File cyrus-sasl-issue-402.patch of Package cyrus-sasl

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File cyrus-sasl-issue-402.patch of Package cyrus-sasl (Revision d22b60e82b2754f7a572002675a45c62)

Currently displaying revision d22b60e82b2754f7a572002675a45c62 , Show latest

commit 06260404c047e111f86b67de2862ec124f8fe2ec
Author: Sergio Gelato <Sergio.Gelato@astro.su.se>
Date:   Wed Oct 21 20:45:17 2015 +0200

Postpone computing maxbufsize until after security layers have been set.
    
    Prior to this commit it was possible for the GSSAPI mechanism acceptor to
    return a zero maxbufsize together with the integrity and/or confidentiality
    layer bits set. This is not a workable combination.
    
    Solve this by not zeroing maxbufsize (as required by RFC 4752 when only
    the only security layer selected is authentication) until computation of
    the security layer mask is complete. The condition for zeroing maxbufsize
    then becomes much more straightforward.

diff --git a/plugins/gssapi.c b/plugins/gssapi.c
index 2fd1b3b..e861864 100644
--- a/plugins/gssapi.c
+++ b/plugins/gssapi.c
@@ -1007,21 +1007,14 @@ gssapi_server_mech_ssfcap(context_t *text,
     }
 
     /* build up our security properties token */
-    if (text->requiressf != 0 &&
-	(text->qop & (LAYER_INTEGRITY|LAYER_CONFIDENTIALITY))) {
-	if (params->props.maxbufsize > 0xFFFFFF) {
-	    /* make sure maxbufsize isn't too large */
-	    /* maxbufsize = 0xFFFFFF */
-	    sasldata[1] = sasldata[2] = sasldata[3] = 0xFF;
-	} else {
-	    sasldata[1] = (params->props.maxbufsize >> 16) & 0xFF;
-	    sasldata[2] = (params->props.maxbufsize >> 8) & 0xFF;
-	    sasldata[3] = (params->props.maxbufsize >> 0) & 0xFF;
-	}
+    if (params->props.maxbufsize > 0xFFFFFF) {
+	/* make sure maxbufsize isn't too large */
+	/* maxbufsize = 0xFFFFFF */
+	sasldata[1] = sasldata[2] = sasldata[3] = 0xFF;
     } else {
-	/* From RFC 4752: "The client verifies that the server maximum buffer is 0
-	   if the server does not advertise support for any security layer." */
-	sasldata[1] = sasldata[2] = sasldata[3] = 0;
+	sasldata[1] = (params->props.maxbufsize >> 16) & 0xFF;
+	sasldata[2] = (params->props.maxbufsize >> 8) & 0xFF;
+	sasldata[3] = (params->props.maxbufsize >> 0) & 0xFF;
     }
 
     sasldata[0] = 0;
@@ -1047,6 +1040,12 @@ gssapi_server_mech_ssfcap(context_t *text,
 	sasldata[0] |= LAYER_CONFIDENTIALITY;
     }
 
+    if ((sasldata[0] & ~LAYER_NONE) == 0) {
+	/* From RFC 4752: "The client verifies that the server maximum buffer is 0
+	   if the server does not advertise support for any security layer." */
+	sasldata[1] = sasldata[2] = sasldata[3] = 0;
+    }
+
     /* Remember what we want and can offer */
     text->qop = sasldata[0];
 
@@ -1401,7 +1400,7 @@ int gssapiv2_server_plug_init(
 		       keytab, errno);
 	    return SASL_FAIL;
 	}
-	
+
 	if(strlen(keytab) > 1024) {
 	    utils->log(NULL, SASL_LOG_ERR,
 		       "path to keytab is > 1024 characters");

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File cyrus-sasl-issue-402.patch of Package cyrus-sasl (Revision d22b60e82b2754f7a572002675a45c62)

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