File U_dix_integer_overflow_in_REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE.patch of Package tigervnc.407

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File U_dix_integer_overflow_in_REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE.patch of Package tigervnc.407

Subject: dix: integer overflow in REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE()
References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8092
Patch-Mainline: Upstream
Signed-off-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>

Force use of 64-bit integers when evaluating data provided by clients
in 32-bit fields which can overflow when added or multiplied during
checks.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
 include/dix.h |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/dix.h b/include/dix.h
index 991a3ce..e0c6ed8 100644
--- a/include/dix.h
+++ b/include/dix.h
@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ SOFTWARE.
 
 #define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\
     if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \
-        (((sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != client->req_len)) \
+        ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \
+        ((((uint64_t) sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != (uint64_t) client->req_len))  \
          return(BadLength)
 
 #define LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(id,client)\
-- 
1.7.9.2

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File U_dix_integer_overflow_in_REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE.patch of Package tigervnc.407

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