Sign Up
Log In
Log In
or
Sign Up
Places
All Projects
Status Monitor
Collapse sidebar
Please login to access the resource
SUSE:SLE-12-SP2:Update
qemu-linux-user
0259-nbd-server-CVE-2017-15119-Reject-op.patch
Overview
Repositories
Revisions
Requests
Users
Attributes
Meta
File 0259-nbd-server-CVE-2017-15119-Reject-op.patch of Package qemu-linux-user
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 16:25:16 -0600 Subject: nbd/server: CVE-2017-15119 Reject options larger than 32M The NBD spec gives us permission to abruptly disconnect on clients that send outrageously large option requests, rather than having to spend the time reading to the end of the option. No real option request requires that much data anyways; and meanwhile, we already have the practice of abruptly dropping the connection on any client that sends NBD_CMD_WRITE with a payload larger than 32M. For comparison, nbdkit drops the connection on any request with more than 4096 bytes; however, that limit is probably too low (as the NBD spec states an export name can theoretically be up to 4096 bytes, which means a valid NBD_OPT_INFO could be even longer) - even if qemu doesn't permit exports longer than 256 bytes. It could be argued that a malicious client trying to get us to read nearly 4G of data on a bad request is a form of denial of service. In particular, if the server requires TLS, but a client that does not know the TLS credentials sends any option (other than NBD_OPT_STARTTLS or NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME) with a stated payload of nearly 4G, then the server was keeping the connection alive trying to read all the payload, tying up resources that it would rather be spending on a client that can get past the TLS handshake. Hence, this warranted a CVE. Present since at least 2.5 when handling known options, and made worse in 2.6 when fixing support for NBD_FLAG_C_FIXED_NEWSTYLE to handle unknown options. CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit fdad35ef6c5839d50dfc14073364ac893afebc30) [LY: BSC#1070144 CVE-2017-15119] Signed-off-by: Liang Yan <lyan@suse.com> --- nbd/server.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c index a9419428733e9174e5fd88b24c43..f1f596124271c560b113313d4bd7 100644 --- a/nbd/server.c +++ b/nbd/server.c @@ -431,6 +431,12 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_options(NBDClient *client) } length = be32_to_cpu(length); + if (length > NBD_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE) { + LOG("len (%" PRIu32" ) is larger than max len (%u)", + length, NBD_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE); + return -EINVAL; + } + TRACE("Checking option 0x%" PRIx32, clientflags); if (client->tlscreds && client->ioc == (QIOChannel *)client->sioc) {
Locations
Projects
Search
Status Monitor
Help
OpenBuildService.org
Documentation
API Documentation
Code of Conduct
Contact
Support
@OBShq
Terms
openSUSE Build Service is sponsored by
The Open Build Service is an
openSUSE project
.
Sign Up
Log In
Places
Places
All Projects
Status Monitor