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0003-key_protector-Add-TPM2-Key-Protector.patch
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File 0003-key_protector-Add-TPM2-Key-Protector.patch of Package grub2
From 2cb2b00028ca7f43fc069472fbad7b9f129ec24b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com> Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 05:02:55 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 3/5] key_protector: Add TPM2 Key Protector The TPM2 key protector is a module that enables the automatic retrieval of a fully-encrypted disk's unlocking key from a TPM 2.0. The theory of operation is such that the module accepts various arguments, most of which are optional and therefore possess reasonable defaults. One of these arguments is the keyfile/tpm2key parameter, which is mandatory. There are two supported key formats: 1. Raw Sealed Key (--keyfile) When sealing a key with TPM2_Create, the public portion of the sealed key is stored in TPM2B_PUBLIC, and the private portion is in TPM2B_PRIVATE. The raw sealed key glues the fully marshalled TPM2B_PUBLIC and TPM2B_PRIVATE into one file. 2. TPM 2.0 Key (--tpm2key) The following is the ASN.1 definition of TPM 2.0 Key File: TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE { CommandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER CommandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING } TPMAuthPolicy ::= SEQUENCE { Name [0] EXPLICIT UTF8STRING OPTIONAL Policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy } TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { type OBJECT IDENTIFIER emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL secret [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL authPolicy [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMAuthPolicy OPTIONAL description [4] EXPLICIT UTF8String OPTIONAL, rsaParent [5] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, parent INTEGER pubkey OCTET STRING privkey OCTET STRING } The TPM2 key protector only expects a "sealed" key in DER encoding, so 'type' is always 2.23.133.10.1.5, 'emptyAuth' is 'TRUE', and 'secret' is empty. 'policy' and 'authPolicy' are the possible policy command sequences to construst the policy digest to unseal the key. Similar to the raw sealed key, the public portion (TPM2B_PUBLIC) of the sealed key is stored in 'pubkey', and the private portion (TPM2B_PRIVATE) is in 'privkey'. For more details: https://www.hansenpartnership.com/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.html This sealed key file is created via the grub-protect tool. The tool utilizes the TPM's sealing functionality to seal (i.e., encrypt) an unlocking key using a Storage Root Key (SRK) to the values of various Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). These PCRs reflect the state of the system as it boots. If the values are as expected, the system may be considered trustworthy, at which point the TPM allows for a caller to utilize the private component of the SRK to unseal (i.e., decrypt) the sealed key file. The caller, in this case, is this key protector. The TPM2 key protector registers two commands: - tpm2_key_protector_init: Initializes the state of the TPM2 key protector for later usage, clearing any previous state, too, if any. - tpm2_key_protector_clear: Clears any state set by tpm2_key_protector_init. The way this is expected to be used requires the user to, either interactively or, normally, via a boot script, initialize/configure the key protector and then specify that it be used by the 'cryptomount' command (modifications to this command are in a different patch). For instance, to unseal the raw sealed key file: tpm2_key_protector_init --keyfile=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub2/sealed-1.key cryptomount -u <PART1_UUID> -P tpm2 tpm2_key_protector_init --keyfile=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub2/sealed-2.key --pcrs=7,11 cryptomount -u <PART2_UUID> -P tpm2 Or, to unseal the TPM 2.0 Key file: tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub2/sealed-1.tpm cryptomount -u <PART1_UUID> -P tpm2 tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub2/sealed-2.tpm --pcrs=7,11 cryptomount -u <PART2_UUID> -P tpm2 If a user does not initialize the key protector and attempts to use it anyway, the protector returns an error. Before unsealing the key, the TPM2 key protector follows the "TPMPolicy" sequences to enforce the TPM policy commands to construct a valid policy digest to unseal the key. For the TPM 2.0 Key files, 'authPolicy' may contain multiple "TPMPolicy" sequences, the TPM2 key protector iterates 'authPolicy' to find a valid sequence to unseal key. If 'authPolicy' is empty or all sequences in 'authPolicy' fail, the protector tries the one from 'policy'. In case 'policy' is also empty, the protector creates a "TPMPolicy" sequence based on the given PCR selection. For the raw sealed key, the TPM2 key protector treats the key file as a TPM 2.0 Key file without 'authPolicy' and 'policy', so the "TPMPolicy" sequence is always based on the PCR selection from the command parameters. This commit only supports one policy command: TPM2_PolicyPCR. The command set will be extended to support advanced features, such as authorized policy, in the later commits. Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com> --- grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 13 + grub-core/tpm2/args.c | 140 ++++ grub-core/tpm2/module.c | 1226 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.asn | 33 + grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.c | 476 +++++++++++ grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key_asn1_tab.c | 45 ++ include/grub/tpm2/internal/args.h | 49 ++ include/grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h | 86 ++ 8 files changed, 2068 insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/tpm2/args.c create mode 100644 grub-core/tpm2/module.c create mode 100644 grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.asn create mode 100644 grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.c create mode 100644 grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key_asn1_tab.c create mode 100644 include/grub/tpm2/internal/args.h create mode 100644 include/grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def index 4307b8e2d..a3c728442 100644 --- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def +++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def @@ -2612,6 +2612,19 @@ module = { enable = efi; }; +module = { + name = tpm2; + common = tpm2/args.c; + common = tpm2/buffer.c; + common = tpm2/module.c; + common = tpm2/mu.c; + common = tpm2/tpm2.c; + common = tpm2/tpm2key.c; + common = tpm2/tpm2key_asn1_tab.c; + efi = tpm2/tcg2.c; + enable = efi; +}; + module = { name = tr; common = commands/tr.c; diff --git a/grub-core/tpm2/args.c b/grub-core/tpm2/args.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c11280ab9 --- /dev/null +++ b/grub-core/tpm2/args.c @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/* + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader + * Copyright (C) 2022 Microsoft Corporation + * + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <grub/err.h> +#include <grub/mm.h> +#include <grub/misc.h> +#include <grub/tpm2/internal/args.h> + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_parse_pcrs (char *value, grub_uint8_t *pcrs, + grub_uint8_t *pcr_count) +{ + char *current_pcr = value; + char *next_pcr; + unsigned long pcr; + grub_uint8_t i; + + if (grub_strlen (value) == 0) + return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT; + + *pcr_count = 0; + for (i = 0; i < TPM_MAX_PCRS; i++) + { + next_pcr = grub_strchr (current_pcr, ','); + if (next_pcr == current_pcr) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("Empty entry in PCR list")); + if (next_pcr) + *next_pcr = '\0'; + + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + pcr = grub_strtoul (current_pcr, NULL, 10); + if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return grub_error (grub_errno, + N_("Entry '%s' in PCR list is not a number"), + current_pcr); + + if (pcr > TPM_MAX_PCRS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, + N_("Entry %lu in PCR list is too large to be a PCR " + "number, PCR numbers range from 0 to %u"), + pcr, TPM_MAX_PCRS); + + pcrs[i] = (grub_uint8_t)pcr; + *pcr_count += 