File 0019-appended-signatures-support-verifying-appe... of Package grub2

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File 0019-appended-signatures-support-verifying-appended-signa.patch of Package grub2 (Revision 1af500a70e014bde6b93e445d8372db3)

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From 97104dbd207a07fa3759b23766fa60f7bb8d16b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2020 01:35:43 +1000
Subject: [PATCH 19/23] appended signatures: support verifying appended
 signatures

Building on the parsers and the ability to embed x509 certificates, as
well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying
appended signatures.

This includes a verifier that requires that Linux kernels and grub modules
have appended signatures, and commands to manage the list of trusted
certificates for verification.

Verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures. If
GRUB is locked down when the module is loaded, verification will be
enabled and locked automatically.

As with the PGP verifier, it is not a complete secure-boot solution:
other mechanisms, such as a password or lockdown, must be used to ensure
that a user cannot drop to the grub shell and disable verification.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>

---

v2 changes:

- Improve x509 parser function name
 - Constify data parameters in function signatures
 - Support multiple signers
 - Use an enum rather than 0, 1 and 2 for various signature
    enforcement states.
 - Spin out a file reading function that was duplicated.
 - Fix some code style and clarity issues.

Thanks to Nayna Jain and Stefan Berger for their reviews.

Revert "fixups so that you can build pkcs7 without posixly"

This reverts commit 676a19fa8a7f9cca7a58ce2180110f609185b2bd.
---
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def                  |  14 +
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 669 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/grub/file.h                          |   2 +
 3 files changed, 685 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c

--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def
@@ -979,6 +979,21 @@
 };
 
