File openssl-CVE-2014-3571.patch of Package openssl.3233

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File openssl-CVE-2014-3571.patch of Package openssl.3233

commit 45fe66b8ba026186aa5d8ef1e0e6010ea74d5c0b
Author: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date:   Sat Jan 3 00:54:35 2015 +0000

Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source
    of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
    occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
    dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
    
    Reviewed-by: Dr Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>

commit 8d7aab986b499f34d9e1bc58fbfd77f05c38116e
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Date:   Sat Jan 3 00:45:13 2015 +0000

Fix crash in dtls1_get_record whilst in the listen state where you get two
    separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
    handshake record.
    
    CVE-2014-3571
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index d717260..73ce488 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -676,7 +676,8 @@ again:
 		 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
 		 */
 		if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
-		    *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+		    s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
+		    s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
 		    !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
 			{
 			rr->length = 0;
diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index edd17df..d717260 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -642,8 +642,6 @@ again:
 		/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
 		i=rr->length;
 		n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
-		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
-
 		/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
 		if ( n != i)
 			{
diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index d1cd752..1ec9e6e 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
 	 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
 	if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		{
+		if (left == 0 && extend)
+			return 0;
 		if (left > 0 && n > left)
 			n = left;
 		}

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