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home:dirkmueller:branches:openSUSE:Factory:Rings:1-MinimalX
grub2
0003-cryptodisk-wipe-out-the-cached-keys-from-p...
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File 0003-cryptodisk-wipe-out-the-cached-keys-from-protectors.patch of Package grub2
From 370e435b6ada53314888f04dcd8f096fc11cfadb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com> Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2023 15:52:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 3/4] cryptodisk: wipe out the cached keys from protectors An attacker may insert a malicious disk with the same crypto UUID and trick grub2 to mount the fake root. Even though the key from the key protector fails to unlock the fake root, it's not wiped out cleanly so the attacker could dump the memory to retrieve the secret key. To defend such attack, wipe out the cached key when we don't need it. Cc: Fabian Vogt <fvogt@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> --- grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c index f9842f776..aa0d43562 100644 --- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c @@ -1355,7 +1355,11 @@ grub_cryptodisk_clear_key_cache (struct grub_cryptomount_args *cargs) return; for (i = 0; cargs->protectors[i]; i++) - grub_free (cargs->key_cache[i].key); + { + if (cargs->key_cache[i].key) + grub_memset (cargs->key_cache[i].key, 0, cargs->key_cache[i].key_len); + grub_free (cargs->key_cache[i].key); + } grub_free (cargs->key_cache); } -- 2.35.3
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