File 0240-9pfs-local-open2-don-t-follow-symli.patch of Package qemu-linux-user.12301

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File 0240-9pfs-local-open2-don-t-follow-symli.patch of Package qemu-linux-user.12301

From 34d3216a5da1fabf953fefda1aa3cc441414297d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2017 23:45:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: local: open2: don't follow symlinks

The local_open2() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:

(1) open() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
    rightmost one
(2) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
    path elements
(3) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
    mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
    elements but the rightmost one
(4) local_post_create_passthrough() which calls in turn lchown() and
    chmod(), both functions also following symbolic links

This patch converts local_open2() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
mkdirat() to fix (1), as well as local_set_xattrat(),
local_set_mapped_file_attrat() and local_set_cred_passthrough() to
fix (2), (3) and (4) respectively. Since local_open2() already opens
a descriptor to the target file, local_set_cred_passthrough() is
modified to reuse it instead of opening a new one.

The mapped and mapped-file security modes are supposed to be identical,
except for the place where credentials and file modes are stored. While
here, we also make that explicit by sharing the call to openat().

This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a565fea56546e254b7610305b07711f0a3bda0c7)
[BR: Fix and/or infrastructure for BSC#1020427 CVE-2016-9602]
Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
---
 hw/9pfs/9p-local.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++------------------------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)

diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
index 4de1874b34..c333092230 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
@@ -883,62 +883,45 @@ static int local_fstat(FsContext *fs_ctx, int fid_type,
 static int local_open2(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path, const char *name,
                        int flags, FsCred *credp, V9fsFidOpenState *fs)
 {
-    char *path;
     int fd = -1;
     int err = -1;
-    int serrno = 0;
-    V9fsString fullname;
-    char *buffer = NULL;
+    int dirfd;
 
     /*
      * Mark all the open to not follow symlinks
      */
     flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
 
-    v9fs_string_init(&fullname);
-    v9fs_string_sprintf(&fullname, "%s/%s", dir_path->data, name);
-    path = fullname.data;
+    dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(fs_ctx, dir_path->data);
+    if (dirfd == -1) {
+        return -1;
+    }
 
     /* Determine the security model */
-    if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED) {
-        buffer = rpath(fs_ctx, path);
-        fd = open(buffer, flags, SM_LOCAL_MODE_BITS);
+    if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED ||
+        fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE) {
+        fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, flags, SM_LOCAL_MODE_BITS);
         if (fd == -1) {
-            err = fd;
             goto out;
         }
         credp->fc_mode = credp->fc_mode|S_IFREG;
-        /* Set cleint credentials in xattr */
-        err = local_set_xattr(buffer, credp);
-        if (err == -1) {
-            serrno = errno;
-            goto err_end;
-        }
-    } else if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE) {
-        buffer = rpath(fs_ctx, path);
-        fd = open(buffer, flags, SM_LOCAL_MODE_BITS);
-        if (fd == -1) {
-            err = fd;
-            goto out;
+        if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED) {
+            /* Set cleint credentials in xattr */
+            err = local_set_xattrat(dirfd, name, credp);
+        } else {
+            err = local_set_mapped_file_attrat(dirfd, name, credp);
         }
-        credp->fc_mode = credp->fc_mode|S_IFREG;
-        /* Set client credentials in .virtfs_metadata directory files */
-        err = local_set_mapped_file_attr(fs_ctx, path, credp);
         if (err == -1) {
-            serrno = errno;
             goto err_end;
         }
     } else if ((fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_PASSTHROUGH) ||
                (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_NONE)) {
-        buffer = rpath(fs_ctx, path);
-        fd = open(buffer, flags, credp->fc_mode);
+        fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, flags, credp->fc_mode);
         if (fd == -1) {
-            err = fd;
             goto out;
         }
-        err = local_post_create_passthrough(fs_ctx, path, credp);
+        err = local_set_cred_passthrough(fs_ctx, dirfd, name, credp);
         if (err == -1) {
-            serrno = errno;
             goto err_end;
         }
     }
@@ -947,12 +930,11 @@ static int local_open2(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path, const char *name,
     goto out;
 
 err_end:
-    close(fd);
-    remove(buffer);
-    errno = serrno;
+    unlinkat_preserve_errno(dirfd, name,
+                            flags & O_DIRECTORY ? AT_REMOVEDIR : 0);
+    close_preserve_errno(fd);
 out:
-    g_free(buffer);
-    v9fs_string_free(&fullname);
+    close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
     return err;
 }

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File 0240-9pfs-local-open2-don-t-follow-symli.patch of Package qemu-linux-user.12301

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