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libgcrypt.2574
v10-0001-SP800-90A-Deterministic-Random-Bit-Gen...
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File v10-0001-SP800-90A-Deterministic-Random-Bit-Generator.patch of Package libgcrypt.2574
From d1e3e61b0133cb5772971653da4ddbc9312c6696 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2014 02:39:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH v10] SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator This is a clean-room implementation of the DRBG defined in SP800-90A. All three viable DRBGs defined in the standard are implemented: * HMAC: This is the leanest DRBG and compiled per default * Hash: The more complex DRBG can be enabled at compile time * CTR: The most complex DRBG can also be enabled at compile time The DRBG implementation offers the following: * All three DRBG types are implemented with a derivation function. * All DRBG types are available with and without prediction resistance. * All SHA types of SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 are available for * the HMAC and Hash DRBGs. * All AES types of AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 are available for the * CTR DRBG. * A self test is implemented with drbg_healthcheck(). * The FIPS 140-2 continuous self test is implemented. * Additional cipher primitives, such as Serpent or Twofish, can be * added to the DRBG without changing the implementation. The only * change necessary is to the DRBG definition given in the cores[] * array. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> --- random/Makefile.am | 1 + random/drbg.c | 2303 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ random/rand-internal.h | 9 + random/random.c | 33 +- random/random.h | 22 + src/gcrypt.h.in | 109 ++- src/global.c | 22 + 7 files changed, 2488 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) create mode 100644 random/drbg.c Index: libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/Makefile.am =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.6.1.orig/random/Makefile.am 2013-12-16 18:44:32.000000000 +0100 +++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/Makefile.am 2014-12-15 17:29:44.286836294 +0100 @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ random.c random.h \ rand-internal.h \ random-csprng.c \ random-fips.c \ +drbg.c \ random-system.c \ rndhw.c Index: libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/drbg.c =================================================================== --- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/drbg.c 2014-12-15 17:29:44.287836306 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,2303 @@ +/* + * DRBG: Deterministic Random Bits Generator + * Based on NIST Recommended DRBG from NIST SP800-90A with the following + * properties: + * * CTR DRBG with DF with AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 cores + * * Hash DRBG with DF with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 cores + * * HMAC DRBG with DF with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 cores + * * with and without prediction resistance + * + * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2014 + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, + * including the disclaimer of warranties. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote + * products derived from this software without specific prior + * written permission. + * + * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of + * LGPLv2+, in which case the provisions of the LGPL are + * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is + * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the LGPL and + * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF + * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE + * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH + * DAMAGE. + * + * + * gcry_control GCRYCTL_DRBG_REINIT + * ================================ + * This control request re-initializes the DRBG completely, i.e. the entire + * state of the DRBG is zeroized (with two exceptions listed in + * GCRYCTL_DRBG_SET_ENTROPY). + * + * The control request takes the following values which influences how the DRBG + * is re-initialized: + * * u32 flags: This variable specifies the DRBG type to be used for the + * next initialization. If set to 0, the previous DRBG type is + * used for the initialization. The DRBG type is an OR of the + * mandatory flags of the requested DRBG strength and DRBG + * cipher type. Optionally, the prediction resistance flag + * can be ORed into the flags variable. For example: + * - CTR-DRBG with AES-128 without prediction resistance: + * DRBG_CTRAES128 + * - HMAC-DRBG with SHA-512 with prediction resistance: + * DRBG_HMACSHA512 | DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST + * * struct gcry_drbg_string *pers: personalization string to be used for + * initialization. + * The variable of flags is independent from the pers/perslen variables. If + * flags is set to 0 and perslen is set to 0, the current DRBG type is + * completely reset without using a personalization string. + * + * DRBG Usage + * ========== + * The SP 800-90A DRBG allows the user to specify a personalization string + * for initialization as well as an additional information string for each + * random number request. The following code fragments show how a caller + * uses the kernel crypto API to use the full functionality of the DRBG. + * + * Usage without any additional data + * --------------------------------- + * gcry_randomize(outbuf, OUTLEN, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); + * + * + * Usage with personalization string during initialization + * ------------------------------------------------------- + * struct gcry_drbg_string pers; + * char personalization[11] = "some-string"; + * + * gcry_drbg_string_fill(&pers, personalization, strlen(personalization)); + * // The reset completely re-initializes the DRBG with the provided + * // personalization string without changing the DRBG type + * ret = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DRBG_REINIT, 0, &pers); + * gcry_randomize(outbuf, OUTLEN, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); + * + * + * Usage with additional information string during random number request + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * struct gcry_drbg_string addtl; + * char addtl_string[11] = "some-string"; + * + * gcry_drbg_string_fill(&addtl, addtl_string, strlen(addtl_string)); + * // The following call is a wrapper to gcry_randomize() and returns + * // the same error codes. + * gcry_randomize_drbg(outbuf, OUTLEN, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM, &addtl); + * + * + * Usage with personalization and additional information strings + * ------------------------------------------------------------- + * Just mix both scenarios above. + * + * + * Switch the DRBG type to some other type + * --------------------------------------- + * // Switch to CTR DRBG AES-128 without prediction resistance + * ret = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DRBG_REINIT, DRBG_NOPR_CTRAES128, NULL); + * gcry_randomize(outbuf, OUTLEN, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); + */ + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <asm/types.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +#include <config.h> + +#include "g10lib.h" +#include "random.h" +#include "rand-internal.h" +#include "../cipher/bithelp.h" + +/****************************************************************** + * Common data structures + ******************************************************************/ + +struct gcry_drbg_state; + +struct gcry_drbg_core +{ + u32 flags; /* flags for the cipher */ + ushort statelen; /* maximum state length */ + ushort blocklen_bytes; /* block size of output in bytes */ + int backend_cipher; /* libgcrypt backend cipher */ +}; + +struct gcry_drbg_state_ops +{ + gpg_err_code_t (*update) (struct gcry_drbg_state * drbg, + struct gcry_drbg_string * seed, int reseed); + gpg_err_code_t (*generate) (struct gcry_drbg_state * drbg, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen, + struct gcry_drbg_string * addtl); +}; + +/* DRBG test data */ +struct gcry_drbg_test_data +{ + struct gcry_drbg_string *testentropy; /* TEST PARAMETER: test entropy */ + int fail_seed_source:1; /* if set, the seed function will return an error */ +}; + + +struct gcry_drbg_state +{ + unsigned char *V; /* internal state 10.1.1.1 1a) */ + unsigned char *C; /* hash: static value 10.1.1.1 1b) + * hmac / ctr: key */ + size_t reseed_ctr; /* Number of RNG requests since last reseed -- + * 10.1.1.1 1c) */ + unsigned char *scratchpad; /* some memory the DRBG can use for its + * operation -- allocated during init */ + int seeded:1; /* DRBG fully seeded? */ + int pr:1; /* Prediction resistance enabled? */ + int fips_primed:1; /* Continuous test primed? */ + unsigned char *prev; /* previous output value of gcry_drbg_blocklen + * for FIPS 140-2 continuous test */ + /* Taken from libgcrypt ANSI X9.31 DRNG: We need to keep track of the + * process which did the initialization so that we can detect a fork. + * The volatile modifier is required so that the compiler does not + * optimize it away in case the getpid function is badly attributed. */ + pid_t seed_init_pid; + const struct gcry_drbg_state_ops *d_ops; + const struct gcry_drbg_core *core; + struct gcry_drbg_test_data *test_data; +}; + +enum gcry_drbg_prefixes +{ + DRBG_PREFIX0 = 0x00, + DRBG_PREFIX1, + DRBG_PREFIX2, + DRBG_PREFIX3 +}; + +#define ARRAY_SIZE(a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0])) + +/*************************************************************** + * Backend cipher definitions available to DRBG + ***************************************************************/ + +static const struct gcry_drbg_core gcry_drbg_cores[] = { + /* Hash DRBGs */ + {DRBG_HASHSHA1, 55, 20, GCRY_MD_SHA1}, + {DRBG_HASHSHA256, 55, 32, GCRY_MD_SHA256}, + {DRBG_HASHSHA384, 111, 48, GCRY_MD_SHA384}, + {DRBG_HASHSHA512, 111, 64, GCRY_MD_SHA512}, + /* HMAC DRBGs */ + {DRBG_HASHSHA1 | DRBG_HMAC, 20, 20, GCRY_MD_SHA1}, + {DRBG_HASHSHA256 | DRBG_HMAC, 32, 32, GCRY_MD_SHA256}, + {DRBG_HASHSHA384 | DRBG_HMAC, 48, 48, GCRY_MD_SHA384}, + {DRBG_HASHSHA512 | DRBG_HMAC, 64, 64, GCRY_MD_SHA512}, + /* block ciphers */ + {DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM128, 32, 16, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128}, + {DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM192, 40, 16, GCRY_CIPHER_AES192}, + {DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM256, 48, 16, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256}, +}; + +static gpg_err_code_t gcry_drbg_sym (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned char *outval, + const struct gcry_drbg_string *buf); +static gpg_err_code_t gcry_drbg_hmac (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned char *outval, + const struct gcry_drbg_string *buf); + +/****************************************************************** + ****************************************************************** + ****************************************************************** + * Generic DRBG code + ****************************************************************** + ****************************************************************** + ******************************************************************/ + +/****************************************************************** + * Generic helper functions + ******************************************************************/ + +#if 0 +#define dbg(x) do { log_debug x; } while(0) +#else +#define dbg(x) +#endif + +static inline ushort +gcry_drbg_statelen (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg) +{ + if (drbg && drbg->core) + return drbg->core->statelen; + return 0; +} + +static inline ushort +gcry_drbg_blocklen (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg) +{ + if (drbg && drbg->core) + return drbg->core->blocklen_bytes; + return 0; +} + +static inline ushort +gcry_drbg_keylen (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg) +{ + if (drbg && drbg->core) + return (drbg->core->statelen - drbg->core->blocklen_bytes); + return 0; +} + +static inline size_t +gcry_drbg_max_request_bytes (void) +{ + /* SP800-90A requires the limit 2**19 bits, but we return bytes */ + return (1 << 16); +} + +static inline size_t +gcry_drbg_max_addtl (void) +{ + /* SP800-90A requires 2**35 bytes additional info str / pers str */ +#ifdef __LP64__ + return (1UL << 35); +#else + /* + * SP800-90A allows smaller maximum numbers to be returned -- we + * return SIZE_MAX - 1 to allow the verification of the enforcement + * of this value in gcry_drbg_healthcheck_sanity. + */ + return (SIZE_MAX - 1); +#endif +} + +static inline size_t +gcry_drbg_max_requests (void) +{ + /* SP800-90A requires 2**48 maximum requests before reseeding */ +#ifdef __LP64__ + return (1UL << 48); +#else + return SIZE_MAX; +#endif +} + +/* + * Return strength of DRBG according to SP800-90A section 8.4 + * + * flags: DRBG flags reference + * + * Return: normalized strength value or 32 as a default to counter + * programming errors + */ +static inline unsigned short +gcry_drbg_sec_strength (u32 flags) +{ + if ((flags & DRBG_HASHSHA1) || (flags & DRBG_SYM128)) + return 16; + else if (flags & DRBG_SYM192) + return 24; + else if ((flags & DRBG_SYM256) || (flags & DRBG_HASHSHA256) || + (flags & DRBG_HASHSHA384) || (flags & DRBG_HASHSHA512)) + return 32; + else + return 32; +} + +/* + * FIPS 140-2 continuous self test + * The test is performed on the result of one round of the output + * function. Thus, the function implicitly knows the size of the + * buffer. + * + * @drbg DRBG handle + * @buf output buffer of random data to be checked + * + * return: + * false on error + * true on success + */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_fips_continuous_test (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + const unsigned char *buf) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + /* skip test if we test the overall system */ + if (drbg->test_data) + return 1; + /* only perform test in FIPS mode */ + if (0 == fips_mode ()) + return 1; + if (!drbg->fips_primed) + { + /* Priming of FIPS test */ + memcpy (drbg->prev, buf, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + drbg->fips_primed = 1; + /* return false due to priming, i.e. another round is needed */ + return 0; + } + ret = memcmp (drbg->prev, buf, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + memcpy (drbg->prev, buf, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + /* the test shall pass when the two compared values are not equal */ + return ret != 0; +} + +/* + * Convert an integer into a byte representation of this integer. + * The byte representation is big-endian + * + * @val value to be converted + * @buf buffer holding the converted integer -- caller must ensure that + * buffer size is at least 32 bit + */ +static inline void +gcry_drbg_cpu_to_be32 (u32 val, unsigned char *buf) +{ + struct s + { + u32 conv; + }; + struct s *conversion = (struct s *) buf; + + conversion->conv = be_bswap32 (val); +} + +static void +gcry_drbg_add_buf (unsigned char *dst, size_t dstlen, + unsigned char *add, size_t addlen) +{ + /* implied: dstlen > addlen */ + unsigned char *dstptr, *addptr; + unsigned int remainder = 0; + size_t len = addlen; + + dstptr = dst + (dstlen - 1); + addptr = add + (addlen - 1); + while (len) + { + remainder += *dstptr + *addptr; + *dstptr = remainder & 0xff; + remainder >>= 8; + len--; + dstptr--; + addptr--; + } + len = dstlen - addlen; + while (len && remainder > 0) + { + remainder = *dstptr + 1; + *dstptr = remainder & 0xff; + remainder >>= 8; + len--; + dstptr--; + } +} + +/* Helper variables for read_cb(). + * + * The _gcry_rnd*_gather_random interface does not allow to provide a + * data pointer. Thus we need to use a global variable for + * communication. However, the then required locking is anyway a good + * idea because it does not make sense to have several readers of (say + * /dev/random). It is easier to serve them one after the other. */ +static unsigned char *read_cb_buffer; /* The buffer. */ +static size_t read_cb_size; /* Size of the buffer. */ +static size_t read_cb_len; /* Used length. */ + +/* Callback for generating seed from kernel device. */ +static void +gcry_drbg_read_cb (const void *buffer, size_t length, + enum random_origins origin) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buffer; + + (void) origin; + gcry_assert (read_cb_buffer); + + /* Note that we need to protect against gatherers returning more + * than the requested bytes (e.g. rndw32). */ + while (length-- && read_cb_len < read_cb_size) + read_cb_buffer[read_cb_len++] = *p++; +} + +static inline int +gcry_drbg_get_entropy (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *buffer, + size_t len) +{ + int rc = 0; + + /* Perform testing as defined in 11.3.2 */ + if (drbg->test_data && drbg->test_data->fail_seed_source) + return -1; + + read_cb_buffer = buffer; + read_cb_size = len; + read_cb_len = 0; +#if USE_RNDLINUX + rc = _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (gcry_drbg_read_cb, 0, len, + GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM); +#elif USE_RNDUNIX + rc = _gcry_rndunix_gather_random (read_cb, 0, length, + GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM); +#elif USE_RNDW32 + do + { + rc = _gcry_rndw32_gather_random (read_cb, 0, length, + GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM); + } + while (rc >= 0 && read_cb_len < read_cb_size); +#else + rc = -1; +#endif + return rc; +} + +/****************************************************************** + * CTR DRBG callback functions + ******************************************************************/ + +/* BCC function for CTR DRBG as defined in 10.4.3 */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_ctr_bcc (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, + struct gcry_drbg_string *in) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; + struct gcry_drbg_string *curr = in; + size_t inpos = curr->len; + const unsigned char *pos = curr->buf; + struct gcry_drbg_string data; + + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data, out, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + + /* 10.4.3 step 1 */ + memset (out, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + + /* 10.4.3 step 2 / 4 */ + while (inpos) + { + short cnt = 0; + /* 10.4.3 step 4.1 */ + for (cnt = 0; cnt < gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg); cnt++) + { + out[cnt] ^= *pos; + pos++; + inpos--; + /* the following branch implements the linked list + * iteration. If we are at the end of the current data + * set, we have to start using the next data set if + * available -- the inpos value always points to the + * current byte and will be zero if we have processed + * the last byte of the last linked list member */ + if (0 == inpos) + { + curr = curr->next; + if (NULL != curr) + { + pos = curr->buf; + inpos = curr->len; + } + else + { + inpos = 0; + break; + } + } + } + /* 10.4.3 step 4.2 */ + ret = gcry_drbg_sym (drbg, key, out, &data); + if (ret) + return ret; + /* 10.4.3 step 2 */ + } + return 0; +} + + +/* + * scratchpad usage: gcry_drbg_ctr_update is interlinked with gcry_drbg_ctr_df + * (and gcry_drbg_ctr_bcc, but this function does not need any temporary buffers), + * the scratchpad is used as follows: + * gcry_drbg_ctr_update: + * temp + * start: drbg->scratchpad + * length: gcry_drbg_statelen(drbg) + gcry_drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * note: the cipher writing into this variable works + * blocklen-wise. Now, when the statelen is not a multiple + * of blocklen, the generateion loop below "spills over" + * by at most blocklen. Thus, we need to give sufficient + * memory. + * df_data + * start: drbg->scratchpad + + * gcry_drbg_statelen(drbg) + + * gcry_drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * length: gcry_drbg_statelen(drbg) + * + * gcry_drbg_ctr_df: + * pad + * start: df_data + gcry_drbg_statelen(drbg) + * length: gcry_drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * iv + * start: pad + gcry_drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * length: gcry_drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * temp + * start: iv + gcry_drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * length: gcry_drbg_satelen(drbg) + gcry_drbg_blocklen(drbg) + * note: temp is the buffer that the BCC function operates + * on. BCC operates blockwise. gcry_drbg_statelen(drbg) + * is sufficient when the DRBG state length is a multiple + * of the block size. For AES192 (and maybe other ciphers) + * this is not correct and the length for temp is + * insufficient (yes, that also means for such ciphers, + * the final output of all BCC rounds are truncated). + * Therefore, add gcry_drbg_blocklen(drbg) to cover all + * possibilities. + */ + +/* Derivation Function for CTR DRBG as defined in 10.4.2 */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_ctr_df (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *df_data, + size_t bytes_to_return, struct gcry_drbg_string *addtl) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; + unsigned char L_N[8]; + /* S3 is input */ + struct gcry_drbg_string S1, S2, S4, cipherin; + struct gcry_drbg_string *tempstr = addtl; + unsigned char *pad = df_data + gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg); + unsigned char *iv = pad + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg); + unsigned char *temp = iv + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg); + size_t padlen = 0; + unsigned int templen = 0; + /* 10.4.2 step 7 */ + unsigned int i = 0; + /* 10.4.2 step 8 */ + const unsigned char *K = (unsigned char *) + "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" + "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f"; + unsigned char *X; + size_t generated_len = 0; + size_t inputlen = 0; + + memset (pad, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + memset (iv, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + memset (temp, 0, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + + /* 10.4.2 step 1 is implicit as we work byte-wise */ + + /* 10.4.2 step 2 */ + if ((512 / 8) < bytes_to_return) + return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG; + + /* 10.4.2 step 2 -- calculate the entire length of all input data */ + for (; NULL != tempstr; tempstr = tempstr->next) + inputlen += tempstr->len; + gcry_drbg_cpu_to_be32 (inputlen, &L_N[0]); + + /* 10.4.2 step 3 */ + gcry_drbg_cpu_to_be32 (bytes_to_return, &L_N[4]); + + /* 10.4.2 step 5: length is size of L_N, input_string, one byte, padding */ + padlen = (inputlen + sizeof (L_N) + 1) % (gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + /* wrap the padlen appropriately */ + if (padlen) + padlen = gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) - padlen; + /* pad / padlen contains the 0x80 byte and the following zero bytes, so + * add one for byte for 0x80 */ + padlen++; + pad[0] = 0x80; + + /* 10.4.2 step 4 -- first fill the linked list and then order it */ + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&S1, iv, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&S2, L_N, sizeof (L_N)); + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&S4, pad, padlen); + S1.next = &S2; + S2.next = addtl; + + /* Splice in addtl between S2 and S4 -- we place S4 at the end of the + * input data chain. As this code is only triggered when addtl is not + * NULL, no NULL checks are necessary.