1; + + if (next_pcr == NULL) + break; + + current_pcr = next_pcr + 1; + if (*current_pcr == '\0') + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("Trailing comma at the end of PCR list")); + } + + if (i == TPM_MAX_PCRS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, + N_("Too many PCRs in PCR list, the maximum number of " + "PCRs is %u"), TPM_MAX_PCRS); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_parse_asymmetric (const char *value, + grub_srk_type_t *srk_type) +{ + if (grub_strcasecmp (value, "ECC") == 0 || + grub_strcasecmp (value, "ECC_NIST_P256") == 0) + { + srk_type->type = TPM_ALG_ECC; + srk_type->detail.ecc_curve = TPM_ECC_NIST_P256; + } + else if (grub_strcasecmp (value, "RSA") == 0 || + grub_strcasecmp (value, "RSA2048") == 0) + { + srk_type->type = TPM_ALG_RSA; + srk_type->detail.rsa_bits = 2048; + } + else + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, + N_("Value '%s' is not a valid asymmetric key type"), + value); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_parse_bank (const char *value, TPM_ALG_ID *bank) +{ + if (grub_strcasecmp (value, "SHA1") == 0) + *bank = TPM_ALG_SHA1; + else if (grub_strcasecmp (value, "SHA256") == 0) + *bank = TPM_ALG_SHA256; + else if (grub_strcasecmp (value, "SHA384") == 0) + *bank = TPM_ALG_SHA384; + else if (grub_strcasecmp (value, "SHA512") == 0) + *bank = TPM_ALG_SHA512; + else + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, + N_("Value '%s' is not a valid PCR bank"), value); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_parse_tpm_handle (const char *value, TPM_HANDLE *handle) +{ + unsigned long num; + + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + num = grub_strtoul (value, NULL, 0); + if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return grub_error (grub_errno, N_("TPM handle value '%s' is not a number"), + value); + + if (num > GRUB_UINT_MAX) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, + N_("Value %lu is too large to be a TPM handle, TPM " + "handles are unsigned 32-bit integers"), num); + + *handle = (TPM_HANDLE)num; + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} diff --git a/grub-core/tpm2/module.c b/grub-core/tpm2/module.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3db25ceca --- /dev/null +++ b/grub-core/tpm2/module.c @@ -0,0 +1,1226 @@ +/* + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader + * Copyright (C) 2022 Microsoft Corporation + * + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <grub/dl.h> +#include <grub/extcmd.h> +#include <grub/file.h> +#include <grub/libtasn1.h> +#include <grub/list.h> +#include <grub/misc.h> +#include <grub/mm.h> +#include <grub/key_protector.h> +#include <grub/tpm2/buffer.h> +#include <grub/tpm2/internal/args.h> +#include <grub/tpm2/internal/types.h> +#include <grub/tpm2/mu.h> +#include <grub/tpm2/tpm2.h> +#include <grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h> + +GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +typedef enum grub_tpm2_protector_mode +{ + GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_UNSET, + GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK, + GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV +} grub_tpm2_protector_mode_t; + +enum grub_tpm2_protector_options +{ + OPTION_MODE, + OPTION_PCRS, + OPTION_BANK, + OPTION_TPM2KEY, + OPTION_KEYFILE, + OPTION_SRK, + OPTION_ASYMMETRIC, + OPTION_NVINDEX +}; + +struct grub_tpm2_protector_context +{ + grub_tpm2_protector_mode_t mode; + grub_uint8_t pcrs[TPM_MAX_PCRS]; + grub_uint8_t pcr_count; + grub_srk_type_t srk_type; + TPM_ALG_ID bank; + const char *tpm2key; + const char *keyfile; + TPM_HANDLE srk; + TPM_HANDLE nv; +}; + +static const struct grub_arg_option grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd_options[] = + { + /* Options for all modes */ + { + .longarg = "mode", + .shortarg = 'm', + .flags = 0, + .arg = NULL, + .type = ARG_TYPE_STRING, + .doc = + N_("Unseal key using SRK ('srk') (default) or retrieve it from an NV " + "Index ('nv')."), + }, + { + .longarg = "pcrs", + .shortarg = 'p', + .flags = 0, + .arg = NULL, + .type = ARG_TYPE_STRING, + .doc = + N_("Comma-separated list of PCRs used to authorize key release " + "e.g., '7,11'. (default: 7)"), + }, + { + .longarg = "bank", + .shortarg = 'b', + .flags = 0, + .arg = NULL, + .type = ARG_TYPE_STRING, + .doc = + N_("Bank of PCRs used to authorize key release: " + "SHA1, SHA256, SHA384 or SHA512. (default: SHA256)"), + }, + /* SRK-mode options */ + { + .longarg = "tpm2key", + .shortarg = 'T', + .flags = 0, + .arg = NULL, + .type = ARG_TYPE_STRING, + .doc = + N_("In SRK mode, path to the key file in the TPM 2.0 Key File format " + "to unseal using the TPM (e.g., (hd0,gpt1)/boot/grub2/sealed.tpm)."), + }, + { + .longarg = "keyfile", + .shortarg = 'k', + .flags = 0, + .arg = NULL, + .type = ARG_TYPE_STRING, + .doc = + N_("In SRK mode, path to the key file in the raw format to unseal " + "using the TPM (e.g., (hd0,gpt1)/boot/grub2/sealed.key). " + "(Mainly for backward compatibility. Please use '--tpm2key'.)"), + }, + { + .longarg = "srk", + .shortarg = 's', + .flags = 0, + .arg = NULL, + .type = ARG_TYPE_STRING, + .doc = + N_("In SRK mode, the SRK handle if the SRK is persistent."), + }, + { + .longarg = "asymmetric", + .shortarg = 'a', + .flags = 0, + .arg = NULL, + .type = ARG_TYPE_STRING, + .doc = + N_("In SRK mode, the type of SRK: RSA (RSA2048) and ECC (ECC_NIST_P256)" + "(default: ECC)"), + }, + /* NV Index-mode options */ + { + .longarg = "nvindex", + .shortarg = 'n', + .flags = 0, + .arg = NULL, + .type = ARG_TYPE_STRING, + .doc = + N_("Required in NV Index mode, the NV handle to read which must " + "readily exist on the TPM and which contains the key."), + }, + /* End of list */ + {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} + }; + +static grub_extcmd_t grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd; +static grub_extcmd_t grub_tpm2_protector_clear_cmd; +static struct grub_tpm2_protector_context grub_tpm2_protector_ctx = { 0 }; + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_srk_read_file (const char *filepath, void **buffer, + grub_size_t *buffer_size) +{ + grub_file_t file; + grub_off_t file_size; + void *read_buffer; + grub_off_t read_n; + grub_err_t err; + + /* Using GRUB_FILE_TYPE_SIGNATURE ensures we do not hash the keyfile into PCR9 + * otherwise we'll never be able to predict the value of PCR9 at unseal time */ + file = grub_file_open (filepath, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_SIGNATURE); + if (file == NULL) + { + /* Push errno from grub_file_open() into the error message stack */ + grub_error_push(); + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, + N_("Could not open file: %s\n"), + filepath); + goto error; + } + + file_size = grub_file_size (file); + if (file_size == 0) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, + N_("Could not read file size: %s"), + filepath); + goto error; + } + + read_buffer = grub_malloc (file_size); + if (read_buffer == NULL) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, + N_("Could not allocate buffer for %s"), + filepath); + goto error; + } + + read_n = grub_file_read (file, read_buffer, file_size); + if (read_n != file_size) + { + grub_free (read_buffer); + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_READ_ERROR, + N_("Could not retrieve file contents: %s"), + filepath); + goto error; + } + + *buffer = read_buffer; + *buffer_size = file_size; + + err = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + +error: + if (file != NULL) + grub_file_close (file); + + return err; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_srk_unmarshal_keyfile (void *sealed_key, + grub_size_t sealed_key_size, + TPM2_SEALED_KEY *sk) +{ + struct grub_tpm2_buffer buf; + + grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&buf); + if (sealed_key_size > buf.cap) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("Sealed key larger than %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " bytes"), + buf.cap); + + grub_memcpy (buf.data, sealed_key, sealed_key_size); + buf.size = sealed_key_size; + + grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_PUBLIC_Unmarshal (&buf, &sk->public); + grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_PRIVATE_Unmarshal (&buf, &sk->private); + + if (buf.error) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("Malformed TPM wire key