File 5afc13ae-9-x86-cpuid-improve-guest-policies-for... of Package xen

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File 5afc13ae-9-x86-cpuid-improve-guest-policies-for-speculative.patch of Package xen (Revision 314db9aeafefd72e6bd61f90e7b21cac)

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# Commit cb06b308ec71b23f37a44f5e2351fe2cae0306e9
# Date 2018-05-16 12:19:10 +0100
# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
# Committer Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
x86/cpuid: Improvements to guest policies for speculative sidechannel features

If Xen isn't virtualising MSR_SPEC_CTRL for guests, IBRSB shouldn't be
advertised.  It is not currently possible to express this via the existing
command line options, but such an ability will be introduced.

Another useful option in some usecases is to offer IBPB without IBRS.  When a
guest kernel is known to be compatible (uses retpoline and knows about the AMD
IBPB feature bit), an administrator with pre-Skylake hardware may wish to hide
IBRS.  This allows the VM to have full protection, without Xen or the VM
needing to touch MSR_SPEC_CTRL, which can reduce the overhead of Spectre
mitigations.

Break the logic common to both PV and HVM CPUID calculations into a common
helper, to avoid duplication.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
@@ -368,6 +368,28 @@ static void __init calculate_host_policy
     }
 }
 
+static void __init guest_common_feature_adjustments(uint32_t *fs)
+{
+    /* Unconditionally claim to be able to set the hypervisor bit. */
+    __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR, fs);
+
+    /*
+     * If IBRS is offered to the guest, unconditionally offer STIBP.  It is a
+     * nop on non-HT hardware, and has this behaviour to make heterogeneous
+     * setups easier to manage.
+     */
+    if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB, fs) )
+        __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_STIBP, fs);
+
+    /*
+     * On hardware which supports IBRS/IBPB, we can offer IBPB independently
+     * of IBRS by using the AMD feature bit.  An administrator may wish for
+     * performance reasons to offer IBPB without IBRS.
+     */
+    if ( host_cpuid_policy.feat.ibrsb )
+        __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_IBPB, fs);
+}
+
 static void __init calculate_pv_max_policy(void)
 {
     struct cpuid_policy *p = &pv_max_cpuid_policy;
@@ -380,18 +402,14 @@ static void __init calculate_pv_max_poli
     for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pv_featureset); ++i )
         pv_featureset[i] &= pv_featuremask[i];
 
-    /* Unconditionally claim to be able to set the hypervisor bit. */
-    __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR, pv_featureset);
-
-    /* On hardware with IBRS/IBPB support, there are further adjustments. */
-    if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB, pv_featureset) )
-    {
-        /* Offer STIBP unconditionally.  It is a nop on non-HT hardware. */
-        __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_STIBP, pv_featureset);
+    /*
+     * If Xen isn't virtualising MSR_SPEC_CTRL for PV guests because of
+     * administrator choice, hide the feature.
+     */
+    if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) )
+        __clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB, pv_featureset);
 
-        /* AMD's IBPB is a subset of IBRS/IBPB. */
-        __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_IBPB, pv_featureset);
-    }
+    guest_common_feature_adjustments(pv_featureset);
 
     sanitise_featureset(pv_featureset);
     cpuid_featureset_to_policy(pv_featureset, p);
@@ -419,9 +437,6 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_pol
     for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hvm_featureset); ++i )
         hvm_featureset[i] &= hvm_featuremask[i];
 
-    /* Unconditionally claim to be able to set the hypervisor bit. */
-    __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR, hvm_featureset);
-
     /*
      * Xen can provide an APIC emulation to HVM guests even if the host's APIC
      * isn't enabled.
@@ -438,6 +453,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_pol
         __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_SEP, hvm_featureset);
 
     /*
+     * If Xen isn't virtualising MSR_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests because of
+     * administrator choice, hide the feature.
+     */
+    if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) )
+        __clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB, hvm_featureset);
+
+    /*
      * With VT-x, some features are only supported by Xen if dedicated
      * hardware support is also available.
      */
@@ -450,15 +472,7 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_pol
             __clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES, hvm_featureset);
     }
 
-    /* On hardware with IBRS/IBPB support, there are further adjustments. */
-    if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB, hvm_featureset) )
-    {
-        /* Offer STIBP unconditionally.  It is a nop on non-HT hardware. */
-        __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_STIBP, hvm_featureset);
-
-        /* AMD's IBPB is a subset of IBRS/IBPB. */
-        __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_IBPB, hvm_featureset);
-    }
+    guest_common_feature_adjustments(hvm_featureset);
 
     sanitise_featureset(hvm_featureset);
     cpuid_featureset_to_policy(hvm_featureset, p);

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File 5afc13ae-9-x86-cpuid-improve-guest-policies-for-speculative.patch of Package xen (Revision 314db9aeafefd72e6bd61f90e7b21cac)

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