 module = {
+  name = appendedsig;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/x509.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c;
+
+  extra_dist = commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h;
+  // posix wrapper required for gcry to get sys/types.h
+  cflags = '$(CFLAGS_POSIX)';
+  cppflags = '-I$(srcdir)/lib/posix_wrap';
+};
+
+module = {
   name = hdparm;
   common = commands/hdparm.c;
   enable = pci;
--- /dev/null
+++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,669 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2020-2021  IBM Corporation.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/err.h>
+#include <grub/dl.h>
+#include <grub/file.h>
+#include <grub/command.h>
+#include <grub/crypto.h>
+#include <grub/pkcs1_v15.h>
+#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/gcrypt/gcrypt.h>
+#include <grub/kernel.h>
+#include <grub/extcmd.h>
+#include <grub/verify.h>
+#include <grub/libtasn1.h>
+#include <grub/env.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+
+#include "appendedsig.h"
+
+GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+
+const char magic[] = "~Module signature appended~\n";
+
+/*
+ * This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel
+ * source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible.
+ */
+struct module_signature
+{
+  grub_uint8_t algo;		/* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
+  grub_uint8_t hash;		/* Digest algorithm [0] */
+  grub_uint8_t id_type;		/* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
+  grub_uint8_t signer_len;	/* Length of signer's name [0] */
+  grub_uint8_t key_id_len;	/* Length of key identifier [0] */
+  grub_uint8_t __pad[3];
+  grub_uint32_t sig_len;	/* Length of signature data */
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+
+
+/* This represents an entire, parsed, appended signature */
+struct grub_appended_signature
+{
+  grub_size_t signature_len;		/* Length of PKCS#7 data +
+                                         * metadata + magic */
+
+  struct module_signature sig_metadata;	/* Module signature metadata */
+  struct pkcs7_signedData pkcs7;	/* Parsed PKCS#7 data */
+};
+
+/* Trusted certificates for verifying appended signatures */
+struct x509_certificate *grub_trusted_key;
+
+/*
+ * Force gcry_rsa to be a module dependency.
+ *
+ * If we use grub_crypto_pk_rsa, then then the gcry_rsa module won't be built
+ * in if you add 'appendedsig' to grub-install --modules. You would need to
+ * add 'gcry_rsa' too. That's confusing and seems suboptimal, especially when
+ * we only support RSA.
+ *
+ * Dynamic loading also causes some concerns. We can't load gcry_rsa from the
+ * the filesystem after we install the verifier - we won't be able to verify
+ * it without having it already present. We also shouldn't load it before we
+ * install the verifier, because that would mean it wouldn't be verified - an
+ * attacker could insert any code they wanted into the module.
+ *
+ * So instead, reference the internal symbol from gcry_rsa. That creates a
+ * direct dependency on gcry_rsa, so it will be built in when this module
+ * is built in. Being built in (assuming the core image is itself signed!)
+ * also resolves our concerns about loading from the filesystem.
+ */
+extern gcry_pk_spec_t _gcry_pubkey_spec_rsa;
+
+static enum
+{ check_sigs_no = 0,
+  check_sigs_enforce = 1,
+  check_sigs_forced = 2
+} check_sigs = check_sigs_no;
+
+static const char *
+grub_env_read_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__((unused)),
+		   const char *val __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+  if (check_sigs == check_sigs_forced)
+    return "forced";
+  else if (check_sigs == check_sigs_enforce)
+    return "enforce";
+  else
+    return "no";
+}
+
+static char *
+grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__((unused)),
+		    const char *val)
+{
+  /* Do not allow the value to be changed if set to forced */
+  if (check_sigs == check_sigs_forced)
+    return grub_strdup ("forced");
+
+  if ((*val == '2') || (*val == 'f'))
+    check_sigs = check_sigs_forced;
+  else if ((*val == '1') || (*val == 'e'))
+    check_sigs = check_sigs_enforce;
+  else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 'n'))
+    check_sigs = check_sigs_no;
+
+  return grub_strdup (grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+file_read_all (grub_file_t file, grub_uint8_t **buf, grub_size_t *len)
+{
+  grub_off_t full_file_size;
+  grub_size_t file_size, total_read_size = 0;
+  grub_ssize_t read_size;
+
+  full_file_size = grub_file_size (file);
+  if (full_file_size == GRUB_FILE_SIZE_UNKNOWN)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("Cannot read a file of unknown size into a buffer"));
+
+  if (full_file_size > GRUB_SIZE_MAX)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+		       N_("File is too large to read: %" PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T
+			  " bytes"), full_file_size);
+
+  file_size = (grub_size_t) full_file_size;
+
+  *buf = grub_malloc (file_size);
+  if (!*buf)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+		       N_("Could not allocate file data buffer size %"
+			  PRIuGRUB_SIZE), file_size);
+
+  while (total_read_size < file_size)
+    {
+      read_size =
+	grub_file_read (file, *buf + total_read_size,
+			file_size - total_read_size);
+
+      if (read_size < 0)
+	{
