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SUSE:SLE-15-SP7:Update
openssl-3.32463
openssl-CVE-2023-5363.patch
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File openssl-CVE-2023-5363.patch of Package openssl-3.32463
From dc23323cf47efad90e895a47314cea4550d8d9c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org> Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2023 10:26:23 +1100 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] evp: process key length and iv length early if present evp_cipher_init_internal() takes a params array argument and this is processed late in the initialisation process for some ciphers (AEAD ones). This means that changing the IV length as a parameter will either truncate the IV (very bad if SP 800-38d section 8.2.1 is used) or grab extra uninitialised bytes. Truncation is very bad if SP 800-38d section 8.2.1 is being used to contruct a deterministic IV. This leads to an instant loss of confidentiality. Grabbing extra bytes isn't so serious, it will most likely result in a bad decryption. Problem reported by Tony Battersby of Cybernetics.com but earlier discovered and raised as issue #19822. Fixes CVE-2023-5363 Fixes #19822 --- crypto/evp/evp_enc.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+) Index: openssl-3.0.8/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c =================================================================== --- openssl-3.0.8.orig/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c +++ openssl-3.0.8/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c @@ -218,6 +218,42 @@ static int evp_cipher_init_internal(EVP_ return 0; } +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + /* + * Fix for CVE-2023-5363 + * Passing in a size as part of the init call takes effect late + * so, force such to occur before the initialisation. + * + * The FIPS provider's internal library context is used in a manner + * such that this is not an issue. + */ + if (params != NULL) { + OSSL_PARAM param_lens[3] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END, + OSSL_PARAM_END }; + OSSL_PARAM *q = param_lens; + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN); + if (p != NULL) + memcpy(q++, p, sizeof(*q)); + + /* + * Note that OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN is a synomym for + * OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN so both are covered here. + */ + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN); + if (p != NULL) + memcpy(q++, p, sizeof(*q)); + + if (q != param_lens) { + if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, param_lens)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + } + } +#endif + if (enc) { if (ctx->cipher->einit == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); Index: openssl-3.0.8/test/evp_extra_test.c =================================================================== --- openssl-3.0.8.orig/test/evp_extra_test.c +++ openssl-3.0.8/test/evp_extra_test.c @@ -4717,6 +4717,253 @@ static int test_ecx_not_private_key(int } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +static int aes_gcm_encrypt(const unsigned char *gcm_key, size_t gcm_key_s, + const unsigned char *gcm_iv, size_t gcm_ivlen, + const unsigned char *gcm_pt, size_t gcm_pt_s, + const unsigned char *gcm_aad, size_t gcm_aad_s, + const unsigned char *gcm_ct, size_t gcm_ct_s, + const unsigned char *gcm_tag, size_t gcm_tag_s) +{ + int ret = 0; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; + int outlen, tmplen; + unsigned char outbuf[1024]; + unsigned char outtag[16]; + OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { + OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + + if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) + || !TEST_ptr(cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "AES-256-GCM", ""))) + goto err; + + params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN, + &gcm_ivlen); + + if (!TEST_true(EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, gcm_key, gcm_iv, params)) + || (gcm_aad != NULL + && !