file")); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_srk_unmarshal_tpm2key (void *sealed_key, + grub_size_t sealed_key_size, + tpm2key_policy_t *policy_seq, + tpm2key_authpolicy_t *authpol_seq, + grub_uint8_t *rsaparent, + grub_uint32_t *parent, + TPM2_SEALED_KEY *sk) +{ + asn1_node tpm2key = NULL; + grub_uint8_t rsaparent_tmp; + grub_uint32_t parent_tmp; + void *sealed_pub = NULL; + grub_size_t sealed_pub_size; + void *sealed_priv = NULL; + grub_size_t sealed_priv_size; + struct grub_tpm2_buffer buf; + grub_err_t err; + + /* + * Start to parse the tpm2key file + * TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + * policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL, + * secret [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + * authPolicy [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMAuthPolicy OPTIONAL, + * description [4] EXPLICIT UTF8String OPTIONAL, + * rsaParent [5] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + * parent INTEGER, + * pubkey OCTET STRING, + * privkey OCTET STRING + * } + */ + err = grub_tpm2key_start_parsing (&tpm2key, sealed_key, sealed_key_size); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + + /* + * Retrieve the policy sequence from 'policy' + * policy_seq will be NULL when 'policy' is not available + */ + err = grub_tpm2key_get_policy_seq (tpm2key, policy_seq); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto error; + + /* + * Retrieve the authpolicy sequence from 'authPolicy' + * authpol_seq will be NULL when 'authPolicy' is not available + */ + err = grub_tpm2key_get_authpolicy_seq (tpm2key, authpol_seq); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto error; + + /* Retrieve rsaParent */ + err = grub_tpm2key_get_rsaparent (tpm2key, &rsaparent_tmp); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto error; + + *rsaparent = rsaparent_tmp; + + /* Retrieve the parent handle */ + err = grub_tpm2key_get_parent (tpm2key, &parent_tmp); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto error; + + /* The parent handle should be either PERMANENT or PERSISTENT. */ + if (!TPM_HT_IS_PERMANENT (parent_tmp) && !TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (parent_tmp)) + { + err = GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE; + goto error; + } + + *parent = parent_tmp; + + /* Retrieve the public part of the sealed key */ + err = grub_tpm2key_get_pubkey (tpm2key, &sealed_pub, &sealed_pub_size); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto error; + + /* Retrieve the private part of the sealed key */ + err = grub_tpm2key_get_privkey (tpm2key, &sealed_priv, &sealed_priv_size); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto error; + + /* Unmarshal the sealed key */ + grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&buf); + if (sealed_pub_size + sealed_priv_size > buf.cap) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("Sealed key larger than %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " bytes"), + buf.cap); + goto error; + } + + grub_tpm2_buffer_pack (&buf, sealed_pub, sealed_pub_size); + grub_tpm2_buffer_pack (&buf, sealed_priv, sealed_priv_size); + + buf.offset = 0; + + grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_PUBLIC_Unmarshal (&buf, &sk->public); + grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_PRIVATE_Unmarshal (&buf, &sk->private); + + if (buf.error) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("Malformed TPM 2.0 key file")); + goto error; + } + + err = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + +error: + /* End the parsing */ + grub_tpm2key_end_parsing (tpm2key); + grub_free (sealed_pub); + grub_free (sealed_priv); + + return err; +} + +/* Check if the SRK exists in the specified handle */ +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_srk_check (const TPM_HANDLE srk_handle) +{ + TPM_RC rc; + TPM2B_PUBLIC public; + + /* Find SRK */ + rc = TPM2_ReadPublic (srk_handle, NULL, &public); + if (rc == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("Failed to retrieve SRK from 0x%x (TPM2_ReadPublic: 0x%x)"), + srk_handle, rc); +} + +/* Get the SRK with the template */ +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_srk_get (const grub_srk_type_t srk_type, + const TPM_HANDLE parent, + TPM_HANDLE *srk_handle) +{ + TPM_RC rc; + TPMT_PUBLIC_PARMS parms = { 0 }; + TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND authCommand = { 0 }; + TPM2B_SENSITIVE_CREATE inSensitive = { 0 }; + TPM2B_PUBLIC inPublic = { 0 }; + TPM2B_DATA outsideInfo = { 0 }; + TPML_PCR_SELECTION creationPcr = { 0 }; + TPM2B_PUBLIC outPublic = { 0 }; + TPM2B_CREATION_DATA creationData = { 0 }; + TPM2B_DIGEST creationHash = { 0 }; + TPMT_TK_CREATION creationTicket = { 0 }; + TPM2B_NAME srkName = { 0 }; + TPM_HANDLE tmp_handle = 0; + + inPublic.publicArea.type = srk_type.type; + inPublic.publicArea.nameAlg = TPM_ALG_SHA256; + inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.restricted = 1; + inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.userWithAuth = 1; + inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.decrypt = 1; + inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.fixedTPM = 1; + inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.fixedParent = 1; + inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.sensitiveDataOrigin = 1; + inPublic.publicArea.objectAttributes.noDA = 1; + + if (srk_type.type == TPM_ALG_RSA) + { + inPublic.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.symmetric.algorithm = TPM_ALG_AES; + inPublic.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.symmetric.keyBits.aes = 128; + inPublic.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.symmetric.mode.aes = TPM_ALG_CFB; + inPublic.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.scheme.scheme = TPM_ALG_NULL; + inPublic.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.keyBits = srk_type.detail.rsa_bits; + inPublic.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.exponent = 0; + } + else if (srk_type.type == TPM_ALG_ECC) + { + inPublic.publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.symmetric.algorithm = TPM_ALG_AES; + inPublic.publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.symmetric.keyBits.aes = 128; + inPublic.publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.symmetric.mode.aes = TPM_ALG_CFB; + inPublic.publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.scheme.scheme = TPM_ALG_NULL; + inPublic.publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID = srk_type.detail.ecc_curve; + inPublic.publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.kdf.scheme = TPM_ALG_NULL; + } + else + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("Unknown SRK algorithm")); + + /* Test the parameters before SRK generation */ + parms.type = srk_type.type; + grub_memcpy (&parms.parameters, &inPublic.publicArea.parameters, + sizeof (TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS)); + + rc = TPM2_TestParms (&parms, NULL); + if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("Unsupported SRK template (TPM2_TestParms: 0x%x)"), + rc); + + /* Create SRK */ + authCommand.sessionHandle = TPM_RS_PW; + rc = TPM2_CreatePrimary (parent, &authCommand, &inSensitive, &inPublic, + &outsideInfo, &creationPcr, &tmp_handle, &outPublic, + &creationData, &creationHash, &creationTicket, + &srkName, NULL); + if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE, + N_("Could not create SRK (TPM2_CreatePrimary: 0x%x)"), + rc); + + *srk_handle = tmp_handle; + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +/* Load the SRK from the persistent handle or create one with a given type of + template, and then associate the sealed key with the SRK + Return values: + * GRUB_ERR_NONE: Everything is fine. + * GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT: The SRK doesn't match. Try another one. + * Other: Something went wrong. +*/ +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_srk_load (const grub_srk_type_t srk_type, + const TPM2_SEALED_KEY *sealed_key, + const TPM_HANDLE parent, + TPM_HANDLE *sealed_handle, + TPM_HANDLE *srk_handle) +{ + TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND authCmd = { 0 }; + TPM2B_NAME name = { 0 }; + TPM_RC rc; + grub_err_t err; + + if (srk_handle == NULL) + return GRUB_ERR_BUG; + + if (*srk_handle != 0) + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_check (*srk_handle); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + } + else + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_get (srk_type, parent, srk_handle); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + } + + /* Load the sealed key and associate it with the SRK */ + authCmd.sessionHandle = TPM_RS_PW; + rc = TPM2_Load (*srk_handle, &authCmd, &sealed_key->private, &sealed_key->public, + sealed_handle, &name, NULL); + /* If TPM2_Load returns (TPM_RC_INTEGRITY | TPM_RC_P | TPM_RC_1), then it + implies the wrong SRK is used. */ + if (rc == (TPM_RC_INTEGRITY | TPM_RC_P | TPM_RC_1)) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("SRK not matched")); + goto error; + } + else if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE, + N_("Failed to load sealed key (TPM2_Load: 0x%x)"), + rc); + goto error; + } + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + +error: + if (!TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (*srk_handle)) + TPM2_FlushContext (*srk_handle); + + return err; +} + +static const char * +srk_type_to_name (grub_srk_type_t srk_type) +{ + if (srk_type.type == TPM_ALG_ECC) + { + switch (srk_type.detail.ecc_curve) + { + case TPM_ECC_NIST_P256: + return "ECC_NIST_P256"; + } + } + else if (srk_type.type == TPM_ALG_RSA) + { + switch (srk_type.detail.rsa_bits) + { + case 2048: + return "RSA2048"; + } + } + + return "Unknown"; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_load_key (const struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx, + const TPM2_SEALED_KEY *sealed_key, + const TPM_HANDLE parent_handle, + TPM_HANDLE *sealed_handle, + TPM_HANDLE *srk_handle) +{ + grub_err_t err; + int i; + grub_srk_type_t fallback_srks[] = { + { + .type = TPM_ALG_ECC, + .detail.ecc_curve = TPM_ECC_NIST_P256, + }, + { + .type = TPM_ALG_RSA, + .detail.rsa_bits = 2048, + }, + { + .type = TPM_ALG_ERROR, + } + }; + + /* Try the given persistent SRK if exists */ + if (*srk_handle != 0) + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_load (ctx->srk_type, sealed_key, + parent_handle, sealed_handle, + srk_handle); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT) + return err; + + grub_print_error (); + grub_printf_ (N_("Trying the specified SRK algorithm: %s\n"), + srk_type_to_name (ctx->srk_type)); + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + *srk_handle = 0; + } + + /* Try the specified algorithm for the SRK template */ + if (*srk_handle == 0) + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_load (ctx->srk_type, sealed_key, + parent_handle, sealed_handle, + srk_handle); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT) + return err; + + grub_print_error (); + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + *srk_handle = 0; + } + + /* Try all the fallback SRK templates */ + for (i = 0; fallback_srks[i].type != TPM_ALG_ERROR; i++) + { + /* Skip the specified algorithm */ + if (fallback_srks[i].type == ctx->srk_type.type && + (fallback_srks[i].detail.rsa_bits == ctx->srk_type.detail.rsa_bits || + fallback_srks[i].detail.ecc_curve == ctx->srk_type.detail.ecc_curve)) + continue; + + grub_printf_ (N_("Trying fallback %s template\n"), + srk_type_to_name (fallback_srks[i])); + + *srk_handle = 0; + + err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_load (fallback_srks[i], sealed_key, + parent_handle, sealed_handle, + srk_handle); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT) + return err; + + grub_print_error (); + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + + return err; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_policypcr (TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION session, + struct grub_tpm2_buffer *cmd_buf) +{ + TPM2B_DIGEST pcr_digest; + TPML_PCR_SELECTION pcr_sel; + TPM_RC rc; + + grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal (cmd_buf, &pcr_digest); + grub_tpm2_mu_TPML_PCR_SELECTION_Unmarshal (cmd_buf, &pcr_sel); + if (cmd_buf->error) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("Failed to unmarshal CommandPolicy for TPM2_PolicyPCR")); + + rc = TPM2_PolicyPCR (session, NULL, &pcr_digest, &pcr_sel, NULL); + if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE, + N_("Failed to submit PCR policy (TPM2_PolicyPCR: 0x%x)"), + rc); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_enforce_policy (tpm2key_policy_t policy, TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION session) +{ + struct grub_tpm2_buffer buf; + grub_err_t err; + + grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&buf); + if (policy->cmd_policy_len > buf.cap) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("CommandPolicy larger than TPM buffer")); + + grub_memcpy (buf.data, policy->cmd_policy, policy->cmd_policy_len); + buf.size = policy->cmd_policy_len; + + switch (policy->cmd_code) + { + case TPM_CC_PolicyPCR: + err = grub_tpm2_protector_policypcr (session, &buf); + break; + default: + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("Unknown TPM Command: 0x%x"), policy->cmd_code); + } + + return err; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_enforce_policy_seq (tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq, + TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION session) +{ + tpm2key_policy_t policy; + grub_err_t err; + + FOR_LIST_ELEMENTS (policy, policy_seq) + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_enforce_policy (policy, session); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + } + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_simple_policy_seq (const struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx, + tpm2key_policy_t *policy_seq) +{ + tpm2key_policy_t policy = NULL; + struct grub_tpm2_buffer buf; + TPML_PCR_SELECTION pcr_sel = { + .count = 1, + .pcrSelections = { + { + .hash = ctx->bank, + .sizeOfSelect = 3, + .pcrSelect = { 0 } + }, + } + }; + grub_uint8_t i; + grub_err_t err; + + if (policy_seq == NULL) + return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT; + + grub_tpm2_buffer_init (&buf); + + for (i = 0; i < ctx->pcr_count; i++) + TPMS_PCR_SELECTION_SelectPCR (&pcr_sel.pcrSelections[0], ctx->pcrs[i]); + + grub_tpm2_buffer_pack_u16 (&buf, 0); + grub_tpm2_mu_TPML_PCR_SELECTION_Marshal (&buf, &pcr_sel); + + if (buf.error) + return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT; + + policy = grub_malloc (sizeof(struct tpm2key_policy)); + if (policy == NULL) + { + err = GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + policy->cmd_code = TPM_CC_PolicyPCR; + policy->cmd_policy = grub_malloc (buf.size); + if (policy->cmd_policy == NULL) + { + err = GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + grub_memcpy (policy->cmd_policy, buf.data, buf.size); + policy->cmd_policy_len = buf.size; + + grub_list_push (GRUB_AS_LIST_P (policy_seq), GRUB_AS_LIST (policy)); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + +error: + grub_free (policy); + + return err; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_unseal (tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq, TPM_HANDLE sealed_handle, + grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size) +{ + TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND authCmd = { 0 }; + TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA data; + TPM2B_NONCE nonceCaller = { 0 }; + TPMT_SYM_DEF symmetric = { 0 }; + TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION session; + grub_uint8_t *key_out; + TPM_RC rc; + grub_err_t err; + + /* Start Auth Session */ + nonceCaller.size = TPM_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + symmetric.algorithm = TPM_ALG_NULL; + rc = TPM2_StartAuthSession (TPM_RH_NULL, TPM_RH_NULL, NULL, &nonceCaller, NULL, + TPM_SE_POLICY, &symmetric, TPM_ALG_SHA256, + &session, NULL, NULL); + if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE, + N_("Failed to start auth session (TPM2_StartAuthSession: 0x%x)"), + rc); + + /* Enforce the policy command sequence */ + err = grub_tpm2_protector_enforce_policy_seq (policy_seq, session); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto error; + + /* Unseal Sealed Key */ + authCmd.sessionHandle = session; + rc = TPM2_Unseal (sealed_handle, &authCmd, &data, NULL); + if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE, + N_("Failed to unseal sealed key (TPM2_Unseal: 0x%x)"), + rc); + goto error; + } + + /* Epilogue */ + key_out = grub_malloc (data.size); + if (key_out == NULL) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, + N_("No memory left to allocate unlock key buffer")); + goto error; + } + + grub_memcpy (key_out, data.buffer, data.size); + + *key = key_out; + *key_size = data.size; + + err = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + +error: + TPM2_FlushContext (session); + + return err; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_srk_recover (const struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx, + grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size) +{ + TPM2_SEALED_KEY sealed_key = { 0 }; + void *file_bytes = NULL; + grub_size_t file_size = 0; + grub_uint8_t rsaparent = 0; + TPM_HANDLE parent_handle = 0; + TPM_HANDLE srk_handle = 0; + TPM_HANDLE sealed_handle = 0; + tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq = NULL; + tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol = NULL; + tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol_seq = NULL; + grub_err_t err; + + /* + * Retrieve sealed key, parent handle, policy sequence, and authpolicy + * sequence from the key file + */ + if (ctx->tpm2key) + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_read_file (ctx->tpm2key, &file_bytes, + &file_size); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + + err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_unmarshal_tpm2key (file_bytes, + file_size, + &policy_seq, + &authpol_seq, + &rsaparent, + &parent_handle, + &sealed_key); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto exit1; + + if (rsaparent == 1) + { + struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx_w; + + /* Overwrite the SRK type as noted in the key */ + ctx_w = (struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *)ctx; + ctx_w->srk_type.type = TPM_ALG_RSA; + ctx_w->srk_type.detail.rsa_bits = 2048; + } + } + else + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_read_file (ctx->keyfile, &file_bytes, + &file_size); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + + parent_handle = TPM_RH_OWNER; + err = grub_tpm2_protector_srk_unmarshal_keyfile (file_bytes, + file_size, + &sealed_key); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto exit1; + } + + /* Set the SRK handle if it is specified with '--srk' or inside the key file */ + if (ctx->srk != 0) + srk_handle = ctx->srk; + else if (TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (parent_handle)) + srk_handle = parent_handle; + + /* Load the sealed key into TPM and associate it with the SRK */ + err = grub_tpm2_protector_load_key (ctx, &sealed_key, parent_handle, + &sealed_handle, &srk_handle); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto exit1; + + /* + * Set err to an error code to trigger the standalone policy sequence + * if there is no authpolicy sequence + */ + err = GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR; + + /* Iterate the authpolicy sequence to find one that unseals the key */ + FOR_LIST_ELEMENTS (authpol, authpol_seq) + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_unseal (authpol->policy_seq, sealed_handle, + key, key_size); + if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE) + break; + + /* + * Push the error message into the grub_error stack + * Note: The grub_error stack may overflow if there are too many policy + * sequences. Anyway, we still can keep the error messages from + * the first few policy sequences which are usually most likely to + * unseal the key. + */ + grub_error_push(); + } + + /* Give the standalone policy sequence a try */ + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + { + /* + * Create a basic policy sequence based on the given PCR selection if the + * key file doesn't provide one + */ + if (policy_seq == NULL) + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_simple_policy_seq (ctx, &policy_seq); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto exit2; + } + + err = grub_tpm2_protector_unseal (policy_seq, sealed_handle, key, key_size); + } + + /* Pop error messages on success */ + if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE) + while (grub_error_pop ()); + +exit2: + TPM2_FlushContext (sealed_handle); + + if (!TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (srk_handle)) + TPM2_FlushContext (srk_handle); + +exit1: + grub_tpm2key_free_policy_seq (policy_seq); + grub_tpm2key_free_authpolicy_seq (authpol_seq); + grub_free (file_bytes); + return err; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_nv_recover (const struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx, + grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size) +{ + (void)ctx; + (void)key; + (void)key_size; + + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET, + N_("NV Index mode is not implemented yet")); +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_recover (const struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx, + grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size) +{ + switch (ctx->mode) + { + case GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK: + return grub_tpm2_protector_srk_recover (ctx, key, key_size); + case GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV: + return grub_tpm2_protector_nv_recover (ctx, key, key_size); + default: + return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT; + } +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_recover_key (grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size) +{ + /* Expect a call to tpm2_protector_init before anybody tries to use us */ + if (grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_UNSET) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND, + N_("Cannot use TPM2 key protector without initializing " + "it, call tpm2_protector_init first")); + + if (key == NULL || key_size == NULL) + return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT; + + return grub_tpm2_protector_recover (&grub_tpm2_protector_ctx, key, key_size); +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_check_args (struct grub_tpm2_protector_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_UNSET) + ctx->mode = GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK; + + /* Checks for SRK mode */ + if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK && + (ctx->keyfile == NULL && ctx->tpm2key == NULL)) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("In SRK mode, a key file must be specified: " + "--tpm2key/-T or --keyfile/-k")); + + if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK && + (ctx->keyfile != NULL && ctx->tpm2key != NULL)) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("In SRK mode, please specify a key file with " + "only --tpm2key/-T or --keyfile/-k")); + + if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK && ctx->nv != 0) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("In SRK mode, an NV Index cannot be specified")); + + /* Checks for NV mode */ + if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && ctx->nv == 0) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("In NV Index mode, an NV Index must be specified: " + "--nvindex or -n")); + + if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && + (ctx->tpm2key != NULL || ctx->keyfile != NULL)) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("In NV Index mode, a keyfile cannot be specified")); + + if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && ctx->srk != 0) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("In NV Index mode, an SRK cannot be specified")); + + if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && + ctx->srk_type.type != TPM_ALG_ERROR) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("In NV Index mode, an asymmetric key type cannot be " + "specified")); + + /* Defaults assignment */ + if (ctx->bank == TPM_ALG_ERROR) + ctx->bank = TPM_ALG_SHA256; + + if (ctx->pcr_count == 0) + { + ctx->pcrs[0] = 7; + ctx->pcr_count = 1; + } + + if (ctx->mode == GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK && + ctx->srk_type.type == TPM_ALG_ERROR) + { + ctx->srk_type.type = TPM_ALG_ECC; + ctx->srk_type.detail.ecc_curve = TPM_ECC_NIST_P256; + } + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_parse_file (const char *value, const char **file) +{ + if (grub_strlen (value) == 0) + return GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT; + + *file = grub_strdup (value); + if (*file == NULL) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, + N_("No memory