(el,ret); + + if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + + ret += el; + } + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { @@ -290,15 +350,17 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned short size; unsigned short len; unsigned char *data = *p; + int renegotiate_seen = 0; s->servername_done = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = -1; if (data >= (d+n-2)) - return 1; + goto ri_check; + n2s(data,len); if (data > (d+n-len)) - return 1; + goto ri_check; while (data <= (d+n-4)) { @@ -306,7 +368,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, n2s(data,size); if (data+size > (d+n)) - return 1; + goto ri_check; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, @@ -407,8 +469,14 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, } } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request - && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) + { + if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) + return 0; + renegotiate_seen = 1; + } + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && + s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { if (size < 5) @@ -511,8 +579,21 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, data+=size; } - *p = data; + + ri_check: + + /* Need RI if renegotiating */ + + if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session && + !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) + { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + return 0; + } + return 1; } @@ -524,9 +605,10 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *data = *p; int tlsext_servername = 0; + int renegotiate_seen = 0; if (data >= (d+n-2)) - return 1; + goto ri_check; n2s(data,len); @@ -536,7 +618,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, n2s(data,size); if (data+size > (d+n)) - return 1; + goto ri_check; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, @@ -561,7 +643,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, } s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && + s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested * a status request message. @@ -574,7 +657,12 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; } - + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) + { + if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) + return 0; + renegotiate_seen = 1; + } data+=size; } @@ -606,6 +694,26 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, } *p = data; + + ri_check: + + /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to + * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server + * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an + * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server + * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI + * absence on initial connect only. + */ + if (!renegotiate_seen + && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) + && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) + { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + return 0; + } + return 1; } --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/t1_reneg.c.orig 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/t1_reneg.c 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,292 @@ + /* ssl/t1_reneg.c */ + /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + /* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2009 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + #include <stdio.h> + #include <assert.h> + #include <openssl/objects.h> + #include "ssl_locl.h" + + /* Add the client's renegotiation binding */ + int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, + int maxlen) + { + if(p) + { + if((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len+1) > maxlen) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + + /* Length byte */ + *p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len; + p++; + + memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len); +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension sent by client\n", + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len ? "Non-empty" : "Empty"); +#endif + } + + *len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + 1; + + return 1; + } + + /* Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not + right */ + int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, + int *al) + { + int ilen; + + /* Parse the length byte */ + if(len < 1) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); + *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return 0; + } + ilen = *d; + d++; + + /* Consistency check */ + if((ilen+1) != len) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); + *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return 0; + } + + /* Check that the extension matches */ + if(ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); + *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + return 0; + } + + if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); + *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + return 0; + } +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension received by server\n", + ilen ? "Non-empty" : "Empty"); +#endif + + s->s3->send_connection_binding=1; + + return 1; + } + + /* Add the server's renegotiation binding */ + int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, + int maxlen) + { + if(p) + { + if((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1) > maxlen) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + + /* Length byte */ + *p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len; + p++; + + memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len); + p += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len; + + memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_server_finished, + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len); +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension sent by server\n", + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len ? "Non-empty" : "Empty"); +#endif + } + + *len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1; + + return 1; + } + + /* Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not + right */ + int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len, + int *al) + { + int expected_len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len; + int ilen; + + /* Check for logic errors */ + OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len); + OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len); + + /* Parse the length byte */ + if(len < 1) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); + *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return 0; + } + ilen = *d; + d++; + + /* Consistency check */ + if(ilen+1 != len) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); + *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return 0; + } + + /* Check that the extension matches */ + if(ilen != expected_len) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); + *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + return 0; + } + + if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); + *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + return 0; + } + d += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len; + + if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_server_finished, + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); + *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return 0; + } + +#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension received by client\n", + ilen ? "Non-empty" : "Empty"); +#endif + s->s3->send_connection_binding=1; + return 1; + } --- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/tls1.h.orig 2008-04-30 16:11:33.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/tls1.h 2011-08-03 16:02:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ extern "C" { #define TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats 11 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket 35 +/* Temporary extension type */ +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01 + /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */ #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 /* status request value from RFC 3546 */
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