File CVE-2018-10839-qemuu-ne2000-integer-overflow-le... of Package xen.14030

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File CVE-2018-10839-qemuu-ne2000-integer-overflow-leads-to-buffer-overflow-issue.patch of Package xen.14030

References: bsc#1110924 CVE-2018-10839

In ne2000_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts
from size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater
INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass
the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access of
for both buf and buf1.

Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t.

CC: address@hidden
Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <address@hidden>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <address@hidden>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
---
 hw/net/ne2000.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Index: xen-4.5.5-testing/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/net/ne2000.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.5.5-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/net/ne2000.c
+++ xen-4.5.5-testing/tools/qemu-xen-dir-remote/hw/net/ne2000.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ int ne2000_can_receive(NetClientState *n
 ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
 {
     NE2000State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
-    int size = size_;
+    size_t size = size_;
     uint8_t *p;
     unsigned int total_len, next, avail, len, index, mcast_idx;
     uint8_t buf1[60];
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *n
         { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
 
 #if defined(DEBUG_NE2000)
-    printf("NE2000: received len=%d\n", size);
+    printf("NE2000: received len=%zu\n", size);
 #endif
 
     if (s->cmd & E8390_STOP || ne2000_buffer_full(s))

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File CVE-2018-10839-qemuu-ne2000-integer-overflow-leads-to-buffer-overflow-issue.patch of Package xen.14030

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