File CVE-2022-43548.patch of Package nodejs-electron

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File CVE-2022-43548.patch of Package nodejs-electron (Revision a93d9b78dc3175950ea2819985ab4c85)

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From 165342beac61a5573c8eb422cb5bc7001adbf0c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Tobias=20Nie=C3=9Fen?= <tniessen@tnie.de>
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2022 12:34:05 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] inspector: harden IP address validation again

Use inet_pton() to parse IP addresses, which restricts IP addresses
to a small number of well-defined formats. In particular, octal and
hexadecimal number formats are not allowed, and neither are leading
zeros. Also explicitly reject 0.0.0.0/8 and ::/128 as non-routable.

Refs: https://hackerone.com/reports/1710652
CVE-ID: CVE-2022-43548
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/354
Reviewed-by: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Rafael Gonzaga <rafael.nunu@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com>
---
 src/inspector_socket.cc              | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++------
 test/cctest/test_inspector_socket.cc | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/inspector_socket.cc b/src/inspector_socket.cc
index ab1cdf1fa5bd..8001d893e1fd 100644
--- a/third_party/electron_node/src/inspector_socket.cc
+++ b/third_party/electron_node/src/inspector_socket.cc
@@ -162,25 +162,70 @@ static std::string TrimPort(const std::string& host) {
 }
 
 static bool IsIPAddress(const std::string& host) {
-  if (host.length() >= 4 && host.front() == '[' && host.back() == ']')
-    return true;
-  if (host.front() == '0') return false;
-  uint_fast16_t accum = 0;
-  uint_fast8_t quads = 0;
-  bool empty = true;
-  auto endOctet = [&accum, &quads, &empty](bool final = false) {
-    return !empty && accum <= 0xff && ++quads <= 4 && final == (quads == 4) &&
-           (empty = true) && !(accum = 0);
-  };
-  for (char c : host) {
-    if (isdigit(c)) {
-      if ((accum = (accum * 10) + (c - '0')) > 0xff) return false;
-      empty = false;
-    } else if (c != '.' || !endOctet()) {
+  // TODO(tniessen): add CVEs to the following bullet points
+  // To avoid DNS rebinding attacks, we are aware of the following requirements:
+  // * the host name must be an IP address,
+  // * the IP address must be routable, and
+  // * the IP address must be formatted unambiguously.
+
+  // The logic below assumes that the string is null-terminated, so ensure that
+  // we did not somehow end up with null characters within the string.
+  if (host.find('\0') != std::string::npos) return false;
+
+  // All IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets, and anything
+  // enclosed in square brackets must be an IPv6 address.
+  if (host.length() >= 4 && host.front() == '[' && host.back() == ']') {
+    // INET6_ADDRSTRLEN is the maximum length of the dual format (including the
+    // terminating null character), which is the longest possible representation
+    // of an IPv6 address: xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:ddd.ddd.ddd.ddd
+    if (host.length() - 2 >= INET6_ADDRSTRLEN) return false;
+
+    // Annoyingly, libuv's implementation of inet_pton() deviates from other
+    // implementations of the function in that it allows '%' in IPv6 addresses.
+    if (host.find('%') != std::string::npos) return false;
+
+    // Parse the IPv6 address to ensure it is syntactically valid.
+    char ipv6_str[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+    std::copy(host.begin() + 1, host.end() - 1, ipv6_str);
+    ipv6_str[host.length()] = '\0';
+    unsigned char ipv6[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
+    if (uv_inet_pton(AF_INET6, ipv6_str, ipv6) != 0) return false;
+
+    // The only non-routable IPv6 address is ::/128. It should not be necessary
+    // to explicitly reject it because it will still be enclosed in square
+    // brackets and not even macOS should make DNS requests in that case, but
+    // history has taught us that we cannot be careful enough.
+    // Note that RFC 4291 defines both "IPv4-Compatible IPv6 Addresses" and
+    // "IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses", which means that there are IPv6 addresses
+    // (other than ::/128) that represent non-routable IPv4 addresses. However,
+    // this translation assumes that the host is interpreted as an IPv6 address
+    // in the first place, at which point DNS rebinding should not be an issue.
+    if (std::all_of(ipv6, ipv6 + sizeof(ipv6), [](auto b) { return b == 0; })) {
       return false;
     }
+
+    // It is a syntactically valid and routable IPv6 address enclosed in square
+    // brackets. No client should be able to misinterpret this.
+    return true;
   }
-  return endOctet(true);
+
+  // Anything not enclosed in square brackets must be an IPv4 address. It is
+  // important here that inet_pton() accepts only the so-called dotted-decimal
+  // notation, which is a strict subset of the so-called numbers-and-dots
+  // notation that is allowed by inet_aton() and inet_addr(). This subset does
+  // not allow hexadecimal or octal number formats.
+  unsigned char ipv4[sizeof(struct in_addr)];
+  if (uv_inet_pton(AF_INET, host.c_str(), ipv4) != 0) return false;
+
+  // The only strictly non-routable IPv4 address is 0.0.0.0, and macOS will make
+  // DNS requests for this IP address, so we need to explicitly reject it. In
+  // fact, we can safely reject all of 0.0.0.0/8 (see Section 3.2 of RFC 791 and
+  // Section 3.2.1.3 of RFC 1122).
+  // Note that inet_pton() stores the IPv4 address in network byte order.
+  if (ipv4[0] == 0) return false;
+
+  // It is a routable IPv4 address in dotted-decimal notation.
+  return true;
 }
 
 // Constants for hybi-10 frame format.

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File CVE-2022-43548.patch of Package nodejs-electron (Revision a93d9b78dc3175950ea2819985ab4c85)

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