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openssl-1_0_0.29468
openssl-CVE-2022-4304.patch
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File openssl-CVE-2022-4304.patch of Package openssl-1_0_0.29468
From aefe424d7695ed13b240673298d340bc552365fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 17:46:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Alternative fix for CVE-2022-4304 This is about a timing leak in the topmost limb of the internal result of RSA_private_decrypt, before the padding check. There are in fact at least three bugs together that caused the timing leak: First and probably most important is the fact that the blinding did not use the constant time code path at all when the RSA object was used for a private decrypt, due to the fact that the Montgomery context rsa->_method_mod_n was not set up early enough in rsa_ossl_private_decrypt, when BN_BLINDING_create_param needed it, and that was persisted as blinding->m_ctx, although the RSA object creates the Montgomery context just a bit later. Then the infamous bn_correct_top was used on the secret value right after the blinding was removed. And finally the function BN_bn2binpad did not use the constant-time code path since the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME was not set on the secret value. In order to address the first problem, this patch makes sure that the rsa->_method_mod_n is initialized right before the blinding context. And to fix the second problem, we add a new utility function bn_correct_top_consttime, a const-time variant of bn_correct_top. Together with the fact, that BN_bn2binpad is already constant time if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set, this should eliminate the timing oracle completely. In addition the no-asm variant may also have branches that depend on secret values, because the last invocation of bn_sub_words in bn_from_montgomery_word had branches when the function is compiled by certain gcc compiler versions, due to the clumsy coding style. So additionally this patch stream-lined the no-asm C-code in order to avoid branches where possible and improve the resulting code quality. --- CHANGES | 10 ++++ crypto/bn/bn_asm.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ crypto/bn/bn_blind.c | 3 - crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h | 26 ++++++------ crypto/bn/bn_lib.c | 23 +++++++++++ crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 11 ++--- 6 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -9,6 +9,16 @@ Changes between 1.0.2o and 1.0.2p [14 Aug 2018] + *) Reworked the Fix for the Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption (CVE-2022-4304). + The previous fix for this timing side channel turned out to cause + a severe 2-3x performance regression in the typical use case + compared to 1.1.1s. The new fix uses existing constant time + code paths, and restores the previous performance level while + fully eliminating all existing timing side channels. + The fix was developed by Bernd Edlinger with testing support + by Hubert Kario. + [Bernd Edlinger] + *) Client DoS due to large DH parameter During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a --- a/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_asm.c @@ -435,25 +435,33 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const #ifndef OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT while (n & ~3) { t1 = a[0]; - t2 = b[0]; - r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; - if (t1 != t2) - c = (t1 < t2); + t2 = (t1 - c) & BN_MASK2; + c = (t2 > t1); + t1 = b[0]; + t1 = (t2 - t1) & BN_MASK2; + r[0] = t1; + c += (t1 > t2); t1 = a[1]; - t2 = b[1]; - r[1] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; - if (t1 != t2) - c = (t1 < t2); + t2 = (t1 - c) & BN_MASK2; + c = (t2 > t1); + t1 = b[1]; + t1 = (t2 - t1) & BN_MASK2; + r[1] = t1; + c += (t1 > t2); t1 = a[2]; - t2 = b[2]; - r[2] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; - if (t1 != t2) - c = (t1 < t2); + t2 = (t1 - c) & BN_MASK2; + c = (t2 > t1); + t1 = b[2]; + t1 = (t2 - t1) & BN_MASK2; + r[2] = t1; + c += (t1 > t2); t1 = a[3]; - t2 = b[3]; - r[3] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; - if (t1 != t2) - c = (t1 < t2); + t2 = (t1 - c) & BN_MASK2; + c = (t2 > t1); + t1 = b[3]; + t1 = (t2 - t1) & BN_MASK2; + r[3] = t1; + c += (t1 > t2); a += 4; b += 4; r += 4; @@ -462,10 +470,12 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const #endif while (n) { t1 = a[0]; - t2 = b[0]; - r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2; - if (t1 != t2) - c = (t1 < t2); + t2 = (t1 - c) & BN_MASK2; + c = (t2 > t1); + t1 = b[0]; + t1 = (t2 - t1) & BN_MASK2; + r[0] = t1; + c += (t1 > t2); a++; b++; r++; @@ -500,7 +510,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const t += c0; /* no carry */ \ c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(t); \ hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(t); \ - c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \ + c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi); \ } while(0) # define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \ @@ -509,11 +519,11 