to duplicate file path")); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_parse_mode (const char *value, + grub_tpm2_protector_mode_t *mode) +{ + if (grub_strcmp (value, "srk") == 0) + *mode = GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK; + else if (grub_strcmp (value, "nv") == 0) + *mode = GRUB_TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV; + else + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, + N_("Value '%s' is not a valid TPM2 key protector mode"), + value); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd_handler (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, + char **args __attribute__ ((unused))) +{ + struct grub_arg_list *state = ctxt->state; + grub_err_t err; + + if (argc) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("The TPM2 key protector does not accept any " + "non-option arguments (i.e., like -o and/or --option " + "only)")); + + grub_free ((void *) grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.keyfile); + grub_memset (&grub_tpm2_protector_ctx, 0, sizeof (grub_tpm2_protector_ctx)); + + if (state[OPTION_MODE].set) /* mode */ + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_mode (state[OPTION_MODE].arg, + &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.mode); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + } + + if (state[OPTION_PCRS].set) /* pcrs */ + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_pcrs (state[OPTION_PCRS].arg, + grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.pcrs, + &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.pcr_count); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + } + + if (state[OPTION_BANK].set) /* bank */ + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_bank (state[OPTION_BANK].arg, + &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.bank); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + } + + if (state[OPTION_TPM2KEY].set) /* tpm2key */ + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_file (state[OPTION_TPM2KEY].arg, + &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.tpm2key); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + } + + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set) /* keyfile */ + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_file (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].arg, + &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.keyfile); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + } + + if (state[OPTION_SRK].set) /* srk */ + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_tpm_handle (state[OPTION_SRK].arg, + &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.srk); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + } + + if (state[OPTION_ASYMMETRIC].set) /* asymmetric */ + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_asymmetric (state[OPTION_ASYMMETRIC].arg, + &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.srk_type); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + } + + if (state[OPTION_NVINDEX].set) /* nvindex */ + { + err = grub_tpm2_protector_parse_tpm_handle (state[OPTION_NVINDEX].arg, + &grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.nv); + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return err; + } + + err = grub_tpm2_protector_check_args (&grub_tpm2_protector_ctx); + + /* This command only initializes the protector, so nothing else to do. */ + + return err; +} + +static grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_clear_cmd_handler (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt __attribute__ ((unused)), + int argc, + char **args __attribute__ ((unused))) +{ + if (argc) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("tpm2_key_protector_clear accepts no arguments")); + + grub_free ((void *) grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.keyfile); + grub_memset (&grub_tpm2_protector_ctx, 0, sizeof (grub_tpm2_protector_ctx)); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +static struct grub_key_protector grub_tpm2_key_protector = + { + .name = "tpm2", + .recover_key = grub_tpm2_protector_recover_key + }; + +GRUB_MOD_INIT (tpm2) +{ + grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd = + grub_register_extcmd ("tpm2_key_protector_init", + grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd_handler, 0, + N_("[-m mode] " + "[-p pcr_list] " + "[-b pcr_bank] " + "[-T tpm2_key_file_path] " + "[-k sealed_key_file_path] " + "[-s srk_handle] " + "[-a asymmetric_key_type] " + "[-n nv_index]"), + N_("Initialize the TPM2 key protector."), + grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd_options); + grub_tpm2_protector_clear_cmd = + grub_register_extcmd ("tpm2_key_protector_clear", + grub_tpm2_protector_clear_cmd_handler, 0, NULL, + N_("Clear the TPM2 key protector if previously initialized."), + NULL); + grub_key_protector_register (&grub_tpm2_key_protector); +} + +GRUB_MOD_FINI (tpm2) +{ + grub_free ((void *) grub_tpm2_protector_ctx.keyfile); + grub_memset (&grub_tpm2_protector_ctx, 0, sizeof (grub_tpm2_protector_ctx)); + + grub_key_protector_unregister (&grub_tpm2_key_protector); + grub_unregister_extcmd (grub_tpm2_protector_clear_cmd); + grub_unregister_extcmd (grub_tpm2_protector_init_cmd); +} diff --git a/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.asn b/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.asn new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7ad4b6a2a --- /dev/null +++ b/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.asn @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +-- +-- TPM 2.0 key file format +-- To generate tpm2key_asn1_tab.c: asn1Parser tpm2key.asn +-- +TPM2KEY {} +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + +BEGIN + +TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE { + CommandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER, + CommandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING +} + +TPMAuthPolicy ::= SEQUENCE { + Name [0] EXPLICIT UTF8String OPTIONAL, + Policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy +} + +TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { + type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL, + secret [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + authPolicy [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMAuthPolicy OPTIONAL, + description [4] EXPLICIT UTF8String OPTIONAL, + rsaParent [5] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + parent INTEGER, + pubkey OCTET STRING, + privkey OCTET STRING +} + +END diff --git a/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.c b/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7a55644e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key.c @@ -0,0 +1,476 @@ +/* + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader + * Copyright (C) 2023 SUSE LLC + * + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <grub/libtasn1.h> +#include <grub/list.h> +#include <grub/misc.h> +#include <grub/mm.h> +#include <grub/tpm2/buffer.h> +#include <grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h> + +extern asn1_static_node tpm2key_asn1_tab[]; +const char *sealed_key_oid = "2.23.133.10.1.5"; + +static int +asn1_allocate_and_read (asn1_node node, const char *name, void **content, grub_size_t *content_size) +{ + grub_uint8_t *tmpstr = NULL; + int tmpstr_size = 0; + int ret; + + if (content == NULL) + return ASN1_MEM_ERROR; + + ret = asn1_read_value (node, name, NULL, &tmpstr_size); + if (ret != ASN1_MEM_ERROR) + return ret; + + tmpstr = grub_malloc (tmpstr_size); + if (tmpstr == NULL) + return ASN1_MEM_ERROR; + + ret = asn1_read_value (node, name, tmpstr, &tmpstr_size); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + *content = tmpstr; + *content_size = tmpstr_size; + + return ASN1_SUCCESS; +} + +static int +asn1_read_uint32 (asn1_node node, const char *name, grub_uint32_t *out) +{ + grub_uint32_t tmp = 0; + grub_uint8_t *ptr; + void *data = NULL; + grub_size_t data_size; + int ret; + + ret = asn1_allocate_and_read (node, name, &data, &data_size); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + if (data_size > 4) + { + ret = ASN1_MEM_ERROR; + goto error; + } + + /* convert the big-endian integer to host uint32 */ + ptr = (grub_uint8_t *)&tmp + (4 - data_size); + grub_memcpy (ptr, data, data_size); + tmp = grub_be_to_cpu32 (tmp); + + *out = tmp; +error: + if (data) + grub_free (data); + return