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, + gcm_aad, gcm_aad_s))) + || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, + gcm_pt, gcm_pt_s)) + || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &tmplen))) + goto err; + + params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG, + outtag, sizeof(outtag)); + + if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ctx, params)) + || !TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, gcm_ct, gcm_ct_s) + || !TEST_mem_eq(outtag, gcm_tag_s, gcm_tag, gcm_tag_s)) + goto err; + + ret = 1; +err: + EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + + return ret; +} + +static int aes_gcm_decrypt(const unsigned char *gcm_key, size_t gcm_key_s, + const unsigned char *gcm_iv, size_t gcm_ivlen, + const unsigned char *gcm_pt, size_t gcm_pt_s, + const unsigned char *gcm_aad, size_t gcm_aad_s, + const unsigned char *gcm_ct, size_t gcm_ct_s, + const unsigned char *gcm_tag, size_t gcm_tag_s) +{ + int ret = 0; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; + int outlen; + unsigned char outbuf[1024]; + OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { + OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + + if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "AES-256-GCM", "")) == NULL) + goto err; + + params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN, + &gcm_ivlen); + + if (!TEST_true(EVP_DecryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, gcm_key, gcm_iv, params)) + || (gcm_aad != NULL + && !TEST_true(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, + gcm_aad, gcm_aad_s))) + || !TEST_true(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, + gcm_ct, gcm_ct_s)) + || !TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, gcm_pt, gcm_pt_s)) + goto err; + + params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG, + (void*)gcm_tag, gcm_tag_s); + + if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) + ||!TEST_true(EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &outlen))) + goto err; + + ret = 1; +err: + EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + + return ret; +} + +static int test_aes_gcm_ivlen_change_cve_2023_5363(void) +{ + /* AES-GCM test data obtained from NIST public test vectors */ + static const unsigned char gcm_key[] = { + 0xd0, 0xc2, 0x67, 0xc1, 0x9f, 0x30, 0xd8, 0x0b, 0x89, 0x14, 0xbb, 0xbf, + 0xb7, 0x2f, 0x73, 0xb8, 0xd3, 0xcd, 0x5f, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x70, 0x15, 0x84, + 0x8a, 0x7b, 0x30, 0xe3, 0x8f, 0x16, 0xf1, 0x8b, + }; + static const unsigned char gcm_iv[] = { + 0xb6, 0xdc, 0xda, 0x95, 0xac, 0x99, 0x77, 0x76, 0x25, 0xae, 0x87, 0xf8, + 0xa3, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0x64, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xbd, 0x5f, 0x4a, 0x0e, 0x54, 0xca, + 0x1a, 0x9f, 0xa2, 0xe3, 0xf4, 0x5f, 0x5f, 0xc2, 0xce, 0xa7, 0xb6, 0x14, + 0x12, 0x6f, 0xf0, 0xaf, 0xfd, 0x3e, 0x17, 0x35, 0x6e, 0xa0, 0x16, 0x09, + 0xdd, 0xa1, 0x3f, 0xd8, 0xdd, 0xf3, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0xcb, 0x18, 0x49, 0xb8, + 0xb3, 0x69, 0x2c, 0x5d, 0x4f, 0xad, 0x30, 0x91, 0x08, 0xbc, 0xbe, 0x24, + 0x01, 0x0f, 0xbe, 0x9c, 0xfb, 0x4f, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x7f, 0x4c, 0x53, 0xb0, + 0x95, 0x90, 0xac, 0x7b, 0x1f, 0x7b, 0xa0, 0x99, 0xe1, 0xf3, 0x48, 0x54, + 0xd0, 0xfc, 0xa9, 0xcc, 0x91, 0xf8, 0x1f, 0x9b, 0x6c, 0x9a, 0xe0, 0xdc, + 0x63, 0xea, 0x7d, 0x2a, 0x4a, 0x7d, 0xa5, 0xed, 0x68, 0x57, 0x27, 0x6b, + 0x68, 0xe0, 0xf2, 0xb8, 0x51, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x3d, + }; + static const unsigned char gcm_pt[] = { + 0xb8, 0xb6, 0x88, 0x36, 0x44, 0xe2, 0x34, 0xdf, 0x24, 0x32, 0x91, 0x07, + 0x4f, 0xe3, 0x6f, 0x81, + }; + static const unsigned char gcm_ct[] = { + 0xff, 0x4f, 0xb3, 0xf3, 0xf9, 0xa2, 0x51, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xc2, 0xbe, 0xf3, + 0xe2, 0xd0, 0xec, 0xed, + }; + static const unsigned char gcm_tag[] = { + 0xbd, 0x06, 0x38, 0x09, 0xf7, 0xe1, 0xc4, 0x72, 0x0e, 0xf2, 0xea, 0x63, + 0xdb, 0x99, 0x6c, 0x21, + }; + + return aes_gcm_encrypt(gcm_key, sizeof(gcm_key), gcm_iv, sizeof(gcm_iv), + gcm_pt, sizeof(gcm_pt), NULL, 0, + gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct), gcm_tag, sizeof(gcm_tag)) + && aes_gcm_decrypt(gcm_key, sizeof(gcm_key), gcm_iv, sizeof(gcm_iv), + gcm_pt, sizeof(gcm_pt), NULL, 0, + gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct), gcm_tag, sizeof(gcm_tag)); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 +static int rc4_encrypt(const unsigned char *rc4_key, size_t rc4_key_s, + const unsigned char *rc4_pt, size_t rc4_pt_s, + const unsigned char *rc4_ct, size_t rc4_ct_s) +{ + int ret = 0; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; + int outlen, tmplen; + unsigned char outbuf[1024]; + OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { + OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + + if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) + || !TEST_ptr(cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "RC4", ""))) + goto err; + + params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN, + &rc4_key_s); + + if (!TEST_true(EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, rc4_key, NULL, params)) + || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, + rc4_pt, rc4_pt_s)) + || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &tmplen))) + goto err; + + if (!TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, rc4_ct, rc4_ct_s)) + goto err; + + ret = 1; +err: + EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + + return ret; +} + +static int rc4_decrypt(const unsigned char *rc4_key, size_t rc4_key_s, + const unsigned char *rc4_pt, size_t rc4_pt_s, + const unsigned char *rc4_ct, size_t rc4_ct_s) +{ + int ret = 0; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; + int outlen; + unsigned char outbuf[1024]; + OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { + OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + + if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "RC4", "")) == NULL) + goto err; + + params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN, + &rc4_key_s); + + if (!TEST_true(EVP_DecryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, rc4_key, NULL, params)) + || !TEST_true(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, + rc4_ct, rc4_ct_s)) + || !TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, rc4_pt, rc4_pt_s)) + goto err; + + ret = 1; +err: + EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + + return ret; +} + +static int test_aes_rc4_keylen_change_cve_2023_5363(void) +{ + /* RC4 test data obtained from RFC 6229 */ + static const struct { + unsigned char key[5]; + unsigned char padding[11]; + } rc4_key = { + { /* Five bytes of key material */ + 0x83, 0x32, 0x22, 0x77, 0x2a, + }, + { /* Random padding to 16 bytes */ + 0x80, 0xad, 0x97, 0xbd, 0xc9, 0x73, 0xdf, 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x32, 0x91 + } + }; + static const unsigned char rc4_pt[] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }; + static const unsigned char rc4_ct[] = { + 0x80, 0xad, 0x97, 0xbd, 0xc9, 0x73, 0xdf, 0x8a, + 0x2e, 0x87, 0x9e, 0x92, 0xa4, 0x97, 0xef, 0xda + }; + + if (lgcyprov == NULL) + return TEST_skip("Test requires legacy provider to be loaded"); + + return rc4_encrypt(rc4_key.key, sizeof(rc4_key.key), + rc4_pt, sizeof(rc4_pt), rc4_ct, sizeof(rc4_ct)) + && rc4_decrypt(rc4_key.key, sizeof(rc4_key.key), + rc4_pt, sizeof(rc4_pt), rc4_ct, sizeof(rc4_ct)); +} +#endif + int setup_tests(void) { OPTION_CHOICE o; @@ -4856,6 +5103,12 @@ int setup_tests(void) ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ecx_not_private_key, OSSL_NELEM(keys)); #endif + /* Test cases for CVE-2023-5363 */ + ADD_TEST(test_aes_gcm_ivlen_change_cve_2023_5363); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 + ADD_TEST(test_aes_rc4_keylen_change_cve_2023_5363); +#endif + return 1; } Index: openssl-3.0.8/CHANGES.md =================================================================== --- openssl-3.0.8.orig/CHANGES.md +++ openssl-3.0.8/CHANGES.md @@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ breaking changes, and mappings for the l ### Changes between 3.0.7 and 3.0.8 [7 Feb 2023] + * Fix incorrect key and IV resizing issues when calling EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(), + EVP_DecryptInit_ex2() or EVP_CipherInit_ex2() with OSSL_PARAM parameters + that alter the key or IV length ([CVE-2023-5363]). + + *Paul Dale* + * Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form. @@ -19639,6 +19645,7 @@ ndif <!-- Links --> +[CVE-2023-5363]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-5363 [CVE-2023-2650]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-2650 [CVE-2023-1255]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-1255 [CVE-2023-0466]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0466 Index: openssl-3.0.8/NEWS.md =================================================================== --- openssl-3.0.8.orig/NEWS.md +++ openssl-3.0.8/NEWS.md @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ OpenSSL 3.0 ### Major changes between OpenSSL 3.0.7 and OpenSSL 3.0.8 [7 Feb 2023] + * Mitigate incorrect resize handling for symmetric cipher keys and IVs. + ([CVE-2023-5363]) * Mitigate for very slow `OBJ_obj2txt()` performance with gigantic OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identities. ([CVE-2023-2650]) * Fixed buffer overread in AES-XTS decryption on ARM 64 bit platforms @@ -1439,6 +1441,7 @@ OpenSSL 0.9.x <!-- Links --> +[CVE-2023-5363]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-5363 [CVE-2023-2650]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-2650 [CVE-2023-1255]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-1255 [CVE-2023-0466]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2023-0466
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