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SUSE:SLE-12:Update
polkit.19838
CVE-2019-6133.patch
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File CVE-2019-6133.patch of Package polkit.19838
diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitsubject.c b/src/polkit/polkitsubject.c index d4c1182141d486fb0a2005d336f3ac05213f65a5..ccabd0a24627de8e785fc0dc31527082f8aecda0 100644 --- a/src/polkit/polkitsubject.c +++ b/src/polkit/polkitsubject.c @@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ polkit_subject_hash (PolkitSubject *subject) * @b: A #PolkitSubject. * * Checks if @a and @b are equal, ie. represent the same subject. + * However, avoid calling polkit_subject_equal() to compare two processes; + * for more information see the `PolkitUnixProcess` documentation. * * This function can be used in e.g. g_hash_table_new(). * diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.c b/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.c index b02b25894ad120d88ea21d4c96ac8dca1821fcf2..78d72514ffd1ddd97ac28a678cf384f4045bb621 100644 --- a/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.c +++ b/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.c @@ -51,7 +51,10 @@ * @title: PolkitUnixProcess * @short_description: Unix processs * - * An object for representing a UNIX process. + * An object for representing a UNIX process. NOTE: This object as + * designed is now known broken; a mechanism to exploit a delay in + * start time in the Linux kernel was identified. Avoid + * calling polkit_subject_equal() to compare two processes. * * To uniquely identify processes, both the process id and the start * time of the process (a monotonic increasing value representing the @@ -66,6 +69,72 @@ * polkit_unix_process_new_for_owner() with trusted data. */ +/* See https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/polkit/polkit/issues/75 + + But quoting the original email in full here to ensure it's preserved: + + From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> + Subject: [SECURITY] polkit: temporary auth hijacking via PID reuse and non-atomic fork + Date: Wednesday, October 10, 2018 5:34 PM + +When a (non-root) user attempts to e.g. control systemd units in the system +instance from an active session over DBus, the access is gated by a polkit +policy that requires "auth_admin_keep" auth. This results in an auth prompt +being shown to the user, asking the user to confirm the action by entering the +password of an administrator account. + +After the action has been confirmed, the auth decision for "auth_admin_keep" is +cached for up to five minutes. Subject to some restrictions, similar actions can +then be performed in this timespan without requiring re-auth: + + - The PID of the DBus client requesting the new action must match the PID of + the DBus client requesting the old action (based on SO_PEERCRED information + forwarded by the DBus daemon). + - The "start time" of the client's PID (as seen in /proc/$pid/stat, field 22) + must not have changed. The granularity of this timestamp is in the + millisecond range. + - polkit polls every two seconds whether a process with the expected start time + still exists. If not, the temporary auth entry is purged. + +Without the start time check, this would obviously be buggy because an attacker +could simply wait for the legitimate client to disappear, then create a new +client with the same PID. + +Unfortunately, the start time check is bypassable because fork() is not atomic. +Looking at the source code of copy_process() in the kernel: + + p->start_time = ktime_get_ns(); + p->real_start_time = ktime_get_boot_ns(); + [...] + retval = copy_thread_tls(clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, tls); + if (retval) + goto bad_fork_cleanup_io; + + if (pid != &init_struct_pid) { + pid = alloc_pid(p->nsproxy->pid_ns_for_children); + if (IS_ERR(pid)) { + retval = PTR_ERR(pid); + goto bad_fork_cleanup_thread; + } + } + +The ktime_get_boot_ns() call is where the "start time" of the process is +recorded. The alloc_pid() call is where a free PID is allocated. In between +these, some time passes; and because the copy_thread_tls() call between them can +access userspace memory when sys_clone() is invoked through the 32-bit syscall +entry point, an attacker can even stall the kernel arbitrarily long at this +point (by supplying a pointer into userspace memory that is associated with a +userfaultfd or is backed by a custom FUSE filesystem). + +This means that an attacker can immediately call sys_clone() when the victim +process is created, often resulting in a process that has the exact same start +time reported in procfs; and then the attacker can delay the alloc_pid() call +until after the victim process has died and the PID assignment has cycled +around. This results in an attacker process that polkit can't distinguish from +the victim process. +*/ + + /** * PolkitUnixProcess: * diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c index a1630b9535333ad6c728a198cc6bc8a4e55211a9..80e814155c2a0f58a4e8301eb2b7c4910fa31782 100644 --- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c +++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendinteractiveauthority.c @@ -3031,6 +3031,43 @@ temporary_authorization_store_free (TemporaryAuthorizationStore *store) g_free (store); } +/* See the comment at the top of polkitunixprocess.c */ +static gboolean +subject_equal_for_authz (PolkitSubject *a, + PolkitSubject *b) +{ + if (!polkit_subject_equal (a, b)) + return FALSE; + + /* Now special case unix processes, as we want to protect against + * pid reuse by including the UID. + */ + if (POLKIT_IS_UNIX_PROCESS (a) && POLKIT_IS_UNIX_PROCESS (b)) { + PolkitUnixProcess *ap = (PolkitUnixProcess*)a; + int uid_a = polkit_unix_process_get_uid ((PolkitUnixProcess*)a); + PolkitUnixProcess *bp = (PolkitUnixProcess*)b; + int uid_b = polkit_unix_process_get_uid ((PolkitUnixProcess*)b); + + if (uid_a != -1 && uid_b != -1) + { + if (uid_a == uid_b) + { + return TRUE; + } + else + { + g_printerr ("denying slowfork; pid %d uid %d != %d!\n", + polkit_unix_process_get_pid (ap), + uid_a, uid_b); + return FALSE; + } + } + /* Fall through; one of the uids is unset so we can't reliably compare */ + } + + return TRUE; +} + static gboolean temporary_authorization_store_has_authorization (TemporaryAuthorizationStore *store, PolkitSubject *subject, @@ -3073,7 +3110,7 @@ temporary_authorization_store_has_authorization (TemporaryAuthorizationStore *st TemporaryAuthorization *authorization = l->data; if (strcmp (action_id, authorization->action_id) == 0 && - polkit_subject_equal (subject_to_use, authorization->subject)) + subject_equal_for_authz (subject_to_use, authorization->subject)) { ret = TRUE; if (out_tmp_authz_id != NULL)
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