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SUSE:SLE-12-SP5:GA
python3.35772
CVE-2019-9947-no-ctrl-char-http.patch
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File CVE-2019-9947-no-ctrl-char-http.patch of Package python3.35772
--- Lib/http/client.py | 15 +++ Lib/test/test_urllib.py | 50 ++++++++++ Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py | 10 +- Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-36276.51E-DA.rst | 1 4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/Lib/http/client.py +++ b/Lib/http/client.py @@ -246,6 +246,16 @@ _MAXHEADERS = 100 _is_legal_header_name = re.compile(rb'[^:\s][^:\r\n]*').fullmatch _is_illegal_header_value = re.compile(rb'\n(?![ \t])|\r(?![ \t\n])').search +# These characters are not allowed within HTTP URL paths. +# See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.3 and the +# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#appendix-A pchar definition. +# Prevents CVE-2019-9740. Includes control characters such as \r\n. +# We don't restrict chars above \x7f as putrequest() limits us to ASCII. +_contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x20\x7f]') +# Arguably only these _should_ allowed: +# _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$") +# We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes. + # We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some # servers will otherwise respond with a 411 _METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'} @@ -1008,6 +1018,11 @@ class HTTPConnection: self._method = method if not url: url = '/' + # Prevent CVE-2019-9740. + match = _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(url) + if match: + raise InvalidURL(("URL can't contain control characters. {!r} " + + "(found at least {!r})").format(url, match.group)) request = '%s %s %s' % (method, url, self._http_vsn_str) # Non-ASCII characters should have been eliminated earlier --- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py +++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py @@ -305,6 +305,56 @@ class urlopen_HttpTests(unittest.TestCas finally: self.unfakehttp() + def test_url_with_control_char_rejected(self): + for char_no in list(range(0, 0x21)) + [0x7f]: + char = chr(char_no) + schemeless_url = "//localhost:7777/test{}/".format(char) + self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.") + try: + # We explicitly test urllib.request.urlopen() instead of + # the top level 'def urlopen()' function defined in + # this... (quite ugly) test suite. They use different + # url opening codepaths. Plain urlopen uses + # FancyURLOpener which goes via a codepath that calls + # urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the + # above attempts at injection within the url _path_ + # safe. + escaped_char_repr = repr(char).replace('\\', r'\\') + with self.assertRaisesRegex( + http.client.InvalidURL, "contain control"): + urllib.request.urlopen("http:{}".format(schemeless_url)) + with self.assertRaisesRegex( + http.client.InvalidURL, "contain control"): + urllib.request.urlopen("https:{}".format(schemeless_url)) + # This code path quotes the URL so there is no injection. + resp = urlopen("http:{}".format(schemeless_url)) + self.assertNotIn(char, resp.geturl()) + finally: + self.unfakehttp() + + def test_url_with_newline_header_injection_rejected(self): + self.fakehttp(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nHello.") + host = "localhost:7777?a=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nX-injected: header\r\nTEST: 123" + schemeless_url = "//" + host + ":8080/test/?test=a" + try: + # We explicitly test urllib.request.urlopen() instead of the top + # level 'def urlopen()' function defined in this... (quite ugly) + # test suite. they use different url opening codepaths. plain + # urlopen uses FancyURLOpener which goes via a codepath that + # calls urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the + # above attempts at injection within the url _path_ safe. + with self.assertRaisesRegex(http.client.InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\r"): + urllib.request.urlopen("http:{}".format(schemeless_url)) + with self.assertRaisesRegex(http.client.InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\n"): + urllib.request.urlopen("http:{}".format(schemeless_url)) + # This code path quotes the URL so there is no injection. + resp = urlopen("http:{}".format(schemeless_url)) + self.assertNotIn(' ', resp.geturl()) + self.assertNotIn('\r', resp.geturl()) + self.assertNotIn('\n', resp.geturl()) + finally: + self.unfakehttp() + def test_read_0_9(self): # "0.9" response accepted (but not "simple responses" without # a status line) --- a/Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py +++ b/Lib/test/test_xmlrpc.py @@ -709,9 +709,13 @@ class SimpleServerTestCase(BaseServerTes def test_partial_post(self): # Check that a partial POST doesn't make the server loop: issue #14001. - conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(ADDR, PORT) - conn.request('POST', '/RPC2 HTTP/1.0\r\nContent-Length: 100\r\n\r\nbye') - conn.close() + with contextlib.closing(socket.create_connection((ADDR, PORT))) as conn: + conn.send(('POST /RPC2 HTTP/1.0\r\n' + + 'Content-Length: 100\r\n\r\n' + + 'bye HTTP/1.1\r\n' + + 'Host: {}:{}\r\n'.format(ADDR,PORT) + + 'Accept-Encoding: identity\r\n' + + 'Content-Length: 0\r\n\r\n').encode('ascii')) class MultiPathServerTestCase(BaseServerTestCase): --- /dev/null +++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-36276.51E-DA.rst @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +Address CVE-2019-9740 by disallowing URL paths with embedded whitespace or control characters through into the underlying http client request. Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause a InvalidURL to be raised. \ No newline at end of file
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