+	  grub_free (*buf);
+	  return grub_errno;
+	}
+      else if (read_size == 0)
+	{
+	  grub_free (*buf);
+	  return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_IO,
+			     N_("Could not read full file size (%"
+				PRIuGRUB_SIZE "), only %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE
+				" bytes read"), file_size, total_read_size);
+	}
+
+      total_read_size += read_size;
+    }
+  *len = file_size;
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+read_cert_from_file (grub_file_t f, struct x509_certificate *certificate)
+{
+  grub_err_t err;
+  grub_uint8_t *buf;
+  grub_size_t file_size;
+
+  err = file_read_all (f, &buf, &file_size);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    return err;
+
+  err = parse_x509_certificate (buf, file_size, certificate);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_free (buf);
+      return err;
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+extract_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize,
+			    struct grub_appended_signature *sig)
+{
+  grub_err_t err;
+  grub_size_t pkcs7_size;
+  grub_size_t remaining_len;
+  const grub_uint8_t *appsigdata = buf + bufsize - grub_strlen (magic);
+
+  if (bufsize < grub_strlen (magic))
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+		       N_("File too short for signature magic"));
+
+  if (grub_memcmp (appsigdata, (grub_uint8_t *) magic, grub_strlen (magic)))
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+		       N_("Missing or invalid signature magic"));
+
+  remaining_len = bufsize - grub_strlen (magic);
+
+  if (remaining_len < sizeof (struct module_signature))
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+		       N_("File too short for signature metadata"));
+
+  appsigdata -= sizeof (struct module_signature);
+
+  /* extract the metadata */
+  grub_memcpy (&(sig->sig_metadata), appsigdata,
+	       sizeof (struct module_signature));
+
+  remaining_len -= sizeof (struct module_signature);
+
+  if (sig->sig_metadata.id_type != 2)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, N_("Wrong signature type"));
+
+  pkcs7_size = grub_be_to_cpu32 (sig->sig_metadata.sig_len);
+
+  if (pkcs7_size > remaining_len)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+		       N_("File too short for PKCS#7 message"));
+
+  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "sig len %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n", pkcs7_size);
+
+  sig->signature_len =
+    grub_strlen (magic) + sizeof (struct module_signature) + pkcs7_size;
+
+  /* rewind pointer and parse pkcs7 data */
+  appsigdata -= pkcs7_size;
+
+  err = parse_pkcs7_signedData (appsigdata, pkcs7_size, &sig->pkcs7);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    return err;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
+{
+  grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+  grub_size_t datasize;
+  void *context;
+  unsigned char *hash;
+  gcry_mpi_t hashmpi;
+  gcry_err_code_t rc;
+  struct x509_certificate *pk;
+  struct grub_appended_signature sig;
+  struct pkcs7_signerInfo *si;
+  int i;
+
+  if (!grub_trusted_key)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+		       N_("No trusted keys to verify against"));
+
+  err = extract_appended_signature (buf, bufsize, &sig);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    return err;
+
+  datasize = bufsize - sig.signature_len;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < sig.pkcs7.signerInfo_count; i++)
+    {
+      /* This could be optimised in a couple of ways:
+	  - we could only compute hashes once per hash type
+	  - we could track signer information and only verify where IDs match
+	 For now we do the naive O(trusted keys * pkcs7 signers) approach.
+	*/
+      si = &sig.pkcs7.signerInfos[i];
+      context = grub_zalloc (si->hash->contextsize);
+      if (!context)
+	return grub_errno;
+    
+      si->hash->init (context);
+      si->hash->write (context, buf, datasize);
+      si->hash->final (context);
+      hash = si->hash->read (context);
+
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+		    "data size %" PRIxGRUB_SIZE ", signer %d hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n",
+		    datasize, i, hash[0], hash[1], hash[2], hash[3]);
+    
+      err = GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+      for (pk = grub_trusted_key; pk; pk = pk->next)
+	{
+	  rc = grub_crypto_rsa_pad (&hashmpi, hash, si->hash, pk->mpis[0]);
+	  if (rc)
+	    {
+	      err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+    				N_("Error padding hash for RSA verification: %d"),
+    				rc);
+	      grub_free (context);
+	      goto cleanup;
+	    }
+
+	  rc = _gcry_pubkey_spec_rsa.verify (0, hashmpi, &si->sig_mpi,
+					     pk->mpis, NULL, NULL);
+	  gcry_mpi_release (hashmpi);
+
+	  if (rc == 0)
+	    {
+	      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+			    "verify signer %d with key '%s' succeeded\n", i,
+			    pk->subject);
+	      err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+	      break;
+	    }
+
+	  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+			"verify signer %d with key '%s' failed with %d\n", i,
+			pk->subject, rc);
+	}
+
+      grub_free (context);
+
+      if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	break;
+    }
+
+  /* If we didn't verify, provide a neat message */