*/ + tempstr = addtl; + while (tempstr->next) + tempstr = tempstr->next; + tempstr->next = &S4; + + /* 10.4.2 step 9 */ + while (templen < (gcry_drbg_keylen (drbg) + (gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)))) + { + /* 10.4.2 step 9.1 - the padding is implicit as the buffer + * holds zeros after allocation -- even the increment of i + * is irrelevant as the increment remains within length of i */ + gcry_drbg_cpu_to_be32 (i, iv); + /* 10.4.2 step 9.2 -- BCC and concatenation with temp */ + ret = gcry_drbg_ctr_bcc (drbg, temp + templen, K, &S1); + if (ret) + goto out; + /* 10.4.2 step 9.3 */ + i++; + templen += gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg); + } + + /* 10.4.2 step 11 */ + /* implicit key len with seedlen - blocklen according to table 3 */ + X = temp + (gcry_drbg_keylen (drbg)); + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&cipherin, X, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + + /* 10.4.2 step 12: overwriting of outval */ + + /* 10.4.2 step 13 */ + while (generated_len < bytes_to_return) + { + short blocklen = 0; + /* 10.4.2 step 13.1 */ + /* the truncation of the key length is implicit as the key + * is only gcry_drbg_blocklen in size -- check for the implementation + * of the cipher function callback */ + ret = gcry_drbg_sym (drbg, temp, X, &cipherin); + if (ret) + goto out; + blocklen = (gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) < + (bytes_to_return - generated_len)) ? + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) : (bytes_to_return - generated_len); + /* 10.4.2 step 13.2 and 14 */ + memcpy (df_data + generated_len, X, blocklen); + generated_len += blocklen; + } + + ret = 0; + +out: + memset (iv, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + memset (temp, 0, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + memset (pad, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * update function of CTR DRBG as defined in 10.2.1.2 + * + * The reseed variable has an enhanced meaning compared to the update + * functions of the other DRBGs as follows: + * 0 => initial seed from initialization + * 1 => reseed via gcry_drbg_seed + * 2 => first invocation from gcry_drbg_ctr_update when addtl is present. In + * this case, the df_data scratchpad is not deleted so that it is + * available for another calls to prevent calling the DF function + * again. + * 3 => second invocation from gcry_drbg_ctr_update. When the update function + * was called with addtl, the df_data memory already contains the + * DFed addtl information and we do not need to call DF again. + */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_ctr_update (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + struct gcry_drbg_string *addtl, int reseed) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; + /* 10.2.1.2 step 1 */ + unsigned char *temp = drbg->scratchpad; + unsigned char *df_data = drbg->scratchpad + + gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg) + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg); + unsigned char *temp_p, *df_data_p; /* pointer to iterate over buffers */ + unsigned int len = 0; + struct gcry_drbg_string cipherin; + unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1; + + memset (temp, 0, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg) + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + if (3 > reseed) + memset (df_data, 0, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + + /* 10.2.1.3.2 step 2 and 10.2.1.4.2 step 2 */ + /* TODO use reseed variable to avoid re-doing DF operation */ + (void) reseed; + if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len) + { + ret = + gcry_drbg_ctr_df (drbg, df_data, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg), addtl); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&cipherin, drbg->V, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + /* 10.2.1.3.2 step 2 and 3 -- are already covered as we memset(0) + * all memory during initialization */ + while (len < (gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg))) + { + /* 10.2.1.2 step 2.1 */ + gcry_drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg), &prefix, 1); + /* 10.2.1.2 step 2.2 */ + /* using target of temp + len: 10.2.1.2 step 2.3 and 3 */ + ret = gcry_drbg_sym (drbg, drbg->C, temp + len, &cipherin); + if (ret) + goto out; + /* 10.2.1.2 step 2.3 and 3 */ + len += gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg); + } + + /* 10.2.1.2 step 4 */ + temp_p = temp; + df_data_p = df_data; + for (len = 0; len < gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg); len++) + { + *temp_p ^= *df_data_p; + df_data_p++; + temp_p++; + } + + /* 10.2.1.2 step 5 */ + memcpy (drbg->C, temp, gcry_drbg_keylen (drbg)); + /* 10.2.1.2 step 6 */ + memcpy (drbg->V, temp + gcry_drbg_keylen (drbg), gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + ret = 0; + +out: + memset (temp, 0, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg) + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + if (2 != reseed) + memset (df_data, 0, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * scratchpad use: gcry_drbg_ctr_update is called independently from + * gcry_drbg_ctr_extract_bytes. Therefore, the scratchpad is reused + */ +/* Generate function of CTR DRBG as defined in 10.2.1.5.2 */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_ctr_generate (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen, + struct gcry_drbg_string *addtl) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + unsigned int len = 0; + struct gcry_drbg_string data; + unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1; + + memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + + /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 2 */ + if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len) + { + addtl->next = NULL; + ret = gcry_drbg_ctr_update (drbg, addtl, 2); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 4.1 */ + gcry_drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg), &prefix, 1); + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data, drbg->V, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + while (len < buflen) + { + unsigned int outlen = 0; + /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 4.2 */ + ret = gcry_drbg_sym (drbg, drbg->C, drbg->scratchpad, &data); + if (ret) + goto out; + outlen = (gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) < (buflen - len)) ? + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) : (buflen - len); + if (!gcry_drbg_fips_continuous_test (drbg, drbg->scratchpad)) + { + /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 6 */ + gcry_drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg), &prefix, 1); + continue; + } + /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 4.3 */ + memcpy (buf + len, drbg->scratchpad, outlen); + len += outlen; + /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 6 */ + if (len < buflen) + gcry_drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg), &prefix, 1); + } + + /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 6 */ + if (addtl) + addtl->next = NULL; + ret = gcry_drbg_ctr_update (drbg, addtl, 3); + +out: + memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + return ret; +} + +static struct gcry_drbg_state_ops gcry_drbg_ctr_ops = { + gcry_drbg_ctr_update, + gcry_drbg_ctr_generate, +}; + +/****************************************************************** + * HMAC DRBG callback functions + ******************************************************************/ + +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_hmac_update (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + struct gcry_drbg_string *seed, int reseed) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; + int i = 0; + struct gcry_drbg_string seed1, seed2, cipherin; + + if (!reseed) + /* 10.1.2.3 step 2 already implicitly covered with + * the initial memset(0) of drbg->C */ + memset (drbg->V, 1, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + + /* build linked list which implements the concatenation and fill + * first part*/ + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&seed1, drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + /* buffer will be filled in for loop below with one byte */ + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&seed2, NULL, 1); + seed1.next = &seed2; + /* seed may be NULL */ + seed2.next = seed; + + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&cipherin, drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + /* we execute two rounds of V/K massaging */ + for (i = 2; 0 < i; i--) + { + /* first round uses 0x0, second 0x1 */ + unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX0; + if (1 == i) + prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1; + /* 10.1.2.2 step 1 and 4 -- concatenation and HMAC for key */ + seed2.buf = &prefix; + ret = gcry_drbg_hmac (drbg, drbg->C, drbg->C, &seed1); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* 10.1.2.2 step 2 and 5 -- HMAC for V */ + ret = gcry_drbg_hmac (drbg, drbg->C, drbg->V, &cipherin); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* 10.1.2.2 step 3 */ + if (!seed || 0 == seed->len) + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +/* generate function of HMAC DRBG as defined in 10.1.2.5 */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_hmac_generate (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int buflen, struct gcry_drbg_string *addtl) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + unsigned int len = 0; + struct gcry_drbg_string data; + + /* 10.1.2.5 step 2 */ + if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len) + { + addtl->next = NULL; + ret = gcry_drbg_hmac_update (drbg, addtl, 1); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data, drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + while (len < buflen) + { + unsigned int outlen = 0; + /* 10.1.2.5 step 4.1 */ + ret = gcry_drbg_hmac (drbg, drbg->C, drbg->V, &data); + if (ret) + return ret; + outlen = (gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) < (buflen - len)) ? + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) : (buflen - len); + if (!gcry_drbg_fips_continuous_test (drbg, drbg->V)) + continue; + + /* 10.1.2.5 step 4.2 */ + memcpy (buf + len, drbg->V, outlen); + len += outlen; + } + + /* 10.1.2.5 step 6 */ + if (addtl) + addtl->next = NULL; + ret = gcry_drbg_hmac_update (drbg, addtl, 1); + + return ret; +} + +static struct gcry_drbg_state_ops gcry_drbg_hmac_ops = { + gcry_drbg_hmac_update, + gcry_drbg_hmac_generate, +}; + +/****************************************************************** + * Hash DRBG callback functions + ******************************************************************/ + +/* + * scratchpad usage: as gcry_drbg_hash_update and gcry_drbg_hash_df are used + * interlinked, the scratchpad is used as follows: + * gcry_drbg_hash_update + * start: drbg->scratchpad + * length: gcry_drbg_statelen(drbg) + * gcry_drbg_hash_df: + * start: drbg->scratchpad + gcry_drbg_statelen(drbg) + * length: gcry_drbg_blocklen(drbg) + */ +/* Derivation Function for Hash DRBG as defined in 10.4.1 */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_hash_df (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *outval, size_t outlen, + struct gcry_drbg_string *entropy) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + size_t len = 0; + unsigned char input[5]; + unsigned char *tmp = drbg->scratchpad + gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg); + struct gcry_drbg_string data1; + + memset (tmp, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + + /* 10.4.1 step 3 */ + input[0] = 1; + gcry_drbg_cpu_to_be32 ((outlen * 8), &input[1]); + + /* 10.4.1 step 4.1 -- concatenation of data for input into hash */ + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data1, input, 5); + data1.next = entropy; + + /* 10.4.1 step 4 */ + while (len < outlen) + { + short blocklen = 0; + /* 10.4.1 step 4.1 */ + ret = gcry_drbg_hmac (drbg, NULL, tmp, &data1); + if (ret) + goto out; + /* 10.4.1 step 4.2 */ + input[0]++; + blocklen = (gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) < (outlen - len)) ? + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) : (outlen - len); + memcpy (outval + len, tmp, blocklen); + len += blocklen; + } + +out: + memset (tmp, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + return ret; +} + +/* update function for Hash DRBG as defined in 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_hash_update (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + struct gcry_drbg_string *seed, int reseed) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + struct gcry_drbg_string data1, data2; + unsigned char *V = drbg->scratchpad; + unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1; + + memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + if (!seed) + return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG; + + if (reseed) + { + /* 10.1.1.3 step 1: string length is concatenation of + * 1 byte, V and seed (which is concatenated entropy/addtl + * input) + */ + memcpy (V, drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data1, &prefix, 1); + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data2, V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + data1.next = &data2; + data2.next = seed; + } + else + { + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data1, seed->buf, seed->len); + data1.next = seed->next; + } + + /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 2 and 3 */ + ret = gcry_drbg_hash_df (drbg, drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg), &data1); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 4 -- concatenation */ + prefix = DRBG_PREFIX0; + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data1, &prefix, 1); + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data2, drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + data1.next = &data2; + /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 4 -- df operation */ + ret = gcry_drbg_hash_df (drbg, drbg->C, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg), &data1); + +out: + memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + return ret; +} + +/* processing of additional information string for Hash DRBG */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_hash_process_addtl (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + struct gcry_drbg_string *addtl) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + struct gcry_drbg_string data1, data2; + struct gcry_drbg_string *data3; + unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX2; + + /* this is value w as per documentation */ + memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + + /* 10.1.1.4 step 2 */ + if (!addtl || 0 == addtl->len) + return 0; + + /* 10.1.1.4 step 2a -- concatenation */ + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data1, &prefix, 1); + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data2, drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + data3 = addtl; + data1.next = &data2; + data2.next = data3; + data3->next = NULL; + /* 10.1.1.4 step 2a -- cipher invocation */ + ret = gcry_drbg_hmac (drbg, NULL, drbg->scratchpad, &data1); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* 10.1.1.4 step 2b */ + gcry_drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg), + drbg->scratchpad, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + +out: + memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Hashgen defined in 10.1.1.4 + */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_hash_hashgen (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + unsigned int len = 0; + unsigned char *src = drbg->scratchpad; + unsigned char *dst = drbg->scratchpad + gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg); + struct gcry_drbg_string data; + unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1; + + /* use the scratchpad as a lookaside buffer */ + memset (src, 0, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + memset (dst, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + + /* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 2 */ + memcpy (src, drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data, src, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + while (len < buflen) + { + unsigned int outlen = 0; + /* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 4.1 */ + ret = gcry_drbg_hmac (drbg, NULL, dst, &data); + if (ret) + goto out; + outlen = (gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) < (buflen - len)) ? + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) : (buflen - len); + if (!gcry_drbg_fips_continuous_test (drbg, dst)) + { + gcry_drbg_add_buf (src, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg), &prefix, 1); + continue; + } + /* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 4.2 */ + memcpy (buf + len, dst, outlen); + len += outlen; + /* 10.1.1.4 hashgen step 4.3 */ + if (len < buflen) + gcry_drbg_add_buf (src, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg), &prefix, 1); + } + +out: + memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, + (gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg) + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg))); + return ret; +} + +/* generate function for Hash DRBG as defined in 10.1.1.4 */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_hash_generate (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen, + struct gcry_drbg_string *addtl) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX3; + struct gcry_drbg_string data1, data2; + union + { + unsigned char req[8]; + u64 req_int; + } u; + + /* + * scratchpad usage: gcry_drbg_hash_process_addtl uses the scratchpad, but + * fully completes before returning. Thus, we can reuse the scratchpad + */ + /* 10.1.1.4 step 2 */ + ret = gcry_drbg_hash_process_addtl (drbg, addtl); + if (ret) + return ret; + /* 10.1.1.4 step 3 -- invocation of the Hashgen function defined in + * 10.1.1.4 */ + ret = gcry_drbg_hash_hashgen (drbg, buf, buflen); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* this is the value H as documented in 10.1.1.4 */ + memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + /* 10.1.1.4 step 4 */ + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data1, &prefix, 1); + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data2, drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + data1.next = &data2; + ret = gcry_drbg_hmac (drbg, NULL, drbg->scratchpad, &data1); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* 10.1.1.4 step 5 */ + gcry_drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg), + drbg->scratchpad, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + gcry_drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg), drbg->C, + gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + u.req_int = be_bswap64 (drbg->reseed_ctr); + gcry_drbg_add_buf (drbg->V, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg), u.req, + sizeof (u.req)); + +out: + memset (drbg->scratchpad, 0, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * scratchpad usage: as update and generate are used isolated, both + * can use the scratchpad + */ +static struct gcry_drbg_state_ops gcry_drbg_hash_ops = { + gcry_drbg_hash_update, + gcry_drbg_hash_generate, +}; + +/****************************************************************** + * Functions common for DRBG implementations + ******************************************************************/ + +/* + * Seeding or reseeding of the DRBG + * + * @drbg: DRBG state struct + * @pers: personalization / additional information buffer + * @reseed: 0 for initial seed process, 1 for reseeding + * + * return: + * 0 on success + * error value otherwise + */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_seed (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, struct gcry_drbg_string *pers, + int reseed) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + unsigned char *entropy = NULL; + size_t entropylen = 0; + struct gcry_drbg_string data1; + + /* 9.1 / 9.2 / 9.3.1 step 3 */ + if (pers && pers->len > (gcry_drbg_max_addtl ())) + { + dbg (("DRBG: personalization string too long %lu\n", pers->len)); + return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG; + } + if (drbg->test_data && drbg->test_data->testentropy) + { + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data1, drbg->test_data->testentropy->buf, + drbg->test_data->testentropy->len); + dbg (("DRBG: using test entropy\n")); + } + else + { + /* Gather entropy equal to the security strength of the DRBG. + * With a derivation function, a nonce is required in addition + * to the entropy. A nonce must be at least 1/2 of the security + * strength of the DRBG in size. Thus, entropy * nonce is 3/2 + * of the strength. The consideration of a nonce is only + * applicable during initial seeding. */ + entropylen = gcry_drbg_sec_strength (drbg->core->flags); + if (!entropylen) + return GPG_ERR_GENERAL; + if (0 == reseed) + /* make sure we round up strength/2 in + * case it is not divisible by 2 */ + entropylen = ((entropylen + 1) / 2) * 3; + dbg (("DRBG: (re)seeding with %lu bytes of entropy\n", entropylen)); + entropy = xcalloc_secure (1, entropylen); + if (!entropy) + return GPG_ERR_ENOMEM; + ret = gcry_drbg_get_entropy (drbg, entropy, entropylen); + if (ret) + goto out; + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&data1, entropy, entropylen); + } + + /* concatenation of entropy with personalization str / addtl input) + * the variable pers is directly handed by the caller, check its + * contents whether it is appropriate */ + if (pers && pers->buf && 0 < pers->len && NULL == pers->next) + { + data1.next = pers; + dbg (("DRBG: using personalization string\n")); + } + + ret = drbg->d_ops->update (drbg, &data1, reseed); + dbg (("DRBG: state updated with seed\n")); + if (ret) + goto out; + drbg->seeded = 1; + /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */ + drbg->reseed_ctr = 1; + +out: + xfree (entropy); + return ret; +} + +/************************************************************************* + * exported