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULLONG tt = t+c0; /* no carry */ \ c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(tt); \ hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(tt); \ - c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \ + c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi); \ t += c0; /* no carry */ \ c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(t); \ hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(t); \ - c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \ + c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi); \ } while(0) # define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) do { \ @@ -522,7 +532,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const t += c0; /* no carry */ \ c0 = (BN_ULONG)Lw(t); \ hi = (BN_ULONG)Hw(t); \ - c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \ + c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi); \ } while(0) # define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2) \ @@ -537,26 +547,26 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b); \ BN_ULONG lo, hi; \ BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,tb); \ - c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0; \ - c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0; \ + c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo); \ + c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi); \ } while(0) # define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \ BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b); \ BN_ULONG lo, hi, tt; \ BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,tb); \ - c0 += lo; tt = hi+((c0<lo)?1:0); \ - c1 += tt; c2 += (c1<tt)?1:0; \ - c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0; \ - c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0; \ + c0 += lo; tt = hi + (c0<lo); \ + c1 += tt; c2 += (c1<tt); \ + c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo); \ + c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi); \ } while(0) # define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) do { \ BN_ULONG ta = (a)[i]; \ BN_ULONG lo, hi; \ BN_UMULT_LOHI(lo,hi,ta,ta); \ - c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0; \ - c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0; \ + c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo); \ + c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi); \ } while(0) # define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2) \ @@ -571,26 +581,26 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b); \ BN_ULONG lo = ta * tb; \ BN_ULONG hi = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb); \ - c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0; \ - c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0; \ + c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo); \ + c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi); \ } while(0) # define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \ BN_ULONG ta = (a), tb = (b), tt; \ BN_ULONG lo = ta * tb; \ BN_ULONG hi = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb); \ - c0 += lo; tt = hi + ((c0<lo)?1:0); \ - c1 += tt; c2 += (c1<tt)?1:0; \ - c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0; \ - c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0; \ + c0 += lo; tt = hi + (c0<lo); \ + c1 += tt; c2 += (c1<tt); \ + c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo); \ + c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi); \ } while(0) # define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) do { \ BN_ULONG ta = (a)[i]; \ BN_ULONG lo = ta * ta; \ BN_ULONG hi = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,ta); \ - c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo)?1:0; \ - c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi)?1:0; \ + c0 += lo; hi += (c0<lo); \ + c1 += hi; c2 += (c1<hi); \ } while(0) # define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2) \ @@ -605,8 +615,8 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG lo = LBITS(a), hi = HBITS(a); \ BN_ULONG bl = LBITS(b), bh = HBITS(b); \ mul64(lo,hi,bl,bh); \ - c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; if (c0<lo) hi++; \ - c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \ + c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; hi += (c0<lo); \ + c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi); \ } while(0) # define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \ @@ -615,17 +625,17 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG bl = LBITS(b), bh = HBITS(b); \ mul64(lo,hi,bl,bh); \ tt = hi; \ - c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; if (c0<lo) tt++; \ - c1 = (c1+tt)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<tt) c2++; \ - c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; if (c0<lo) hi++; \ - c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \ + c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; tt += (c0<lo); \ + c1 = (c1+tt)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<tt); \ + c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; hi += (c0<lo); \ + c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi); \ } while(0) # define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) do { \ BN_ULONG lo, hi; \ sqr64(lo,hi,(a)[i]); \ - c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; if (c0<lo) hi++; \ - c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; if (c1<hi) c2++; \ + c0 = (c0+lo)&BN_MASK2; hi += (c0<lo); \ + c1 = (c1+hi)&BN_MASK2; c2 += (c1<hi); \ } while(0) # define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2) \ --- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c @@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, con n->top = (int)(rtop & ~mask) | (ntop & mask); n->flags |= (BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP & ~mask); } - ret = BN_mod_mul_montgomery(n, n, r, b->m_ctx, ctx); + ret = bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(n, n, r, b->m_ctx, ctx); + bn_correct_top_consttime(n); } else { ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx); } --- a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h @@ -372,10 +372,10 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int ret = (r); \ BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,w,tmp); \ ret += (c); \ - (c) = (ret<(c))?1:0; \ + (c) = (ret<(c)); \ (c) += high; \ ret += low; \ - (c) += (ret<low)?1:0; \ + (c) += (ret<low); \ (r) = ret; \ } @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,w,ta); \ ret = low + (c); \ (c) = high; \ - (c) += (ret<low)?1:0; \ + (c) += (ret<low); \ (r) = ret; \ } @@ -400,10 +400,10 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int high= BN_UMULT_HIGH(w,tmp); \ ret += (c); \ low = (w) * tmp; \ - (c) = (ret<(c))?1:0; \ + (c) = (ret<(c)); \ (c) += high; \ ret += low; \ - (c) += (ret<low)?1:0; \ + (c) += (ret<low); \ (r) = ret; \ } @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int high= BN_UMULT_HIGH(w,ta); \ ret = low + (c); \ (c) = high; \ - (c) += (ret<low)?1:0; \ + (c) += (ret<low); \ (r) = ret; \ } @@ -446,10 +446,10 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int lt=(bl)*(lt); \ m1=(bl)*(ht); \ ht =(bh)*(ht); \ - m=(m+m1)&BN_MASK2; if (m < m1) ht+=L2HBITS((BN_ULONG)1); \ + m=(m+m1)&BN_MASK2; ht += L2HBITS((BN_ULONG)(m < m1)); \ ht+=HBITS(m); \ m1=L2HBITS(m); \ - lt=(lt+m1)&BN_MASK2; if (lt < m1) ht++; \ + lt=(lt+m1)&BN_MASK2; ht += (lt < m1); \ (l)=lt; \ (h)=ht; \ } @@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int h*=h; \ h+=(m&BN_MASK2h1)>>(BN_BITS4-1); \ m =(m&BN_MASK2l)<<(BN_BITS4+1); \ - l=(l+m)&BN_MASK2; if (l < m) h++; \ + l=(l+m)&BN_MASK2; h += (l < m); \ (lo)=l; \ (ho)=h; \ } @@ -480,9 +480,9 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int mul64(l,h,(bl),(bh)); \ \ /* non-multiply part */ \ - l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; if (l < (c)) h++; \ + l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; h += (l < (c)); \ (c)=(r); \ - l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; if (l < (c)) h++; \ + l=(l+(c))&BN_MASK2; h += (l < (c)); \ (c)=h&BN_MASK2; \ (r)=l; \ } @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int mul64(l,h,(bl),(bh)); \ \ /* non-multiply part */ \ - l+=(c); if ((l&BN_MASK2) < (c)) h++; \ + l+=(c); h += ((l&BN_MASK2) < (c)); \ (c)=h&BN_MASK2; \ (r)=l&BN_MASK2; \ } @@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, int cl, int dl); int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num); - +void bn_correct_top_consttime(BIGNUM *a); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif --- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ #include <stdio.h> #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" +#include "constant_time_locl.h" const char BN_version[] = "Big Number" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; @@ -965,3 +966,25 @@ void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG conditio } #undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP } + +void bn_correct_top_consttime(BIGNUM *a) +{ + int j, atop; + BN_ULONG limb; + unsigned int mask; + + for (j = 0, atop = 0; j < a->dmax; j++) { + limb = a->d[j]; + limb |= 0 - limb; + limb >>= BN_BITS2 - 1; + limb = 0 - limb; + mask = (unsigned int)limb; + mask &= constant_time_msb(j - a->top); + atop = constant_time_select_int(mask, j + 1, atop); + } + + mask = constant_time_eq_int(atop, 0); + a->top = atop; + a->neg = constant_time_select_int(mask, 0, a->neg); + a->flags &= ~BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP; +} --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c @@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDI * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe * to access the blinding without a lock. */ + BN_set_flags(f, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); } @@ -572,6 +573,11 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int f goto err; } + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, + rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); if (blinding == NULL) { @@ -605,11 +611,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int f BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, - rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
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