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+		      N_("Failed to verify signature against a trusted key"));
+
+cleanup:
+  pkcs7_signedData_release (&sig.pkcs7);
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),
+			   int argc, char **args)
+{
+  grub_file_t f;
+  grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+  grub_uint8_t *data;
+  grub_size_t file_size;
+
+  if (argc < 1)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("one argument expected"));
+
+  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verifying %s\n", args[0]);
+
+  f = grub_file_open (args[0], GRUB_FILE_TYPE_VERIFY_SIGNATURE);
+  if (!f)
+    {
+      err = grub_errno;
+      goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+  err = file_read_all (f, &data, &file_size);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    goto cleanup;
+
+  err = grub_verify_appended_signature (data, file_size);
+
+  grub_free (data);
+
+cleanup:
+  if (f)
+    grub_file_close (f);
+  return err;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_distrust (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),
+		   int argc, char **args)
+{
+  unsigned long cert_num, i;
+  struct x509_certificate *cert, *prev;
+
+  if (argc != 1)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("One argument expected"));
+
+  grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+  cert_num = grub_strtoul (args[0], NULL, 10);
+  if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    return grub_errno;
+
+  if (cert_num < 1)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("Certificate number too small - numbers start at 1"));
+
+  if (cert_num == 1)
+    {
+      cert = grub_trusted_key;
+      grub_trusted_key = cert->next;
+
+      certificate_release (cert);
+      grub_free (cert);
+      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+    }
+  i = 2;
+  prev = grub_trusted_key;
+  cert = grub_trusted_key->next;
+  while (cert)
+    {
+      if (i == cert_num)
+	{
+	  prev->next = cert->next;
+	  certificate_release (cert);
+	  grub_free (cert);
+	  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+	}
+      i++;
+      prev = cert;
+      cert = cert->next;
+    }
+
+  return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		     N_("No certificate number %lu found - only %lu certificates in the store"),
+		     cert_num, i - 1);
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_trust (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),
+		int argc, char **args)
+{
+  grub_file_t certf;
+  struct x509_certificate *cert = NULL;
+  grub_err_t err;
+
+  if (argc != 1)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("one argument expected"));
+
+  certf = grub_file_open (args[0],
+			  GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST
+			  | GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
+  if (!certf)
+    return grub_errno;
+
+
+  cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
+  if (!cert)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+		       N_("Could not allocate memory for certificate"));
+
+  err = read_cert_from_file (certf, cert);
+  grub_file_close (certf);
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_free (cert);
+      return err;
+    }
+  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "Loaded certificate with CN: %s\n",
+		cert->subject);
+
+  cert->next = grub_trusted_key;
+  grub_trusted_key = cert;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_list (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),
+	       int argc __attribute__((unused)),
+	       char **args __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+  int cert_num = 1;
+  grub_size_t i;
+
+  for (cert = grub_trusted_key; cert; cert = cert->next)
+    {
+      grub_printf (N_("Certificate %d:\n"), cert_num);
+
+      grub_printf (N_("\tSerial: "));
+      for (i = 0; i < cert->serial_len - 1; i++)
+	{
+	  grub_printf ("%02x:", cert->serial[i]);
+	}
+      grub_printf ("%02x\n", cert->serial[cert->serial_len - 1]);
+
+      grub_printf ("\tCN: %s\n\n", cert->subject);
+      cert_num++;
+
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+appendedsig_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__((unused)),
+		  enum grub_file_type type,
+		  void **context __attribute__((unused)),
+		  enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
+{
+  if (check_sigs == check_sigs_no)
+    {
+      *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION;
+      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+    }
+
+  switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK)
+    {
+    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST:
+      /*
+       * This is a certificate to add to trusted keychain.
+       *
+       * This needs to be verified or blocked. Ideally we'd write an x509
+       * verifier, but we lack the hubris required to take this on. Instead,
+       * require that it have an appended signature.
+       */
+
+      /* Fall through */
+
+    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL:
+    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE:
+      /*
+       * Appended signatures are only defined for ELF binaries.
+       * Out of an abundance of caution, we only verify Linux kernels and
+       * GRUB modules at this point.
+       */
+      *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK;
+      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ACPI_TABLE:
