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SUSE:SLE-15-SP7:Update
mozilla-nss.15194
nss-fips-combined-hash-sign-dsa-ecdsa.patch
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File nss-fips-combined-hash-sign-dsa-ecdsa.patch of Package mozilla-nss.15194
commit c0ae706da7ce51b9585b0a35430a0efae446a981 Author: Hans Petter Jansson <hpj@cl.no> Date: Fri Apr 17 16:02:23 2020 +0200 Add CKM_(EC)DSA_SHAxxx mechs. diff --git a/nss/cmd/lib/pk11table.c b/nss/cmd/lib/pk11table.c index ec5d889..d7b60e2 100644 --- a/nss/cmd/lib/pk11table.c +++ b/nss/cmd/lib/pk11table.c @@ -274,6 +274,10 @@ const Constant _consts[] = { mkEntry(CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN, Mechanism), mkEntry(CKM_DSA, Mechanism), mkEntry(CKM_DSA_SHA1, Mechanism), + mkEntry(CKM_DSA_SHA224, Mechanism), + mkEntry(CKM_DSA_SHA256, Mechanism), + mkEntry(CKM_DSA_SHA384, Mechanism), + mkEntry(CKM_DSA_SHA512, Mechanism), mkEntry(CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, Mechanism), mkEntry(CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, Mechanism), mkEntry(CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE, Mechanism), @@ -439,6 +443,10 @@ const Constant _consts[] = { mkEntry(CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, Mechanism), mkEntry(CKM_ECDSA, Mechanism), mkEntry(CKM_ECDSA_SHA1, Mechanism), + mkEntry(CKM_ECDSA_SHA224, Mechanism), + mkEntry(CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, Mechanism), + mkEntry(CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, Mechanism), + mkEntry(CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, Mechanism), mkEntry(CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, Mechanism), mkEntry(CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, Mechanism), mkEntry(CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE, Mechanism), diff --git a/nss/lib/pk11wrap/debug_module.c b/nss/lib/pk11wrap/debug_module.c index 59b89c3..74ed3c7 100644 --- a/nss/lib/pk11wrap/debug_module.c +++ b/nss/lib/pk11wrap/debug_module.c @@ -424,10 +424,18 @@ print_mechanism(CK_MECHANISM_PTR m) CASE(CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN); CASE(CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN); CASE(CKM_DSA_SHA1); + CASE(CKM_DSA_SHA224); + CASE(CKM_DSA_SHA256); + CASE(CKM_DSA_SHA384); + CASE(CKM_DSA_SHA512); CASE(CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE); CASE(CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE); CASE(CKM_ECDSA); CASE(CKM_ECDSA_SHA1); + CASE(CKM_ECDSA_SHA224); + CASE(CKM_ECDSA_SHA256); + CASE(CKM_ECDSA_SHA384); + CASE(CKM_ECDSA_SHA512); CASE(CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE); CASE(CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN); /* also CASE(CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN); */ CASE(CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY); diff --git a/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c b/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c index cfbe45b..c7f5272 100644 --- a/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c +++ b/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11mech.c @@ -366,6 +366,10 @@ PK11_GetKeyType(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, unsigned long len) return CKK_RSA; case CKM_DSA: case CKM_DSA_SHA1: + case CKM_DSA_SHA224: + case CKM_DSA_SHA256: + case CKM_DSA_SHA384: + case CKM_DSA_SHA512: case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN: return CKK_DSA; case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE: @@ -376,6 +380,10 @@ PK11_GetKeyType(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, unsigned long len) return CKK_KEA; case CKM_ECDSA: case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1: + case CKM_ECDSA_SHA224: + case CKM_ECDSA_SHA256: + case CKM_ECDSA_SHA384: + case CKM_ECDSA_SHA512: case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN: /* aka CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN */ case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE: return CKK_EC; /* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated */ diff --git a/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c b/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c index 05e3ac1..79f1a50 100644 --- a/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c +++ b/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c @@ -278,6 +278,10 @@ static const struct mechanismList mechanisms[] = { { CKM_DSA, { DSA_MIN_P_BITS, DSA_MAX_P_BITS, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE }, { CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, { DSA_MIN_P_BITS, DSA_MAX_P_BITS, CKF_GENERATE }, PR_TRUE }, { CKM_DSA_SHA1, { DSA_MIN_P_BITS, DSA_MAX_P_BITS, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE }, + { CKM_DSA_SHA224, { DSA_MIN_P_BITS, DSA_MAX_P_BITS, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE }, + { CKM_DSA_SHA256, { DSA_MIN_P_BITS, DSA_MAX_P_BITS, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE }, + { CKM_DSA_SHA384, { DSA_MIN_P_BITS, DSA_MAX_P_BITS, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE }, + { CKM_DSA_SHA512, { DSA_MIN_P_BITS, DSA_MAX_P_BITS, CKF_SN_VR }, PR_TRUE }, /* -------------------- Diffie Hellman Operations --------------------- */ /* no diffie hellman yet */ { CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, { DH_MIN_P_BITS, DH_MAX_P_BITS, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR }, PR_TRUE }, @@ -287,6 +291,10 @@ static const struct mechanismList mechanisms[] = { { CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, { EC_MIN_KEY_BITS, EC_MAX_KEY_BITS, CKF_DERIVE | CKF_EC_BPNU }, PR_TRUE }, { CKM_ECDSA, { EC_MIN_KEY_BITS, EC_MAX_KEY_BITS, CKF_SN_VR | CKF_EC_BPNU }, PR_TRUE }, { CKM_ECDSA_SHA1, { EC_MIN_KEY_BITS, EC_MAX_KEY_BITS, CKF_SN_VR | CKF_EC_BPNU }, PR_TRUE }, + { CKM_ECDSA_SHA224, { EC_MIN_KEY_BITS, EC_MAX_KEY_BITS, CKF_SN_VR | CKF_EC_BPNU }, PR_TRUE }, + { CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, { EC_MIN_KEY_BITS, EC_MAX_KEY_BITS, CKF_SN_VR | CKF_EC_BPNU }, PR_TRUE }, + { CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, { EC_MIN_KEY_BITS, EC_MAX_KEY_BITS, CKF_SN_VR | CKF_EC_BPNU }, PR_TRUE }, + { CKM_ECDSA_SHA512, { EC_MIN_KEY_BITS, EC_MAX_KEY_BITS, CKF_SN_VR | CKF_EC_BPNU }, PR_TRUE }, /* ------------------------- RC2 Operations --------------------------- */ { CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN, { 1, 128, CKF_GENERATE }, PR_TRUE }, { CKM_RC2_ECB, { 1, 128, CKF_EN_DE_WR_UN }, PR_TRUE }, diff --git a/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c index d7307cd..d700041 100644 --- a/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c +++ b/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c @@ -2473,6 +2473,36 @@ sftk_RSAHashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig, hash, hashLen); } +static SECStatus +sftk_DSAHashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig, + unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) +{ + PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYDSAKey); + if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYDSAKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + return SECFailure; + } + + return DSA_HashSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, maxLen, + hash, hashLen); +} + +static SECStatus +sftk_ECDSAHashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig, + unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) +{ + PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYECKey); + if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYECKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + return SECFailure; + } + + return ECDSA_HashSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, maxLen, + hash, hashLen); +} + /* XXX Old template; want to expunge it eventually. */ static DERTemplate SECAlgorithmIDTemplate[] = { { DER_SEQUENCE, @@ -2635,7 +2665,7 @@ nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen, static SECStatus nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen, - void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) + const void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) { SECItem signature, digest; SECStatus rv; @@ -2653,6 +2683,22 @@ nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, return rv; } +SECStatus +DSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, + unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub(key, sig, sigLen, maxLen, hash, hashLen); + + if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { + sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; + } + + return rv; +} + static SECStatus nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen, void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) @@ -2670,7 +2716,7 @@ nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen, static SECStatus nsc_ECDSASignStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen, - void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) + const void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) { SECItem signature, digest; SECStatus rv; @@ -2688,6 +2734,22 @@ nsc_ECDSASignStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, return rv; } +SECStatus +ECDSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, + unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = nsc_ECDSASignStub(key, sig, sigLen, maxLen, hash, hashLen); + + if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { + sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; + } + + return rv; +} + /* NSC_SignInit setups up the signing operations. There are three basic * types of signing: * (1) the tradition single part, where "Raw RSA" or "Raw DSA" is applied @@ -2757,6 +2819,36 @@ NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, info->hashOid = SEC_OID_##mmm; \ goto finish_rsa; +#define INIT_DSA_SIGN_MECH(mmm) \ + case CKM_DSA_##mmm: \ + context->multi = PR_TRUE; \ + crv = sftk_doSub##mmm(context); \ + if (crv != CKR_OK) \ + break; \ + context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_DSAHashSign; \ + info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo); \ + if (info == NULL) { \ + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \ + break; \ + } \ + info->hashOid = SEC_OID_##mmm; \ + goto finish_dsa; + +#define INIT_ECDSA_SIGN_MECH(mmm) \ + case CKM_ECDSA_##mmm: \ + context->multi = PR_TRUE; \ + crv = sftk_doSub##mmm(context); \ + if (crv != CKR_OK) \ + break; \ + context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_ECDSAHashSign; \ + info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo); \ + if (info == NULL) { \ + crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \ + break; \ + } \ + info->hashOid = SEC_OID_##mmm; \ + goto finish_ecdsa; + switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD5) INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD2) @@ -2824,13 +2916,15 @@ NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key); break; - case CKM_DSA_SHA1: - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) - break; - /* fall through */ + INIT_DSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA1) + INIT_DSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA224) + INIT_DSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA256) + INIT_DSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA384) + INIT_DSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA512) + case CKM_DSA: + context->update = (SFTKCipher)nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub; + finish_dsa: if (key_type != CKK_DSA) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; @@ -2839,20 +2933,32 @@ NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, if (privKey == NULL) { break; } - context->cipherInfo = privKey; - context->update = (SFTKCipher)nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub; - context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null : (SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey; - context->maxLen = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN; + /* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism. + * It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final + * signature. + */ + if (info) { + info->key = privKey; + context->cipherInfo = info; + context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space; + } else { + context->cipherInfo = privKey; + context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null : (SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey; + } + + context->maxLen = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN; break; - case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1: - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) - break; - /* fall through */ + INIT_ECDSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA1) + INIT_ECDSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA224) + INIT_ECDSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA256) + INIT_ECDSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA384) + INIT_ECDSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA512) + case CKM_ECDSA: + context->update = (SFTKCipher)nsc_ECDSASignStub; + finish_ecdsa: if (key_type != CKK_EC) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; @@ -2862,11 +2968,21 @@ NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } - context->cipherInfo = privKey; - context->update = (SFTKCipher)nsc_ECDSASignStub; - context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null : (SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey; - context->maxLen = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2; + /* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism. + * It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final + * signature. + */ + if (info) { + info->key = privKey; + context->cipherInfo = info; + context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space; + } else { + context->cipherInfo = privKey; + context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null : (SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey; + } + + context->maxLen = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2; break; #define INIT_HMAC_MECH(mmm) \ @@ -3469,6 +3585,22 @@ NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, info->hashOid = SEC_OID_##mmm; \ goto finish_rsa; +#define INIT_DSA_VFY_MECH(mmm) \ + case CKM_DSA_##mmm: \ + context->multi = PR_TRUE; \ + crv = sftk_doSub##mmm(context); \ + if (crv != CKR_OK) \ + break; \ + goto finish_dsa; + +#define INIT_ECDSA_VFY_MECH(mmm) \ + case CKM_ECDSA_##mmm: \ + context->multi = PR_TRUE; \ + crv = sftk_doSub##mmm(context); \ + if (crv != CKR_OK) \ + break; \ + goto finish_ecdsa; + switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD5) INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD2) @@ -3533,13 +3665,15 @@ NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space; context->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_RSACheckSignPSS; break; - case CKM_DSA_SHA1: - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) - break; - /* fall through */ + + INIT_DSA_VFY_MECH(SHA1) + INIT_DSA_VFY_MECH(SHA224) + INIT_DSA_VFY_MECH(SHA256) + INIT_DSA_VFY_MECH(SHA384) + INIT_DSA_VFY_MECH(SHA512) + case CKM_DSA: + finish_dsa: if (key_type != CKK_DSA) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; @@ -3552,13 +3686,15 @@ NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, context->verify = (SFTKVerify)nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub; context->destroy = sftk_Null; break; - case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1: - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) - break; - /* fall through */ + + INIT_ECDSA_VFY_MECH(SHA1) + INIT_ECDSA_VFY_MECH(SHA224) + INIT_ECDSA_VFY_MECH(SHA256) + INIT_ECDSA_VFY_MECH(SHA384) + INIT_ECDSA_VFY_MECH(SHA512) + case CKM_ECDSA: + finish_ecdsa: if (key_type != CKK_EC) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; @@ -4673,6 +4809,73 @@ loser: #define PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA224_LENGTH /* 224-bits */ #define PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH 20 /* 160-bits */ +static CK_RV +pairwise_signverify_mech (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, + SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privateKey, + CK_MECHANISM mech, + CK_ULONG signature_length, + CK_ULONG pairwise_digest_length) +{ + /* Variables used for Signature/Verification functions. */ + /* Must be at least 256 bits for DSA2 digest */ + unsigned char *known_digest = (unsigned char *)"Mozilla Rules the World through NSS!"; + unsigned char *signature; + CK_RV crv; + + /* Allocate space for signature data. */ + signature = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(signature_length); + if (signature == NULL) { + return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; + } + + /* Sign the known hash using the private key. */ + crv = NSC_SignInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(signature); + return crv; + } + + crv = NSC_Sign(hSession, + known_digest, + pairwise_digest_length, + signature, + &signature_length); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(signature); + return crv; + } + + /* detect