File 5d516531-x86-xpti-dont-leak-TSS-adjacent-data.p... of Package xen

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File 5d516531-x86-xpti-dont-leak-TSS-adjacent-data.patch of Package xen (Revision d8e25f42ca14b566b71c7b616cfb0f4b)

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# Commit 7888440625617693487495a7842e6a991ead2647
# Date 2019-08-12 14:10:09 +0100
# Author Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
x86/xpti: Don't leak TSS-adjacent percpu data via Meltdown

The XPTI work restricted the visibility of most of memory, but missed a few
aspects when it came to the TSS.

Given that the TSS is just an object in percpu data, the 4k mapping for it
created in setup_cpu_root_pgt() maps adjacent percpu data, making it all
leakable via Meltdown, even when XPTI is in use.

Furthermore, no care is taken to check that the TSS doesn't cross a page
boundary.  As it turns out, struct tss_struct is aligned on its size which
does prevent it straddling a page boundary.

Rework the TSS types while making this change.  Rename tss_struct to tss64, to
mirror the existing tss32 structure we have in HVM's Tast Switch logic.  Drop
tss64's alignment and __cacheline_filler[] field.

Introduce tss_page which contains a single tss64 and keeps the rest of the
page clear, so no adjacent data can be leaked.  Move the definition from
setup.c to traps.c, which is a more appropriate place for it to live.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ void load_system_tables(void)
 	unsigned long stack_bottom = get_stack_bottom(),
 		stack_top = stack_bottom & ~(STACK_SIZE - 1);
 
-	struct tss_struct *tss = &this_cpu(init_tss);
+	struct tss64 *tss = &this_cpu(tss_page).tss;
 	seg_desc_t *gdt =
 		this_cpu(gdt_table) - FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_ENTRY;
 	seg_desc_t *compat_gdt =
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ void load_system_tables(void)
 		.limit = (IDT_ENTRIES * sizeof(idt_entry_t)) - 1,
 	};
 
-	*tss = (struct tss_struct){
+	*tss = (struct tss64){
 		/* Main stack for interrupts/exceptions. */
 		.rsp0 = stack_bottom,
 
@@ -767,16 +767,12 @@ void load_system_tables(void)
 		.bitmap = IOBMP_INVALID_OFFSET,
 	};
 
-	_set_tssldt_desc(
-		gdt + TSS_ENTRY,
-		(unsigned long)tss,
-		offsetof(struct tss_struct, __cacheline_filler) - 1,
-		SYS_DESC_tss_avail);
-	_set_tssldt_desc(
-		compat_gdt + TSS_ENTRY,
-		(unsigned long)tss,
-		offsetof(struct tss_struct, __cacheline_filler) - 1,
-		SYS_DESC_tss_busy);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*tss) <= 0x67); /* Mandated by the architecture. */
+
+	_set_tssldt_desc(gdt + TSS_ENTRY, (unsigned long)tss,
+			 sizeof(*tss) - 1, SYS_DESC_tss_avail);
+	_set_tssldt_desc(compat_gdt + TSS_ENTRY, (unsigned long)tss,
+			 sizeof(*tss) - 1, SYS_DESC_tss_busy);
 
 	lgdt(&gdtr);
 	lidt(&idtr);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ static void vmx_set_host_env(struct vcpu
               (unsigned long)(this_cpu(gdt_table) - FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_ENTRY));
     __vmwrite(HOST_IDTR_BASE, (unsigned long)idt_tables[cpu]);
 
-    __vmwrite(HOST_TR_BASE, (unsigned long)&per_cpu(init_tss, cpu));
+    __vmwrite(HOST_TR_BASE, (unsigned long)&per_cpu(tss_page, cpu).tss);
 
     __vmwrite(HOST_SYSENTER_ESP, get_stack_bottom());
 
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
 #include <xen/domain_page.h>
 #include <xen/version.h>
 #include <xen/gdbstub.h>
-#include <xen/percpu.h>
 #include <xen/hypercall.h>
 #include <xen/keyhandler.h>
 #include <xen/numa.h>
@@ -101,8 +100,6 @@ unsigned long __read_mostly xen_phys_sta
 
 unsigned long __read_mostly xen_virt_end;
 
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tss_struct, init_tss);
-
 char __section(".bss.stack_aligned") __aligned(STACK_SIZE)
     cpu0_stack[STACK_SIZE];
 
--- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
@@ -830,7 +830,11 @@ static int setup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigned i
     if ( !rc )
         rc = clone_mapping(idt_tables[cpu], rpt);
     if ( !rc )
-        rc = clone_mapping(&per_cpu(init_tss, cpu), rpt);
+    {
+        BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(this_cpu(tss_page)) != PAGE_SIZE);
+
+        rc = clone_mapping(&per_cpu(tss_page, cpu).tss, rpt);
+    }
     if ( !rc )
         rc = clone_mapping((void *)per_cpu(stubs.addr, cpu), rpt);
 
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -108,6 +108,12 @@ idt_entry_t __section(".bss.page_aligned
 /* Pointer to the IDT of every CPU. */
 idt_entry_t *idt_tables[NR_CPUS] __read_mostly;
 
+/*
+ * The TSS is smaller than a page, but we give it a full page to avoid
+ * adjacent per-cpu data leaking via Meltdown when XPTI is in use.
+ */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct tss_page, tss_page);
+
 bool (*ioemul_handle_quirk)(
     u8 opcode, char *io_emul_stub, struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
 
@@ -559,7 +565,7 @@ void show_stack_overflow(unsigned int cp
 
     printk("Valid stack range: %p-%p, sp=%p, tss.rsp0=%p\n",
            (void *)esp_top, (void *)esp_bottom, (void *)esp,
-           (void *)per_cpu(init_tss, cpu).rsp0);
+           (void *)per_cpu(tss_page, cpu).tss.rsp0);
 
     /*
      * Trigger overflow trace if %esp is anywhere within the guard page, or
@@ -1929,7 +1935,7 @@ static void __init set_intr_gate(unsigne
 
 void load_TR(void)
 {
-    struct tss_struct *tss = &this_cpu(init_tss);
+    struct tss64 *tss = &this_cpu(tss_page).tss;
     struct desc_ptr old_gdt, tss_gdt = {
         .base = (long)(this_cpu(gdt_table) - FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_ENTRY),
         .limit = LAST_RESERVED_GDT_BYTE
@@ -1937,14 +1943,10 @@ void load_TR(void)
 
     _set_tssldt_desc(
         this_cpu(gdt_table) + TSS_ENTRY - FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_ENTRY,
-        (unsigned long)tss,
-        offsetof(struct tss_struct, __cacheline_filler) - 1,
-        SYS_DESC_tss_avail);
+        (unsigned long)tss, sizeof(*tss) - 1, SYS_DESC_tss_avail);
     _set_tssldt_desc(
         this_cpu(compat_gdt_table) + TSS_ENTRY - FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_ENTRY,
-        (unsigned long)tss,
-        offsetof(struct tss_struct, __cacheline_filler) - 1,
-        SYS_DESC_tss_busy);
+        (unsigned long)tss, sizeof(*tss) - 1, SYS_DESC_tss_busy);
 
     /* Switch to non-compat GDT (which has B bit clear) to execute LTR. */
     asm volatile (
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static always_inline void __mwait(unsign
 #define IOBMP_BYTES             8192
 #define IOBMP_INVALID_OFFSET    0x8000
 
-struct __packed __cacheline_aligned tss_struct {
+struct __packed tss64 {
     uint32_t :32;
     uint64_t rsp0, rsp1, rsp2;
     uint64_t :64;
@@ -427,9 +427,11 @@ struct __packed __cacheline_aligned tss_
     uint64_t ist[7];
     uint64_t :64;
     uint16_t :16, bitmap;
-    /* Pads the TSS to be cacheline-aligned (total size is 0x80). */
-    uint8_t __cacheline_filler[24];
 };
+struct tss_page {
+    struct tss64 __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) tss;
+};
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct tss_page, tss_page);
 
 #define IST_NONE 0UL
 #define IST_DF   1UL
@@ -468,7 +470,6 @@ static inline void disable_each_ist(idt_
 extern idt_entry_t idt_table[];
 extern idt_entry_t *idt_tables[];
 
-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct tss_struct, init_tss);
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(root_pgentry_t *, root_pgt);
 
 extern void write_ptbase(struct vcpu *v);

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File 5d516531-x86-xpti-dont-leak-TSS-adjacent-data.patch of Package xen (Revision d8e25f42ca14b566b71c7b616cfb0f4b)

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