+    case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_DEVICE_TREE_IMAGE:
+      /*
+       * It is possible to use appended signature verification without
+       * lockdown - like the PGP verifier. When combined with an embedded
+       * config file in a signed grub binary, this could still be a meaningful
+       * secure-boot chain - so long as it isn't subverted by something like a
+       * rouge ACPI table or DT image. Defer them explicitly.
+       */
+      *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_DEFER_AUTH;
+      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+    default:
+      *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION;
+      return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+    }
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+appendedsig_write (void *ctxt __attribute__((unused)),
+		   void *buf, grub_size_t size)
+{
+  return grub_verify_appended_signature (buf, size);
+}
+
+struct grub_file_verifier grub_appendedsig_verifier = {
+  .name = "appendedsig",
+  .init = appendedsig_init,
+  .write = appendedsig_write,
+};
+
+static grub_ssize_t
+pseudo_read (struct grub_file *file, char *buf, grub_size_t len)
+{
+  grub_memcpy (buf, (grub_uint8_t *) file->data + file->offset, len);
+  return len;
+}
+
+/* Filesystem descriptor.  */
+static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
+  .name = "pseudo",
+  .fs_read = pseudo_read
+};
+
+static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list, cmd_distrust, cmd_trust;
+
+GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
+{
+  int rc;
+  struct grub_module_header *header;
+
+  /* If in lockdown, immediately enter forced mode */
+  if (grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+    check_sigs = check_sigs_forced;
+
+  grub_trusted_key = NULL;
+
+  grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures",
+			       grub_env_read_sec, grub_env_write_sec);
+  grub_env_export ("check_appended_signatures");
+
+  rc = asn1_init ();
+  if (rc)
+    grub_fatal ("Error initing ASN.1 data structures: %d: %s\n", rc,
+		asn1_strerror (rc));
+
+  FOR_MODULES (header)
+  {
+    struct grub_file pseudo_file;
+    struct x509_certificate *pk = NULL;
+    grub_err_t err;
+
+    /* Not an ELF module, skip.  */
+    if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY)
+      continue;
+
+    grub_memset (&pseudo_file, 0, sizeof (pseudo_file));
+    pseudo_file.fs = &pseudo_fs;
+    pseudo_file.size = header->size - sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+    pseudo_file.data = (char *) header + sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+
+    grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+		  "Found an x509 key, size=%" PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T "\n",
+		  pseudo_file.size);
+
+    pk = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
+    if (!pk)
+      {
+	grub_fatal ("Out of memory loading initial certificates");
+      }
+
+    err = read_cert_from_file (&pseudo_file, pk);
+    if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+      grub_fatal ("Error loading initial key: %s", grub_errmsg);
+
+    grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "loaded certificate CN='%s'\n", pk->subject);
+
+    pk->next = grub_trusted_key;
+    grub_trusted_key = pk;
+  }
+
+  cmd_trust =
+    grub_register_command ("trust_certificate", grub_cmd_trust,
+			   N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
+			   N_("Add X509_CERTIFICATE to trusted certificates."));
+  cmd_list =
+    grub_register_command ("list_certificates", grub_cmd_list, 0,
+			   N_("Show the list of trusted x509 certificates."));
+  cmd_verify =
+    grub_register_command ("verify_appended", grub_cmd_verify_signature,
+			   N_("FILE"),
+			   N_("Verify FILE against the trusted x509 certificates."));
+  cmd_distrust =
+    grub_register_command ("distrust_certificate", grub_cmd_distrust,
+			   N_("CERT_NUMBER"),
+			   N_("Remove CERT_NUMBER (as listed by list_certificates) from trusted certificates."));
+
+  grub_verifier_register (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
+  grub_dl_set_persistent (mod);
+}
+
+GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig)
+{
+  /*
+   * grub_dl_set_persistent should prevent this from actually running, but
+   * it does still run under emu.
+   */
+
+  grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
+  grub_unregister_command (cmd_verify);
+  grub_unregister_command (cmd_list);
+  grub_unregister_command (cmd_trust);
+  grub_unregister_command (cmd_distrust);
+}
--- a/include/grub/file.h
+++ b/include/grub/file.h
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@
     GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY,
     /* File holding public key to add to trused keys.  */
     GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_TRUST,
+    /* File holding x509 certificiate to add to trusted keys.  */
+    GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST,
     /* File of which we intend to print a blocklist to the user.  */
     GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PRINT_BLOCKLIST,
     /* File we intend to use for test loading or testing speed.  */

Places

File 0019-appended-signatures-support-verifying-appended-signa.patch of Package grub2 (Revision 1af500a70e014bde6b93e445d8372db3)

Places