interfaces + *************************************************************************/ + +/* + * DRBG generate function as required by SP800-90A - this function + * generates random numbers + * + * @drbg DRBG state handle + * @buf Buffer where to store the random numbers -- the buffer must already + * be pre-allocated by caller + * @buflen Length of output buffer - this value defines the number of random + * bytes pulled from DRBG + * @addtl Additional input that is mixed into state, may be NULL -- note + * the entropy is pulled by the DRBG internally unconditionally + * as defined in SP800-90A. The additional input is mixed into + * the state in addition to the pulled entropy. + * + * return: generated number of bytes + */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_generate (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen, + struct gcry_drbg_string *addtl) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_INV_ARG; + + if (0 == buflen || !buf) + { + dbg (("DRBG: no buffer provided\n")); + return ret; + } + if (addtl && NULL == addtl->buf && 0 < addtl->len) + { + dbg (("DRBG: wrong format of additional information\n")); + return ret; + } + + /* 9.3.1 step 2 */ + if (buflen > (gcry_drbg_max_request_bytes ())) + { + dbg (("DRBG: requested random numbers too large %u\n", buflen)); + return ret; + } + /* 9.3.1 step 3 is implicit with the chosen DRBG */ + /* 9.3.1 step 4 */ + if (addtl && addtl->len > (gcry_drbg_max_addtl ())) + { + dbg (("DRBG: additional information string too long %lu\n", + addtl->len)); + return ret; + } + /* 9.3.1 step 5 is implicit with the chosen DRBG */ + /* 9.3.1 step 6 and 9 supplemented by 9.3.2 step c -- the spec is a + * bit convoluted here, we make it simpler */ + if ((gcry_drbg_max_requests ()) < drbg->reseed_ctr) + drbg->seeded = 0; + + if (drbg->pr || !drbg->seeded) + { + dbg (("DRBG: reseeding before generation (prediction resistance: %s, state %s)\n", drbg->pr ? "true" : "false", drbg->seeded ? "seeded" : "unseeded")); + /* 9.3.1 steps 7.1 through 7.3 */ + ret = gcry_drbg_seed (drbg, addtl, 1); + if (ret) + return ret; + /* 9.3.1 step 7.4 */ + addtl = NULL; + } + + if (addtl && addtl->buf) + { + dbg (("DRBG: using additional information string\n")); + } + + /* 9.3.1 step 8 and 10 */ + ret = drbg->d_ops->generate (drbg, buf, buflen, addtl); + + /* 10.1.1.4 step 6, 10.1.2.5 step 7, 10.2.1.5.2 step 7 */ + drbg->reseed_ctr++; + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* 11.3.3 -- re-perform self tests after some generated random + * numbers, the chosen value after which self test is performed + * is arbitrary, but it should be reasonable */ + /* Here we do not perform the self tests because of the following + * reasons: it is mathematically impossible that the initial self tests + * were successfully and the following are not. If the initial would + * pass and the following would not, the system integrity is violated. + * In this case, the entire system operation is questionable and it + * is unlikely that the integrity violation only affects to the + * correct operation of the DRBG. + */ +#if 0 + if (drbg->reseed_ctr && !(drbg->reseed_ctr % 4096)) + { + dbg (("DRBG: start to perform self test\n")); + ret = gcry_drbg_healthcheck (); + if (ret) + { + log_fatal (("DRBG: self test failed\n")); + return ret; + } + else + { + dbg (("DRBG: self test successful\n")); + } + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Wrapper around gcry_drbg_generate which can pull arbitrary long strings + * from the DRBG without hitting the maximum request limitation. + * + * Parameters: see gcry_drbg_generate + * Return codes: see gcry_drbg_generate -- if one gcry_drbg_generate request fails, + * the entire gcry_drbg_generate_long request fails + */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_generate_long (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen, + struct gcry_drbg_string *addtl) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + unsigned int slice = 0; + unsigned char *buf_p = buf; + unsigned len = 0; + do + { + unsigned int chunk = 0; + slice = ((buflen - len) / gcry_drbg_max_request_bytes ()); + chunk = slice ? gcry_drbg_max_request_bytes () : (buflen - len); + ret = gcry_drbg_generate (drbg, buf_p, chunk, addtl); + if (ret) + return ret; + buf_p += chunk; + len += chunk; + } + while (slice > 0 && (len < buflen)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * DRBG uninstantiate function as required by SP800-90A - this function + * frees all buffers and the DRBG handle + * + * @drbg DRBG state handle + * + * return + * 0 on success + */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_uninstantiate (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg) +{ + if (!drbg) + return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG; + xfree (drbg->V); + drbg->V = NULL; + xfree (drbg->C); + drbg->C = NULL; + drbg->reseed_ctr = 0; + xfree (drbg->scratchpad); + drbg->scratchpad = NULL; + drbg->seeded = 0; + drbg->pr = 0; + drbg->fips_primed = 0; + xfree (drbg->prev); + drbg->prev = NULL; + drbg->seed_init_pid = 0; + return 0; +} + +/* + * DRBG instantiation function as required by SP800-90A - this function + * sets up the DRBG handle, performs the initial seeding and all sanity + * checks required by SP800-90A + * + * @drbg memory of state -- if NULL, new memory is allocated + * @pers Personalization string that is mixed into state, may be NULL -- note + * the entropy is pulled by the DRBG internally unconditionally + * as defined in SP800-90A. The additional input is mixed into + * the state in addition to the pulled entropy. + * @coreref reference to core + * @flags Flags defining the requested DRBG type and cipher type. The flags + * are defined in drbg.h and may be XORed. Beware, if you XOR multiple + * cipher types together, the code picks the core on a first come first + * serve basis as it iterates through the available cipher cores and + * uses the one with the first match. The minimum required flags are: + * cipher type flag + * + * return + * 0 on success + * error value otherwise + */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_instantiate (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + struct gcry_drbg_string *pers, int coreref, int pr) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_ENOMEM; + unsigned int sb_size = 0; + + if (!drbg) + return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG; + + dbg (("DRBG: Initializing DRBG core %d with prediction resistance %s\n", + coreref, pr ? "enabled" : "disabled")); + drbg->core = &gcry_drbg_cores[coreref]; + drbg->pr = pr; + drbg->seeded = 0; + if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HMAC) + drbg->d_ops = &gcry_drbg_hmac_ops; + else if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HASH_MASK) + drbg->d_ops = &gcry_drbg_hash_ops; + else if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_CTR_MASK) + drbg->d_ops = &gcry_drbg_ctr_ops; + else + return GPG_ERR_GENERAL; + /* 9.1 step 1 is implicit with the selected DRBG type -- see + * gcry_drbg_sec_strength() */ + + /* 9.1 step 2 is implicit as caller can select prediction resistance + * and the flag is copied into drbg->flags -- + * all DRBG types support prediction resistance */ + + /* 9.1 step 4 is implicit in gcry_drbg_sec_strength */ + + /* no allocation of drbg as this is done by the kernel crypto API */ + drbg->V = xcalloc_secure (1, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + if (!drbg->V) + goto err; + drbg->C = xcalloc_secure (1, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + if (!drbg->C) + goto err; + drbg->prev = xcalloc_secure (1, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + if (!drbg->prev) + goto err; + drbg->fips_primed = 0; + /* scratchpad is only generated for CTR and Hash */ + if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HMAC) + sb_size = 0; + else if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_CTR_MASK) + sb_size = gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg) + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) + /* temp */ + gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg) + /* df_data */ + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) + /* pad */ + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) + /* iv */ + gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg) + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg); /* temp */ + else + sb_size = gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg) + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg); + + if (0 < sb_size) + { + drbg->scratchpad = xcalloc_secure (1, sb_size); + if (!drbg->scratchpad) + goto err; + } + dbg (("DRBG: state allocated with scratchpad size %u bytes\n", sb_size)); + + /* 9.1 step 6 through 11 */ + ret = gcry_drbg_seed (drbg, pers, 0); + if (ret) + goto err; + + dbg (("DRBG: core %d %s prediction resistance successfully initialized\n", + coreref, pr ? "with" : "without")); + return 0; + +err: + gcry_drbg_uninstantiate (drbg); + return ret; +} + +/* + * DRBG reseed function as required by SP800-90A + * + * @drbg DRBG state handle + * @addtl Additional input that is mixed into state, may be NULL -- note + * the entropy is pulled by the DRBG internally unconditionally + * as defined in SP800-90A. The additional input is mixed into + * the state in addition to the pulled entropy. + * + * return + * 0 on success + * error value otherwise + */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_reseed (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, + struct gcry_drbg_string *addtl) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + ret = gcry_drbg_seed (drbg, addtl, 1); + return ret; +} + +/****************************************************************** + ****************************************************************** + ****************************************************************** + * libgcrypt integration code + ****************************************************************** + ****************************************************************** + ******************************************************************/ + +/*************************************************************** + * libgcrypt backend functions to the RNG API code + ***************************************************************/ + +/* global state variable holding the current instance of the DRBG -- the + * default DRBG type is defined in _gcry_gcry_drbg_init */ +static struct gcry_drbg_state *gcry_drbg = NULL; +GPGRT_LOCK_DEFINE (gcry_drbg_gcry_lock); + +static inline void +gcry_drbg_lock (void) +{ + gpg_err_code_t rc; + rc = gpgrt_lock_lock (&gcry_drbg_gcry_lock); + if (rc) + log_fatal ("failed to acquire the RNG lock: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); +} + +static inline void +gcry_drbg_unlock (void) +{ + gpg_err_code_t rc; + rc = gpgrt_lock_unlock (&gcry_drbg_gcry_lock); + if (rc) + log_fatal ("failed to release the RNG lock: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); +} + +/****** helper functions where lock must be held by caller *****/ + +/* Check whether given flags are known to point to an applicable DRBG */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_algo_available (u32 flags, int *coreref) +{ + int i = 0; + for (i = 0; ARRAY_SIZE (gcry_drbg_cores) > i; i++) + { + if ((gcry_drbg_cores[i].flags & DRBG_CIPHER_MASK) == + (flags & DRBG_CIPHER_MASK)) + { + *coreref = i; + return 0; + } + } + return GPG_ERR_GENERAL; +} + +static gpg_err_code_t +_gcry_drbg_init_internal (int full, u32 flags, struct gcry_drbg_string *pers) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + static u32 oldflags = 0; + int coreref = 0; + int pr = 0; + /* TODO what shall we do with the full variable? */ + (void) full; + + /* If a caller provides 0 as flags, use the flags of the previous + * initialization, otherwise use the current flags and remember them + * for the next invocation + */ + if (0 == flags) + flags = oldflags; + else + oldflags = flags; + + ret = gcry_drbg_algo_available (flags, &coreref); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (NULL != gcry_drbg) + { + gcry_drbg_uninstantiate (gcry_drbg); + } + else + { + gcry_drbg = xcalloc_secure (1, sizeof (struct gcry_drbg_state)); + if (!gcry_drbg) + return GPG_ERR_ENOMEM; + } + if (flags & DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST) + pr = 1; + ret = gcry_drbg_instantiate (gcry_drbg, pers, coreref, pr); + if (ret) + fips_signal_error ("DRBG cannot be initialized"); + else + gcry_drbg->seed_init_pid = getpid (); + return ret; +} + +/************* calls available to common RNG code **************/ + +/* + * Initialize one DRBG invoked by the libgcrypt API + */ +void +_gcry_drbg_init (int full) +{ + /* default DRBG */ + u32 flags = DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA256; + gcry_drbg_lock (); + _gcry_drbg_init_internal (full, flags, NULL); + gcry_drbg_unlock (); +} + +/* + * Backend handler function for GCRYCTL_DRBG_REINIT + * + * Select a different DRBG type and initialize it. + * Function checks whether requested DRBG type exists and returns an error in + * case it does not. In case of an error, the previous instantiated DRBG is + * left untouched and alive. Thus, in case of an error, a DRBG is always + * available, even if it is not the chosen one. + * + * Re-initialization will be performed in any case regardless whether flags + * or personalization string are set. + * + * If flags == 0, do not change current DRBG + * If personalization string is NULL or its length is 0, re-initialize without + * personalization string + */ +gpg_err_code_t +_gcry_drbg_reinit (u32 flags, struct gcry_drbg_string *pers) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; + dbg (("DRBG: reinitialize internal DRBG state with flags %u\n", flags)); + gcry_drbg_lock (); + ret = _gcry_drbg_init_internal (1, flags, pers); + gcry_drbg_unlock (); + return ret; +} + +/* Try to close the FDs of the random gather module. This is + * currently only implemented for rndlinux. */ +void +_gcry_drbg_close_fds (void) +{ +#if USE_RNDLINUX + gcry_drbg_lock (); + _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (NULL, 0, 0, 0); + gcry_drbg_unlock (); +#endif +} + +/* Print some statistics about the RNG. */ +void +_gcry_drbg_dump_stats (void) +{ + /* Not yet implemented. */ + /* Maybe dumping of reseed counter? */ +} + +/* This function returns true if no real RNG is available or the + * quality of the RNG has been degraded for test purposes. */ +int +_gcry_drbg_is_faked (void) +{ + return 0; /* Faked random is not allowed. */ +} + +/* Add BUFLEN bytes from BUF to the internal random pool. QUALITY + * should be in the range of 0..100 to indicate the goodness of the + * entropy added, or -1 for goodness not known. */ +gcry_error_t +_gcry_drbg_add_bytes (const void *buf, size_t buflen, int quality) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + struct gcry_drbg_string seed; + (void) quality; + if (NULL == gcry_drbg) + return GPG_ERR_GENERAL; + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&seed, (unsigned char *) buf, buflen); + gcry_drbg_lock (); + ret = gcry_drbg_reseed (gcry_drbg, &seed); + gcry_drbg_unlock (); + return ret; +} + +/* This function is to be used for all types of random numbers, including + * nonces + */ +void +_gcry_drbg_randomize (void *buffer, size_t length, + enum gcry_random_level level) +{ + (void) level; + gcry_drbg_lock (); + if (NULL == gcry_drbg) + { + fips_signal_error ("DRBG is not initialized"); + goto bailout; + } + + /* As reseeding changes the entire state of the DRBG, including any + * key, either a re-init or a reseed is sufficient for a fork */ + if (gcry_drbg->seed_init_pid != getpid ()) + { + /* We are in a child of us. Perform a reseeding. */ + if (gcry_drbg_reseed (gcry_drbg, NULL)) + { + fips_signal_error ("reseeding upon fork failed"); + log_fatal ("severe error getting random\n"); + goto bailout; + } + } + /* potential integer overflow is covered by gcry_drbg_generate which + * ensures that length cannot overflow an unsigned int */ + if (0 < length) + { + if (!buffer) + goto bailout; + if (gcry_drbg_generate_long + (gcry_drbg, buffer, (unsigned int) length, NULL)) + log_fatal ("No random numbers generated\n"); + } + else + { + struct gcry_drbg_gen *data = (struct gcry_drbg_gen *) buffer; + /* catch NULL pointer */ + if (!data || !data->outbuf) + { + fips_signal_error ("No output buffer provided"); + goto bailout; + } + if (gcry_drbg_generate_long (gcry_drbg, data->outbuf, data->outlen, + data->addtl)) + log_fatal ("No random numbers generated\n"); + } +bailout: + gcry_drbg_unlock (); + return; + +} + +/*************************************************************** + * Self-test code + ***************************************************************/ + +/* + * Test vectors from + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/drbg/drbgtestvectors.zip + */ +struct gcry_drbg_test_vector gcry_drbg_test_pr[] = { + { + .flags = (DRBG_PR_HASHSHA256), + .entropy = (unsigned char *) + "\x5d\xf2\x14\xbc\xf6\xb5\x4e\x0b\xf0\x0d\x6f\x2d" + "\xe2\x01\x66\x7b\xd0\xa4\x73\xa4\x21\xdd\xb0\xc0" + "\x51\x79\x09\xf4\xea\xa9\x08\xfa\xa6\x67\xe0\xe1" + "\xd1\x88\xa8\xad\xee\x69\x74\xb3\x55\x06\x9b\xf6", + .entropylen = 48, + .entpra = (unsigned char *) + "\xef\x48\x06\xa2\xc2\x45\xf1\x44\xfa\x34\x2c\xeb" + "\x8d\x78\x3c\x09\x8f\x34\x72\x20\xf2\xe7\xfd\x13" + "\x76\x0a\xf6\xdc\x3c\xf5\xc0\x15", + .entprb = (unsigned char *) + "\x4b\xbe\xe5\x24\xed\x6a\x2d\x0c\xdb\x73\x5e\x09" + "\xf9\xad\x67\x7c\x51\x47\x8b\x6b\x30\x2a\xc6\xde" + "\x76\xaa\x55\x04\x8b\x0a\x72\x95", + .entprlen = 32, + .expected = (unsigned char *) + "\x3b\x14\x71\x99\xa1\xda\xa0\x42\xe6\xc8\x85\x32" + "\x70\x20\x32\x53\x9a\xbe\xd1\x1e\x15\xef\xfb\x4c" + "\x25\x6e\x19\x3a\xf0\xb9\xcb\xde\xf0\x3b\xc6\x18" + "\x4d\x85\x5a\x9b\xf1\xe3\xc2\x23\x03\x93\x08\xdb" + "\xa7\x07\x4b\x33\x78\x40\x4d\xeb\x24\xf5\x6e\x81" + "\x4a\x1b\x6e\xa3\x94\x52\x43\xb0\xaf\x2e\x21\xf4" + "\x42\x46\x8e\x90\xed\x34\x21\x75\xea\xda\x67\xb6" + "\xe4\xf6\xff\xc6\x31\x6c\x9a\x5a\xdb\xb3\x97\x13" + "\x09\xd3\x20\x98\x33\x2d\x6d\xd7\xb5\x6a\xa8\xa9" + "\x9a\x5b\xd6\x87\x52\xa1\x89\x2b\x4b\x9c\x64\x60" + "\x50\x47\xa3\x63\x81\x16\xaf\x19", + .expectedlen = 128, + .addtla = (unsigned char *) + "\xbe\x13\xdb\x2a\xe9\xa8\xfe\x09\x97\xe1\xce\x5d" + "\xe8\xbb\xc0\x7c\x4f\xcb\x62\x19\x3f\x0f\xd2\xad" + "\xa9\xd0\x1d\x59\x02\xc4\xff\x70", + .addtlb = (unsigned char *) + "\x6f\x96\x13\xe2\xa7\xf5\x6c\xfe\xdf\x66\xe3\x31" + "\x63\x76\xbf\x20\x27\x06\x49\xf1\xf3\x01\x77\x41" + "\x9f\xeb\xe4\x38\xfe\x67\x00\xcd", + .addtllen = 32, + .pers = NULL, + .perslen = 0, + }, + { + .flags = (DRBG_PR_HMACSHA256), + .entropy = (unsigned char *) + "\x13\x54\x96\xfc\x1b\x7d\x28\xf3\x18\xc9\xa7\x89" + "\xb6\xb3\xc8\x72\xac\x00\xd4\x59\x36\x25\x05\xaf" + "\xa5\xdb\x96\xcb\x3c\x58\x46\x87\xa5\xaa\xbf\x20" + "\x3b\xfe\x23\x0e\xd1\xc7\x41\x0f\x3f\xc9\xb3\x67", + .entropylen = 48, + .entpra = (unsigned char *) + "\xe2\xbd\xb7\x48\x08\x06\xf3\xe1\x93\x3c\xac\x79" + "\xa7\x2b\x11\xda\xe3\x2e\xe1\x91\xa5\x02\x19\x57" + "\x20\x28\xad\xf2\x60\xd7\xcd\x45", + .entprb = (unsigned char *) + "\x8b\xd4\x69\xfc\xff\x59\x95\x95\xc6\x51\xde\x71" + "\x68\x5f\xfc\xf9\x4a\xab\xec\x5a\xcb\xbe\xd3\x66" + "\x1f\xfa\x74\xd3\xac\xa6\x74\x60", + .entprlen = 32, + .expected = (unsigned char *) + "\x1f\x9e\xaf\xe4\xd2\x46\xb7\x47\x41\x4c\x65\x99" + "\x01\xe9\x3b\xbb\x83\x0c\x0a\xb0\xc1\x3a\xe2\xb3" + "\x31\x4e\xeb\x93\x73\xee\x0b\x26\xc2\x63\xa5\x75" + "\x45\x99\xd4\x5c\x9f\xa1\xd4\x45\x87\x6b\x20\x61" + "\x40\xea\x78\xa5\x32\xdf\x9e\x66\x17\xaf\xb1\x88" + "\x9e\x2e\x23\xdd\xc1\xda\x13\x97\x88\xa5\xb6\x5e" + "\x90\x14\x4e\xef\x13\xab\x5c\xd9\x2c\x97\x9e\x7c" + "\xd7\xf8\xce\xea\x81\xf5\xcd\x71\x15\x49\x44\xce" + "\x83\xb6\x05\xfb\x7d\x30\xb5\x57\x2c\x31\x4f\xfc" + "\xfe\x80\xb6\xc0\x13\x0c\x5b\x9b\x2e\x8f\x3d\xfc" + "\xc2\xa3\x0c\x11\x1b\x80\x5f\xf3", + .expectedlen = 128, + .addtla = NULL, + .addtlb = NULL, + .addtllen = 0, + .pers = (unsigned char *) + "\x64\xb6\xfc\x60\xbc\x61\x76\x23\x6d\x3f\x4a\x0f" + "\xe1\xb4\xd5\x20\x9e\x70\xdd\x03\x53\x6d\xbf\xce" + "\xcd\x56\x80\xbc\xb8\x15\xc8\xaa", + .perslen = 32, + }, + { + .flags = (DRBG_PR_CTRAES128), + .entropy = (unsigned char *) + "\x92\x89\x8f\x31\xfa\x1c\xff\x6d\x18\x2f\x26\x06" + "\x43\xdf\xf8\x18\xc2\xa4\xd9\x72\xc3\xb9\xb6\x97", + .entropylen = 24, + .entpra = (unsigned char *) + "\x20\x72\x8a\x06\xf8\x6f\x8d\xd4\x41\xe2\x72\xb7" + "\xc4\x2c\xe8\x10", + .entprb = (unsigned char *) + "\x3d\xb0\xf0\x94\xf3\x05\x50\x33\x17\x86\x3e\x22" + "\x08\xf7\xa5\x01", + .entprlen = 16, + .expected = (unsigned char *) + "\x5a\x35\x39\x87\x0f\x4d\x22\xa4\x09\x24\xee\x71" + "\xc9\x6f\xac\x72\x0a\xd6\xf0\x88\x82\xd0\x83\x28" + "\x73\xec\x3f\x93\xd8\xab\x45\x23\xf0\x7e\xac\x45" + "\x14\x5e\x93\x9f\xb1\xd6\x76\x43\x3d\xb6\xe8\x08" + "\x88\xf6\xda\x89\x08\x77\x42\xfe\x1a\xf4\x3f\xc4" + "\x23\xc5\x1f\x68", + .expectedlen = 64, + .addtla = (unsigned char *) + "\x1a\x40\xfa\xe3\xcc\x6c\x7c\xa0\xf8\xda\xba\x59" + "\x23\x6d\xad\x1d", + .addtlb = (unsigned char *) + "\x9f\x72\x76\x6c\xc7\x46\xe5\xed\x2e\x53\x20\x12" + "\xbc\x59\x31\x8c", + .addtllen = 16, + .pers = (unsigned char *) + "\xea\x65\xee\x60\x26\x4e\x7e\xb6\x0e\x82\x68\xc4" + "\x37\x3c\x5c\x0b", + .perslen = 16, + }, +}; + +struct gcry_drbg_test_vector gcry_drbg_test_nopr[] = { + { + .flags = DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA256, + .entropy = (unsigned char *) + "\x73\xd3\xfb\xa3\x94\x5f\x2b\x5f\xb9\x8f\xf6\x9c" + "\x8a\x93\x17\xae\x19\xc3\x4c\xc3\xd6\xca\xa3\x2d" + "\x16\xfc\x42\xd2\x2d\xd5\x6f\x56\xcc\x1d\x30\xff" + "\x9e\x06\x3e\x09\xce\x58\xe6\x9a\x35\xb3\xa6\x56", + .entropylen = 48, + .expected = (unsigned char *) + "\x71\x7b\x93\x46\x1a\x40\xaa\x35\xa4\xaa\xc5\xe7" + "\x6d\x5b\x5b\x8a\xa0\xdf\x39\x7d\xae\x71\x58\x5b" + "\x3c\x7c\xb4\xf0\x89\xfa\x4a\x8c\xa9\x5c\x54\xc0" + "\x40\xdf\xbc\xce\x26\x81\x34\xf8\xba\x7d\x1c\xe8" + "\xad\x21\xe0\x74\xcf\x48\x84\x30\x1f\xa1\xd5\x4f" + "\x81\x42\x2f\xf4\xdb\x0b\x23\xf8\x73\x27\xb8\x1d" + "\x42\xf8\x44\x58\xd8\x5b\x29\x27\x0a\xf8\x69\x59" + "\xb5\x78\x44\xeb\x9e\xe0\x68\x6f\x42\x9a\xb0\x5b" + "\xe0\x4e\xcb\x6a\xaa\xe2\xd2\xd5\x33\x25\x3e\xe0" + "\x6c\xc7\x6a\x07\xa5\x03\x83\x9f\xe2\x8b\xd1\x1c" + "\x70\xa8\x07\x59\x97\xeb\xf6\xbe", + .expectedlen = 128, + .addtla = (unsigned char *) + "\xf4\xd5\x98\x3d\xa8\xfc\xfa\x37\xb7\x54\x67\x73" + "\xc7\xc3\xdd\x47\x34\x71\x02\x5d\xc1\xa0\xd3\x10" + "\xc1\x8b\xbd\xf5\x66\x34\x6f\xdd", + .addtlb = (unsigned char *) + "\xf7\x9e\x6a\x56\x0e\x73\xe9\xd9\x7a\xd1\x69\xe0" + "\x6f\x8c\x55\x1c\x44\xd1\xce\x6f\x28\xcc\xa4\x4d" + "\xa8\xc0\x85\xd1\x5a\x0c\x59\x40", + .addtllen = 32, + .pers = NULL, + .perslen = 0, + }, + { + .flags = DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA256, + .entropy = (unsigned char *) + "\x8d\xf0\x13\xb4\xd1\x03\x52\x30\x73\x91\x7d\xdf" + "\x6a\x86\x97\x93\x05\x9e\x99\x43\xfc\x86\x54\x54" + "\x9e\x7a\xb2\x2f\x7c\x29\xf1\x22\xda\x26\x25\xaf" + "\x2d\xdd\x4a\xbc\xce\x3c\xf4\xfa\x46\x59\xd8\x4e", + .entropylen = 48, + .expected = (unsigned char *) + "\xb9\x1c\xba\x4c\xc8\x4f\xa2\x5d\xf8\x61\x0b\x81" + "\xb6\x41\x40\x27\x68\xa2\x09\x72\x34\x93\x2e\x37" + "\xd5\x90\xb1\x15\x4c\xbd\x23\xf9\x74\x52\xe3\x10" + "\xe2\x91\xc4\x51\x46\x14\x7f\x0d\xa2\xd8\x17\x61" + "\xfe\x90\xfb\xa6\x4f\x94\x41\x9c\x0f\x66\x2b\x28" + "\xc1\xed\x94\xda\x48\x7b\xb7\xe7\x3e\xec\x79\x8f" + "\xbc\xf9\x81\xb7\x91\xd1\xbe\x4f\x17\x7a\x89\x07" + "\xaa\x3c\x40\x16\x43\xa5\xb6\x2b\x87\xb8\x9d\x66" + "\xb3\xa6\x0e\x40\xd4\xa8\xe4\xe9\xd8\x2a\xf6\xd2" + "\x70\x0e\x6f\x53\x5c\xdb\x51\xf7\x5c\x32\x17\x29" + "\x10\x37\x41\x03\x0c\xcc\x3a\x56", + .expectedlen = 128, + .addtla = NULL, + .addtlb = NULL, + .addtllen = 0, + .pers = (unsigned char *) + "\xb5\x71\xe6\x6d\x7c\x33\x8b\xc0\x7b\x76\xad\x37" + "\x57\xbb\x2f\x94\x52\xbf\x7e\x07\x43\x7a\xe8\x58" + "\x1c\xe7\xbc\x7c\x3a\xc6\x51\xa9", + .perslen = 32, + }, + { + .flags = DRBG_NOPR_CTRAES128, + .entropy = (unsigned char *) + "\xc0\x70\x1f\x92\x50\x75\x8f\xcd\xf2\xbe\x73\x98" + "\x80\xdb\x66\xeb\x14\x68\xb4\xa5\x87\x9c\x2d\xa6", + .entropylen = 24, + .expected = (unsigned char *) + "\x97\xc0\xc0\xe5\xa0\xcc\xf2\x4f\x33\x63\x48\x8a" + "\xdb\x13\x0a\x35\x89\xbf\x80\x65\x62\xee\x13\x95" + "\x7c\x33\xd3\x7d\xf4\x07\x77\x7a\x2b\x65\x0b\x5f" + "\x45\x5c\x13\xf1\x90\x77\x7f\xc5\x04\x3f\xcc\x1a" + "\x38\xf8\xcd\x1b\xbb\xd5\x57\xd1\x4a\x4c\x2e\x8a" + "\x2b\x49\x1e\x5c", + .expectedlen = 64, + .addtla = (unsigned char *) + "\xf9\x01\xf8\x16\x7a\x1d\xff\xde\x8e\x3c\x83\xe2" + "\x44\x85\xe7\xfe", + .addtlb = (unsigned char *) + "\x17\x1c\x09\x38\xc2\x38\x9f\x97\x87\x60\x55\xb4" + "\x82\x16\x62\x7f", + .addtllen = 16, + .pers = (unsigned char *) + "\x80\x08\xae\xe8\xe9\x69\x40\xc5\x08\x73\xc7\x9f" + "\x8e\xcf\xe0\x02", + .perslen = 16, + }, +}; + + +/* + * Tests implement the CAVS test approach as documented in + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/drbg/DRBGVS.pdf + */ + +/* + * CAVS test + * + * This function is not static as it is needed for as a private API + * call for the CAVS test tool. + */ +gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_cavs_test (struct gcry_drbg_test_vector *test, unsigned char *buf) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = 0; + struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg = NULL; + struct gcry_drbg_test_data test_data; + struct gcry_drbg_string addtl, pers, testentropy; + int coreref = 0; + int pr = 0; + + ret = gcry_drbg_algo_available (test->flags, &coreref); + if (ret) + goto outbuf; + + drbg = xcalloc_secure (1, sizeof (struct gcry_drbg_state)); + if (!drbg) + { + ret = GPG_ERR_ENOMEM; + goto outbuf; + } + + if (test->flags & DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST) + pr = 1; + + test_data.testentropy = &testentropy; + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&testentropy, test->entropy, test->entropylen); + drbg->test_data = &test_data; + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&pers, test->pers, test->perslen); + ret = gcry_drbg_instantiate (drbg, &pers, coreref, pr); + if (ret) + goto outbuf; + + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&addtl, test->addtla, test->addtllen); + if (test->entpra) + { + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&testentropy, test->entpra, test->entprlen); + drbg->test_data = &test_data; + } + gcry_drbg_generate_long (drbg, buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl); + + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&addtl, test->addtlb, test->addtllen); + if (test->entprb) + { + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&testentropy, test->entprb, test->entprlen); + drbg->test_data = &test_data; + } + gcry_drbg_generate_long (drbg, buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl); + gcry_drbg_uninstantiate (drbg); + +outbuf: + xfree (drbg); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Invoke the CAVS test and perform the final check whether the + * calculated random value matches the expected one. + * + * This function is not static as it is needed for as a private API + * call for the CAVS test tool. + */ +gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_healthcheck_one (struct gcry_drbg_test_vector * test) +{ + gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_ENOMEM; + unsigned char *buf = xcalloc_secure (1, test->expectedlen); + if (!buf) + return GPG_ERR_ENOMEM; + + ret = gcry_drbg_cavs_test (test, buf); + ret = memcmp (test->expected, buf, test->expectedlen); + + xfree (buf); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Tests as defined in 11.3.2 in addition to the cipher tests: testing + * of the error handling. + * + * Note, testing the reseed counter is not done as an automatic reseeding + * is performed in gcry_drbg_generate when the reseed counter is too large. + */ +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_healthcheck_sanity (struct gcry_drbg_test_vector *test) +{ + unsigned int len = 0; + struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg = NULL; + gpg_err_code_t ret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; + gpg_err_code_t tmpret = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; + struct gcry_drbg_test_data test_data; + struct gcry_drbg_string addtl, testentropy; + int coreref = 0; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t max_addtllen, max_request_bytes; + + /* only perform test in FIPS mode */ + if (0 == fips_mode ()) + return 0; + + buf = xcalloc_secure (1, test->expectedlen); + if (!buf) + return GPG_ERR_ENOMEM; + tmpret = gcry_drbg_algo_available (test->flags, &coreref); + if (tmpret) + goto outbuf; + drbg = xcalloc_secure (1, sizeof (struct gcry_drbg_state)); + if (!drbg) + goto outbuf; + + /* if the following tests fail, it is likely that there is a buffer + * overflow and we get a SIGSEV */ + ret = gcry_drbg_instantiate (drbg, NULL, coreref, 1); + if (ret) + goto outbuf; + max_addtllen = gcry_drbg_max_addtl (); + max_request_bytes = gcry_drbg_max_request_bytes (); + /* overflow addtllen with additonal info string */ + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&addtl, test->addtla, (max_addtllen + 1)); + len = gcry_drbg_generate (drbg, buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl); + if (len) + goto outdrbg; + + /* overflow max_bits */ + len = gcry_drbg_generate (drbg, buf, (max_request_bytes + 1), NULL); + if (len) + goto outdrbg; + gcry_drbg_uninstantiate (drbg); + + /* test failing entropy source as defined in 11.3.2 */ + test_data.testentropy = NULL; + test_data.fail_seed_source = 1; + drbg->test_data = &test_data; + tmpret = gcry_drbg_instantiate (drbg, NULL, coreref, 0); + if (!tmpret) + goto outdrbg; + test_data.fail_seed_source = 0; + + test_data.testentropy = &testentropy; + gcry_drbg_string_fill (&testentropy, test->entropy, test->entropylen); + /* overflow max addtllen with personalization string */ + tmpret = gcry_drbg_instantiate (drbg, &addtl, coreref, 0); + if (!tmpret) + goto outdrbg; + + dbg (("DRBG: Sanity tests for failure code paths successfully completed\n")); + ret = 0; + +outdrbg: + gcry_drbg_uninstantiate (drbg); +outbuf: + xfree (buf); + xfree (drbg); + return ret; +} + +/* + * DRBG Healthcheck function as required in SP800-90A + * + * return: + * 0 on success (all tests pass) + * >0 on error (return code indicate the number of failures) + */ +static int +gcry_drbg_healthcheck (void) +{ + int ret = 0; + ret += gcry_drbg_healthcheck_one (&gcry_drbg_test_nopr[0]); + ret += gcry_drbg_healthcheck_one (&gcry_drbg_test_nopr[1]); + ret += gcry_drbg_healthcheck_one (&gcry_drbg_test_nopr[2]); + ret += gcry_drbg_healthcheck_one (&gcry_drbg_test_pr[0]); + ret += gcry_drbg_healthcheck_one (&gcry_drbg_test_pr[1]); + ret += gcry_drbg_healthcheck_one (&gcry_drbg_test_pr[2]); + ret += gcry_drbg_healthcheck_sanity (&gcry_drbg_test_nopr[0]); + return ret; +} + +/* Run the self-tests. */ +gcry_error_t +_gcry_drbg_selftest (selftest_report_func_t report) +{ + gcry_err_code_t ec; + const char *errtxt = NULL; + gcry_drbg_lock (); + if (0 != gcry_drbg_healthcheck ()) + errtxt = "RNG output does not match known value"; + gcry_drbg_unlock (); + if (report && errtxt) + report ("random", 0, "KAT", errtxt); + ec = errtxt ? GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED : 0; + return gpg_error (ec); +} + +/*************************************************************** + * Cipher invocations requested by DRBG + ***************************************************************/ + +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_hmac (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned char *outval, const struct gcry_drbg_string *buf) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + gcry_md_hd_t hd; + + if (key) + { + err = + _gcry_md_open (&hd, drbg->core->backend_cipher, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC); + if (err) + return err; + err = _gcry_md_setkey (hd, key, gcry_drbg_statelen (drbg)); + if (err) + return err; + } + else + { + err = _gcry_md_open (&hd, drbg->core->backend_cipher, 0); + if (err) + return err; + } + for (; NULL != buf; buf = buf->next) + _gcry_md_write (hd, buf->buf, buf->len); + _gcry_md_final (hd); + memcpy (outval, _gcry_md_read (hd, drbg->core->backend_cipher), + gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg)); + _gcry_md_close (hd); + return 0; +} + +static gpg_err_code_t +gcry_drbg_sym (struct gcry_drbg_state *drbg, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned char *outval, const struct gcry_drbg_string *buf) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + gcry_cipher_hd_t hd; + + err = + _gcry_cipher_open (&hd, drbg->core->backend_cipher, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_ECB, + 0); + if (err) + return err; + if (gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) != + _gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (drbg->core->backend_cipher)) + return -GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; + if (gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg) < buf->len) + return -GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; + err = _gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, key, gcry_drbg_keylen (drbg)); + if (err) + return err; + /* in is only component */ + _gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, outval, gcry_drbg_blocklen (drbg), buf->buf, + buf->len); + _gcry_cipher_close (hd); + return 0; +} Index: libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/rand-internal.h =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.6.1.orig/random/rand-internal.h 2013-12-16 18:44:32.000000000 +0100 +++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/rand-internal.h 2014-12-15 17:29:44.287836306 +0100 @@ -88,6 +88,15 @@ gcry_err_code_t _gcry_rngfips_run_extern char *buffer, size_t buflen); void _gcry_rngfips_deinit_external_test (void *context); +/* drbg-gcry.h */ +void _gcry_drbg_init(int full); +void _gcry_drbg_close_fds(void); +void _gcry_drbg_dump_stats(void); +int _gcry_drbg_is_faked (void); +gcry_error_t _gcry_drbg_add_bytes (const void *buf, size_t buflen, int quality); +void _gcry_drbg_randomize (void *buffer, size_t length, + enum gcry_random_level level); +gcry_error_t _gcry_drbg_selftest (selftest_report_func_t report); /*-- random-system.c --*/ void _gcry_rngsystem_initialize (int full); Index: libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/random.c =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.6.1.orig/random/random.c 2014-01-29 10:48:38.000000000 +0100 +++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/random.c 2014-12-15 17:30:06.966101412 +0100 @@ -153,11 +153,13 @@ _gcry_random_initialize (int full) } if (fips_mode ()) - _gcry_rngfips_initialize (full); + /* _gcry_rngfips_initialize (full); */ + _gcry_drbg_init(full); else if (rng_types.standard) _gcry_rngcsprng_initialize (full); else if (rng_types.fips) - _gcry_rngfips_initialize (full); + _gcry_drbg_init(full); + /* _gcry_rngfips_initialize (full); */ else if (rng_types.system) _gcry_rngsystem_initialize (full); else @@ -174,11 +176,13 @@ _gcry_random_close_fds (void) the entropy gatherer. */ if (fips_mode ()) - _gcry_rngfips_close_fds (); + /* _gcry_rngfips_close_fds (); */ + _gcry_drbg_close_fds (); else if (rng_types.standard) _gcry_rngcsprng_close_fds (); else if (rng_types.fips) - _gcry_rngfips_close_fds (); + /* _gcry_rngfips_close_fds (); */ + _gcry_drbg_close_fds (); else if (rng_types.system) _gcry_rngsystem_close_fds (); else @@ -212,7 +216,8 @@ void _gcry_random_dump_stats (void) { if (fips_mode ()) - _gcry_rngfips_dump_stats (); + /* _gcry_rngfips_dump_stats (); */ + _gcry_drbg_dump_stats (); else _gcry_rngcsprng_dump_stats (); } @@ -271,7 +276,8 @@ int _gcry_random_is_faked (void) { if (fips_mode ()) - return _gcry_rngfips_is_faked (); + /* return _gcry_rngfips_is_faked (); */ + return _gcry_drbg_is_faked (); else return _gcry_rngcsprng_is_faked (); } @@ -301,11 +307,13 @@ static void do_randomize (void *buffer, size_t length, enum gcry_random_level level) { if (fips_mode ()) - _gcry_rngfips_randomize (buffer, length, level); + /* _gcry_rngfips_randomize (buffer, length, level); */ + _gcry_drbg_randomize (buffer, length, level); else if (rng_types.standard) _gcry_rngcsprng_randomize (buffer, length, level); else if (rng_types.fips) - _gcry_rngfips_randomize (buffer, length, level); + /* _gcry_rngfips_randomize (buffer, length, level); */ + _gcry_drbg_randomize (buffer, length, level); else if (rng_types.system) _gcry_rngsystem_randomize (buffer, length, level); else /* default */ @@ -437,7 +445,8 @@ _gcry_create_nonce (void *buffer, size_t nonce generator which is seeded by the RNG actual in use. */ if (fips_mode ()) { - _gcry_rngfips_create_nonce (buffer, length); + /* _gcry_rngfips_create_nonce (buffer, length); */ + _gcry_drbg_randomize (buffer, length, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM); return; } @@ -514,7 +523,8 @@ gpg_error_t _gcry_random_selftest (selftest_report_func_t report) { if (fips_mode ()) - return _gcry_rngfips_selftest (report); + /* return _gcry_rngfips_selftest (report); */ + return _gcry_drbg_selftest (report); else return 0; /* No selftests yet. */ } @@ -530,6 +540,7 @@ _gcry_random_init_external_test (void ** const void *seed, size_t seedlen, const void *dt, size_t dtlen) { + return GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; (void)flags; if (fips_mode ()) return _gcry_rngfips_init_external_test (r_context, flags, key, keylen, @@ -544,6 +555,7 @@ _gcry_random_init_external_test (void ** gcry_err_code_t _gcry_random_run_external_test (void *context, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { + return GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; if (fips_mode ()) return _gcry_rngfips_run_external_test (context, buffer, buflen); else @@ -554,6 +566,7 @@ _gcry_random_run_external_test (void *co void _gcry_random_deinit_external_test (void *context) { + return; if (fips_mode ()) _gcry_rngfips_deinit_external_test (context); } Index: libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/random.h =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.6.1.orig/random/random.h 2013-12-16 18:44:32.000000000 +0100 +++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/random.h 2014-12-15 17:29:44.287836306 +0100 @@ -54,7 +54,29 @@ gcry_err_code_t _gcry_random_run_externa char *buffer, size_t buflen); void _gcry_random_deinit_external_test (void *context); +/*-- drbg.c --*/ +gpg_err_code_t _gcry_drbg_reinit (u32 flags, struct gcry_drbg_string *pers); +/* private interfaces for testing of DRBG */ +struct gcry_drbg_test_vector +{ + u32 flags; + unsigned char *entropy; + size_t entropylen; + unsigned char *entpra; + unsigned char *entprb; + size_t entprlen; + unsigned char *addtla; + unsigned char *addtlb; + size_t addtllen; + unsigned char *pers; + size_t perslen; + unsigned char *expected; + size_t expectedlen; +}; +gpg_err_code_t gcry_drbg_cavs_test (struct gcry_drbg_test_vector *test, + unsigned char *buf); +gpg_err_code_t gcry_drbg_healthcheck_one (struct gcry_drbg_test_vector *test); /*-- rndegd.c --*/ gpg_error_t _gcry_rndegd_set_socket_name (const char *name); Index: libgcrypt-1.6.1/src/gcrypt.h.in =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.6.1.orig/src/gcrypt.h.in 2014-01-29 10:49:05.000000000 +0100 +++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/src/gcrypt.h.in 2014-12-15 17:31:03.551762944 +0100 @@ -329,7 +329,9 @@ enum gcry_ctl_cmds GCRYCTL_SET_CCM_LENGTHS = 69, GCRYCTL_CLOSE_RANDOM_DEVICE = 70, GCRYCTL_INACTIVATE_FIPS_FLAG = 71, - GCRYCTL_REACTIVATE_FIPS_FLAG = 72 + GCRYCTL_REACTIVATE_FIPS_FLAG = 72, + GCRYCTL_DRBG_REINIT = 74, + /* Note: 75 is used internally */ }; /* Perform various operations defined by CMD. */ @@ -1668,6 +1670,112 @@ int gcry_is_secure (const void *a) _GCRY /* Return true if Libgcrypt is in FIPS mode. */ #define gcry_fips_mode_active() !!gcry_control (GCRYCTL_FIPS_MODE_P, 0) +/* DRBG input data structure for DRBG generate with additional information + * string */ +struct gcry_drbg_gen { + unsigned char *outbuf; /* output buffer for random numbers */ + unsigned int outlen; /* size of output buffer */ + struct gcry_drbg_string *addtl; /* input buffer for + * additional information string */ +}; + +/* + * Concatenation Helper and string operation helper + * + * SP800-90A requires the concatenation of different data. To avoid copying + * buffers around or allocate additional memory, the following data structure + * is used to point to the original memory with its size. In addition, it + * is used to build a linked list. The linked list defines the concatenation + * of individual buffers. The order of memory block referenced in that + * linked list determines the order of concatenation. + */ +/* DRBG string definition */ +struct gcry_drbg_string { + const unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + struct gcry_drbg_string *next; +}; + +static inline void gcry_drbg_string_fill(struct gcry_drbg_string *string, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + string->buf = buf; + string->len = len; + string->next = NULL; +} + +/* this is a wrapper function for users of libgcrypt */ +static inline void gcry_randomize_drbg(void *outbuf, size_t outlen, + enum gcry_random_level level, + struct gcry_drbg_string *addtl) +{ + struct gcry_drbg_gen genbuf; + genbuf.outbuf = (unsigned char *)outbuf; + genbuf.outlen = outlen; + genbuf.addtl = addtl; + gcry_randomize(&genbuf, 0, level); +} + +/* + * DRBG flags bitmasks + * + * 31 (B) 28 19 (A) 0 + * +-+-+-+--------+---+-----------+-----+ + * |~|~|u|~~~~~~~~| 3 | 2 | 1 | + * +-+-+-+--------+- -+-----------+-----+ + * ctl flg| |drbg use selection flags + * + */ + +/* internal state control flags (B) */ +#define DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST ((u_int32_t)1<<28) + +/* CTR type modifiers (A.1)*/ +#define DRBG_CTRAES ((u_int32_t)1<<0) +#define DRBG_CTRSERPENT ((u_int32_t)1<<1) +#define DRBG_CTRTWOFISH ((u_int32_t)1<<2) +#define DRBG_CTR_MASK (DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_CTRSERPENT | DRBG_CTRTWOFISH) + +/* HASH type modifiers (A.2)*/ +#define DRBG_HASHSHA1 ((u_int32_t)1<<4) +#define DRBG_HASHSHA224 ((u_int32_t)1<<5) +#define DRBG_HASHSHA256 ((u_int32_t)1<<6) +#define DRBG_HASHSHA384 ((u_int32_t)1<<7) +#define DRBG_HASHSHA512 ((u_int32_t)1<<8) +#define DRBG_HASH_MASK (DRBG_HASHSHA1 | DRBG_HASHSHA224 | \ + DRBG_HASHSHA256 | DRBG_HASHSHA384 | \ + DRBG_HASHSHA512) +/* type modifiers (A.3)*/ +#define DRBG_HMAC ((u_int32_t)1<<12) +#define DRBG_SYM128 ((u_int32_t)1<<13) +#define DRBG_SYM192 ((u_int32_t)1<<14) +#define DRBG_SYM256 ((u_int32_t)1<<15) +#define DRBG_TYPE_MASK (DRBG_HMAC | DRBG_SYM128 | DRBG_SYM192 | \ + DRBG_SYM256) +#define DRBG_CIPHER_MASK (DRBG_CTR_MASK | DRBG_HASH_MASK | DRBG_TYPE_MASK) + +#define DRBG_PR_CTRAES128 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM128) +#define DRBG_PR_CTRAES192 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM192) +#define DRBG_PR_CTRAES256 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM256) +#define DRBG_NOPR_CTRAES128 (DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM128) +#define DRBG_NOPR_CTRAES192 (DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM192) +#define DRBG_NOPR_CTRAES256 (DRBG_CTRAES | DRBG_SYM256) +#define DRBG_PR_HASHSHA1 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA1) +#define DRBG_PR_HASHSHA256 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA256) +#define DRBG_PR_HASHSHA384 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA384) +#define DRBG_PR_HASHSHA512 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA512) +#define DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA1 (DRBG_HASHSHA1) +#define DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA256 (DRBG_HASHSHA256) +#define DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA384 (DRBG_HASHSHA384) +#define DRBG_NOPR_HASHSHA512 (DRBG_HASHSHA512) +#define DRBG_PR_HMACSHA1 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA1 | DRBG_HMAC) +#define DRBG_PR_HMACSHA256 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA256|DRBG_HMAC) +#define DRBG_PR_HMACSHA384 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA384|DRBG_HMAC) +#define DRBG_PR_HMACSHA512 (DRBG_PREDICTION_RESIST | DRBG_HASHSHA512|DRBG_HMAC) +#define DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA1 (DRBG_HASHSHA1 | DRBG_HMAC) +#define DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA256 (DRBG_HASHSHA256 | DRBG_HMAC) +#define DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA384 (DRBG_HASHSHA384 | DRBG_HMAC) +#define DRBG_NOPR_HMACSHA512 (DRBG_HASHSHA512 | DRBG_HMAC) #if 0 /* (Keep Emacsens' auto-indent happy.) */ { Index: libgcrypt-1.6.1/src/global.c =================================================================== --- libgcrypt-1.6.1.orig/src/global.c 2014-01-29 10:49:05.000000000 +0100 +++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/src/global.c 2014-12-15 17:30:05.834088178 +0100 @@ -680,6 +680,28 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd, rc = GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; break; + case GCRYCTL_DRBG_REINIT: + { + u32 flags = va_arg (arg_ptr, u32); + struct gcry_drbg_string *pers = va_arg (arg_ptr, + struct gcry_drbg_string *); + rc = _gcry_drbg_reinit(flags, pers); + } + break; + + case 75: + { + struct gcry_drbg_test_vector *test = + va_arg (arg_ptr, struct gcry_drbg_test_vector *); + unsigned char *buf = va_arg (arg_ptr, unsigned char *); + + if (buf) + rc = gcry_drbg_cavs_test (test, buf); + else + rc = gcry_drbg_healthcheck_one (test); + } + break; + default: _gcry_set_preferred_rng_type (0); rc = GPG_ERR_INV_OP;
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