ret; +} + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_start_parsing (asn1_node *parsed_tpm2key, void *data, grub_size_t size) +{ + asn1_node tpm2key; + asn1_node tpm2key_asn1 = NULL; + void *type_oid = NULL; + grub_size_t type_oid_size = 0; + void *empty_auth = NULL; + grub_size_t empty_auth_size = 0; + int tmp_size = 0; + int ret; + grub_err_t err; + + /* + * TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + * policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL, + * secret [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + * authPolicy [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMAuthPolicy OPTIONAL, + * description [4] EXPLICIT UTF8String OPTIONAL, + * rsaParent [5] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + * parent INTEGER, + * pubkey OCTET STRING, + * privkey OCTET STRING + * } + */ + ret = asn1_array2tree (tpm2key_asn1_tab, &tpm2key_asn1, NULL); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("Failed to parse TPM2KEY ASN.1 array")); + + ret = asn1_create_element (tpm2key_asn1, "TPM2KEY.TPMKey", &tpm2key); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("Failed to create TPM2KEY.TPMKey")); + + ret = asn1_der_decoding (&tpm2key, data, size, NULL); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("Failed to decode TPM2KEY DER")); + + /* Check if 'type' is Sealed Key or not */ + ret = asn1_allocate_and_read (tpm2key, "type", &type_oid, &type_oid_size); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, + N_("Not a valid TPM2KEY file")); + + if (grub_memcmp (sealed_key_oid, type_oid, type_oid_size) != 0) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, + N_("Not a valid TPM2KEY file")); + goto error; + } + + /* 'emptyAuth' must be 'TRUE' since we don't support password authorization */ + ret = asn1_allocate_and_read (tpm2key, "emptyAuth", &empty_auth, &empty_auth_size); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS || grub_strncmp ("TRUE", empty_auth, empty_auth_size) != 0) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("emptyAuth not TRUE")); + goto error; + } + + /* 'secret' should not be in a sealed key */ + ret = asn1_read_value (tpm2key, "secret", NULL, &tmp_size); + if (ret != ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + N_("\"secret\" not allowed for Sealed Key")); + goto error; + } + + *parsed_tpm2key = tpm2key; + + err = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + +error: + grub_free (type_oid); + grub_free (empty_auth); + + return err; +} + +void +grub_tpm2key_end_parsing (asn1_node tpm2key) +{ + asn1_delete_structure (&tpm2key); + tpm2key = NULL; +} + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_get_rsaparent (asn1_node tpm2key, grub_uint8_t *rsaparent) +{ + void *bool_str = NULL; + grub_size_t bool_str_size = 0; + int ret; + + if (rsaparent == NULL) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("NULL pointer detected")); + + if (tpm2key == NULL) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, N_("Invalid parent node")); + + ret = asn1_allocate_and_read (tpm2key, "rsaParent", &bool_str, &bool_str_size); + if (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS) + { + if (grub_strncmp ("TRUE", bool_str, bool_str_size) == 0) + *rsaparent = 1; + else + *rsaparent = 0; + } + else if (ret == ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND) + *rsaparent = 0; + else + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, N_("Failed to retrieve rsaParent")); + + grub_free (bool_str); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_get_parent (asn1_node tpm2key, grub_uint32_t *parent) +{ + int ret; + + if (parent == NULL) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("NULL pointer detected")); + + if (tpm2key == NULL) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, N_("Invalid parent node")); + + ret = asn1_read_uint32 (tpm2key, "parent", parent); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, N_("Failed to retrieve parent")); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +static grub_err_t +tpm2key_get_octstring (asn1_node tpm2key, const char *name, void **data, grub_size_t *size) +{ + int ret; + + if (name == NULL || data == NULL || size == NULL) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("Invalid parameter(s)")); + + if (tpm2key == NULL) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, N_("Invalid %s node"), name); + + ret = asn1_allocate_and_read (tpm2key, name, data, size); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, + N_("Failed to retrieve %s"), + name); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_get_pubkey (asn1_node tpm2key, void **data, grub_size_t *size) +{ + return tpm2key_get_octstring (tpm2key, "pubkey", data, size); +} + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_get_privkey (asn1_node tpm2key, void **data, grub_size_t *size) +{ + return tpm2key_get_octstring (tpm2key, "privkey", data, size); +} + +/* + * The string to fetch 'Policy' from 'authPolicy': + * authPolicy.?XX.Policy + */ +#define AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX_STR "authPolicy.?XX.Policy" +#define AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX (sizeof (AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX_STR)) + +/* + * Expected strings for CommandCode and CommandPolicy: + * policy.?XX.CommandCode + * policy.?XX.CommandPolicy + * authPolicy.?XX.Policy.?YY.CommandCode + * authPolicy.?XX.Policy.?YY.CommandPolicy + */ +#define CMD_CODE_MAX_STR AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX_STR".?YY.CommandCode" +#define CMD_POL_MAX_STR AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX_STR".?YY.CommandPolicy" +#define CMD_CODE_MAX (sizeof (CMD_CODE_MAX_STR)) +#define CMD_POL_MAX (sizeof (CMD_POL_MAX_STR)) + +static int +tpm2key_get_policy_seq (asn1_node tpm2key, const char *prefix, + tpm2key_policy_t *policy_seq) +{ + tpm2key_policy_t tmp_seq = NULL; + tpm2key_policy_t policy = NULL; + int policy_n; + char cmd_code[CMD_CODE_MAX]; + char cmd_pol[CMD_POL_MAX]; + grub_size_t cmd_policy_len; + int i; + int ret; + + ret = asn1_number_of_elements (tpm2key, prefix, &policy_n); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + /* + * Limit the number of policy commands to two digits (99) + * Although there is no upper bound for the number of policy commands, + * in practice, it takes one or two policy commands to unseal the key, + * so the 99 commands limit is more than enough. + */ + if (policy_n > 100 || policy_n < 1) + return ASN1_VALUE_NOT_VALID; + + /* + * Iterate the policy commands backwards since grub_list_push() prepends + * the item into the list. + */ + for (i = policy_n; i >= 1; i--) { + policy = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct tpm2key_policy)); + if (policy == NULL) + { + ret = ASN1_MEM_ALLOC_ERROR; + goto error; + } + grub_snprintf (cmd_code, CMD_CODE_MAX, "%s.?%d.CommandCode", prefix, i); + grub_snprintf (cmd_pol, CMD_POL_MAX, "%s.?%d.CommandPolicy", prefix, i); + + /* CommandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER */ + ret = asn1_read_uint32 (tpm2key, cmd_code, &policy->cmd_code); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + /* CommandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING */ + ret = tpm2key_get_octstring (tpm2key, cmd_pol, &policy->cmd_policy, + &cmd_policy_len); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + { + goto error; + } + else if (cmd_policy_len > GRUB_TPM2_BUFFER_CAPACITY) + { + /* + * CommandPolicy is the marshalled parameters for the TPM command so + * it should not be larger than the maximum TPM2 buffer. + */ + ret = ASN1_VALUE_NOT_VALID; + goto error; + } + policy->cmd_policy_len = (grub_uint16_t)cmd_policy_len; + + /* Prepend the policy command into the sequence */ + grub_list_push (GRUB_AS_LIST_P (&tmp_seq), GRUB_AS_LIST (policy)); + } + + *policy_seq = tmp_seq; + + return ASN1_SUCCESS; + +error: + if (policy) + { + grub_free (policy->cmd_policy); + grub_free (policy); + } + grub_tpm2key_free_policy_seq (tmp_seq); + + return ret; +} + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_get_policy_seq (asn1_node tpm2key, tpm2key_policy_t *policy_seq) +{ + int ret; + + ret = tpm2key_get_policy_seq (tpm2key, "policy", policy_seq); + if (ret == ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND) + { + /* "policy" is optional, so it may not be available */ + *policy_seq = NULL; + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + else if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, N_("Failed to retrieve policy")); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +} + +void +grub_tpm2key_free_policy_seq (tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq) +{ + tpm2key_policy_t policy; + tpm2key_policy_t next; + + if (policy_seq == NULL) + return; + + FOR_LIST_ELEMENTS_SAFE (policy, next, policy_seq) + { + grub_free (policy->cmd_policy); + grub_free (policy); + } +} + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_get_authpolicy_seq (asn1_node tpm2key, tpm2key_authpolicy_t *authpol_seq) +{ + tpm2key_authpolicy_t tmp_seq = NULL; + tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol = NULL; + int authpol_n; + char authpol_pol[AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX]; + int i; + int ret; + grub_err_t err; + + ret = asn1_number_of_elements (tpm2key, "authPolicy", &authpol_n); + if (ret == ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND) + { + /* "authPolicy" is optional, so it may not be available */ + *authpol_seq = NULL; + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + else if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, N_("Failed to retrieve authPolicy")); + + /* Limit the number of authPolicy elements to two digits (99) */ + if (authpol_n > 100 || authpol_n < 1) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, + N_("Invalid number of authPolicy elements")); + + /* + * Iterate the authPolicy elements backwards since grub_list_push() prepends + * the item into the list. + */ + for (i = authpol_n; i >= 1; i--) { + authpol = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct tpm2key_authpolicy)); + if (authpol == NULL) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, + N_("Failed to allocate memory for authPolicy")); + goto error; + } + grub_snprintf (authpol_pol, AUTHPOLICY_POL_MAX, "authPolicy.?%d.Policy", i); + + ret = tpm2key_get_policy_seq (tpm2key, authpol_pol, &authpol->policy_seq); + if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) + { + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, + N_("Failed to retrieve policy from authPolicy")); + goto error; + } + + /* Prepend the authPolicy element into the sequence */ + grub_list_push (GRUB_AS_LIST_P (&tmp_seq), GRUB_AS_LIST (authpol)); + } + + *authpol_seq = tmp_seq; + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + +error: + if (authpol) + { + grub_tpm2key_free_policy_seq (authpol->policy_seq); + grub_free (authpol); + } + + grub_tpm2key_free_authpolicy_seq (tmp_seq); + + return err; +} + +void +grub_tpm2key_free_authpolicy_seq (tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol_seq) +{ + tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol; + tpm2key_authpolicy_t next; + + if (authpol_seq == NULL) + return; + + FOR_LIST_ELEMENTS_SAFE (authpol, next, authpol_seq) + { + grub_tpm2key_free_policy_seq (authpol->policy_seq); + grub_free (authpol); + } +} diff --git a/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key_asn1_tab.c b/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key_asn1_tab.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6868924f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/grub-core/tpm2/tpm2key_asn1_tab.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * This file is generated by 'asn1Parser tpm2key.asn' and the '#include' + * headers are replaced with the ones in grub2. + * - 'grub/mm.h' for the definition of 'NULL' + * - 'grub/libtasn1.h' for the definition of 'asn1_static_node' + */ + +#include <grub/mm.h> +#include <grub/libtasn1.h> + +const asn1_static_node tpm2key_asn1_tab[] = { + { "TPM2KEY", 536875024, NULL }, + { NULL, 1073741836, NULL }, + { "TPMPolicy", 1610612741, NULL }, + { "CommandCode", 1610620931, NULL }, + { NULL, 2056, "0"}, + { "CommandPolicy", 536879111, NULL }, + { NULL, 2056, "1"}, + { "TPMAuthPolicy", 1610612741, NULL }, + { "Name", 1610637346, NULL }, + { NULL, 2056, "0"}, + { "Policy", 536879115, NULL }, + { NULL, 1073743880, "1"}, + { NULL, 2, "TPMPolicy"}, + { "TPMKey", 536870917, NULL }, + { "type", 1073741836, NULL }, + { "emptyAuth", 1610637316, NULL }, + { NULL, 2056, "0"}, + { "policy", 1610637323, NULL }, + { NULL, 1073743880, "1"}, + { NULL, 2, "TPMPolicy"}, + { "secret", 1610637319, NULL }, + { NULL, 2056, "2"}, + { "authPolicy", 1610637323, NULL }, + { NULL, 1073743880, "3"}, + { NULL, 2, "TPMAuthPolicy"}, + { "description", 1610637346, NULL }, + { NULL, 2056, "4"}, + { "rsaParent", 1610637316, NULL }, + { NULL, 2056, "5"}, + { "parent", 1073741827, NULL }, + { "pubkey", 1073741831, NULL }, + { "privkey", 7, NULL }, + { NULL, 0, NULL } +}; diff --git a/include/grub/tpm2/internal/args.h b/include/grub/tpm2/internal/args.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9f4c0eb9f --- /dev/null +++ b/include/grub/tpm2/internal/args.h @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader + * Copyright (C) 2022 Microsoft Corporation + * + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#ifndef GRUB_TPM2_INTERNAL_ARGS_HEADER +#define GRUB_TPM2_INTERNAL_ARGS_HEADER 1 + +#include <grub/err.h> +#include <grub/tpm2/tpm2.h> + +struct grub_srk_type +{ + TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC type; + union { + TPM_KEY_BITS rsa_bits; + TPM_ECC_CURVE ecc_curve; + } detail; +}; +typedef struct grub_srk_type grub_srk_type_t; + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_parse_pcrs (char *value, grub_uint8_t *pcrs, + grub_uint8_t *pcr_count); + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_parse_asymmetric (const char *value, + grub_srk_type_t *srk_type); + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_parse_bank (const char *value, TPM_ALG_ID *bank); + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2_protector_parse_tpm_handle (const char *value, TPM_HANDLE *handle); + +#endif /* ! GRUB_TPM2_INTERNAL_ARGS_HEADER */ diff --git a/include/grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h b/include/grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c27b5305e --- /dev/null +++ b/include/grub/tpm2/tpm2key.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader + * Copyright (C) 2023 SUSE LLC + * + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#ifndef GRUB_TPM2_TPM2KEY_HEADER +#define GRUB_TPM2_TPM2KEY_HEADER 1 + +#include <grub/types.h> +#include <grub/libtasn1.h> + +/* + * TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE { + * CommandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER, + * CommandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING + * } + */ +struct tpm2key_policy { + struct tpm2key_policy *next; + struct tpm2key_policy **prev; + grub_uint32_t cmd_code; + void *cmd_policy; + grub_uint16_t cmd_policy_len; +}; +typedef struct tpm2key_policy *tpm2key_policy_t; + +/* + * TPMAuthPolicy ::= SEQUENCE { + * Name [0] EXPLICIT UTF8String OPTIONAL, + * Policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy + * } + * + * Name is not a necessary part to unseal the key. Ignore it. + */ +struct tpm2key_authpolicy { + struct tpm2key_authpolicy *next; + struct tpm2key_authpolicy **prev; + /* char *name; */ + tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq; +}; +typedef struct tpm2key_authpolicy *tpm2key_authpolicy_t; + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_start_parsing (asn1_node *parsed_tpm2key, void *data, grub_size_t size); + +void +grub_tpm2key_end_parsing (asn1_node tpm2key); + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_get_rsaparent (asn1_node tpm2key, grub_uint8_t *rsaparent); + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_get_parent (asn1_node tpm2key, grub_uint32_t *parent); + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_get_pubkey (asn1_node tpm2key, void **data, grub_size_t *size); + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_get_privkey (asn1_node tpm2key, void **data, grub_size_t *size); + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_get_policy_seq (asn1_node tpm2key, tpm2key_policy_t *policy_seq); + +void +grub_tpm2key_free_policy_seq (tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq); + +grub_err_t +grub_tpm2key_get_authpolicy_seq (asn1_node tpm2key, tpm2key_authpolicy_t *authpol_seq); + +void +grub_tpm2key_free_authpolicy_seq (tpm2key_authpolicy_t authpol_seq); + +#endif /* GRUB_TPM2_TPM2KEY_HEADER */ -- 2.35.3
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