trivial signing transforms */ + if ((signature_length >= pairwise_digest_length) && + (PORT_Memcmp(known_digest, signature + (signature_length - pairwise_digest_length), pairwise_digest_length) == 0)) { + PORT_Free(signature); + return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + + /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */ + crv = NSC_VerifyInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle); + if (crv != CKR_OK) { + PORT_Free(signature); + return crv; + } + + crv = NSC_Verify(hSession, + known_digest, + pairwise_digest_length, + signature, + signature_length); + + /* Free signature data. */ + PORT_Free(signature); + + if ((crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE) || + (crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)) { + return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; + } + + return crv; +} + /* * FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check utilized to validate key pair. * @@ -4720,8 +4923,6 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* Variables used for Signature/Verification functions. */ /* Must be at least 256 bits for DSA2 digest */ - unsigned char *known_digest = (unsigned char *)"Mozilla Rules the World through NSS!"; - unsigned char *signature; CK_ULONG signature_length; if (keyType == CKK_RSA) { @@ -4875,76 +5076,32 @@ sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, } } +#define SIGNVERIFY_CHECK_MECH(vfymech) \ + mech.mechanism = vfymech; \ + crv = pairwise_signverify_mech (hSession, publicKey, privateKey, \ + mech, signature_length, pairwise_digest_length); \ + if (crv != CKR_OK) \ + return crv; + if (canSignVerify) { - /* Determine length of signature. */ switch (keyType) { case CKK_RSA: signature_length = modulusLen; - mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + SIGNVERIFY_CHECK_MECH(CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS) break; case CKK_DSA: signature_length = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN; pairwise_digest_length = subPrimeLen; - mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA; + SIGNVERIFY_CHECK_MECH(CKM_DSA_SHA224) break; case CKK_EC: signature_length = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2; - mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA; + SIGNVERIFY_CHECK_MECH(CKM_ECDSA_SHA224) break; default: return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } - /* Allocate space for signature data. */ - signature = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(signature_length); - if (signature == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - /* Sign the known hash using the private key. */ - crv = NSC_SignInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(signature); - return crv; - } - - crv = NSC_Sign(hSession, - known_digest, - pairwise_digest_length, - signature, - &signature_length); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(signature); - return crv; - } - - /* detect trivial signing transforms */ - if ((signature_length >= pairwise_digest_length) && - (PORT_Memcmp(known_digest, signature + (signature_length - pairwise_digest_length), pairwise_digest_length) == 0)) { - PORT_Free(signature); - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - } - - /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */ - crv = NSC_VerifyInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(signature); - return crv; - } - - crv = NSC_Verify(hSession, - known_digest, - pairwise_digest_length, - signature, - signature_length); - - /* Free signature data. */ - PORT_Free(signature); - - if ((crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE) || - (crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)) { - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } if (crv != CKR_OK) { return crv; } diff --git a/nss/lib/softoken/softoken.h b/nss/lib/softoken/softoken.h index 4626e78..1a22b07 100644 --- a/nss/lib/softoken/softoken.h +++ b/nss/lib/softoken/softoken.h @@ -35,6 +35,16 @@ RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen); +extern SECStatus +DSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, + unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen); + +extern SECStatus +ECDSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, + unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen); + /* ** Prepare a buffer for padded CBC encryption, growing to the appropriate ** boundary, filling with the appropriate padding. diff --git a/nss/lib/util/pkcs11t.h b/nss/lib/util/pkcs11t.h index 6ee6609..e42fcba 100644 --- a/nss/lib/util/pkcs11t.h +++ b/nss/lib/util/pkcs11t.h @@ -593,6 +593,10 @@ typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; #define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010 #define CKM_DSA 0x00000011 #define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012 +#define CKM_DSA_SHA224 0x00000013 +#define CKM_DSA_SHA256 0x00000014 +#define CKM_DSA_SHA384 0x00000015 +#define CKM_DSA_SHA512 0x00000016 #define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020 #define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021 @@ -851,6 +855,10 @@ typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; #define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041 #define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042 +#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA224 0x00001043 +#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA256 0x00001044 +#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA384 0x00001045 +#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA512 0x00001046 /* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE * are new for v2.11 */
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