File 5a5e3a4e-4-x86-AMD-set-lfence-as-Dispatch-Seria... of Package xen

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File 5a5e3a4e-4-x86-AMD-set-lfence-as-Dispatch-Serialising.patch of Package xen (Revision 9d7eaa6fc9439e10ad84845d008268a5)

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# Commit fe3ee5530a8d0d0b6a478167125d00c40f294a86
# Date 2018-01-16 17:45:50 +0000
# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
# Committer Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
x86/amd: Try to set lfence as being Dispatch Serialising

This property is required for the AMD's recommended mitigation for Branch
Target Injection, but Xen needs to cope with being unable to detect or modify
the MSR.

This is part of XSA-254.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
@@ -558,8 +558,41 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 			wrmsr_amd_safe(0xc001100d, l, h & ~1);
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Attempt to set lfence to be Dispatch Serialising.  This MSR almost
+	 * certainly isn't virtualised (and Xen at least will leak the real
+	 * value in but silently discard writes), as well as being per-core
+	 * rather than per-thread, so do a full safe read/write/readback cycle
+	 * in the worst case.
+	 */
+	if (c->x86 == 0x0f || c->x86 == 0x11)
+		/* Always dispatch serialising on this hardare. */
+		__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH, c->x86_capability);
+	else /* Implicily "== 0x10 || >= 0x12" by being 64bit. */ {
+		if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, value))
+			/* Unable to read.  Assume the safer default. */
+			__clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH,
+				    c->x86_capability);
+		else if (value & AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE)
+			/* Already dispatch serialising. */
+			__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH,
+				  c->x86_capability);
+		else if (wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG,
+				    value | AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE) ||
+			 rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, value) ||
+			 !(value & AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE))
+			/* Attempt to set failed.  Assume the safer default. */
+			__clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH,
+				    c->x86_capability);
+		else
+			/* Successfully enabled! */
+			__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH,
+				  c->x86_capability);
+	}
+
 	/* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
-	__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability);
+	if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch)
+		__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability);
 
 	switch(c->x86)
 	{
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@
 #define cpu_has_arch_perfmon    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)
 #define cpu_has_cpuid_faulting  boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULTING)
 #define cpu_has_aperfmperf      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF)
+#define cpu_has_lfence_dispatch boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH)
 
 enum _cache_type {
     CACHE_TYPE_NULL = 0,
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
@@ -22,3 +22,4 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(APERFMPERF,      (FSCAPIN
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(MFENCE_RDTSC,    (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+ 9) /* MFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SMEP,        (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+10) /* SMEP gets used by Xen itself */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SMAP,        (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+11) /* SMAP gets used by Xen itself */
+XEN_CPUFEATURE(LFENCE_DISPATCH, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+12) /* lfence set as Dispatch Serialising */
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@
 #define MSR_AMD64_IC_CFG		0xc0011021
 #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG		0xc0011022
 #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG		0xc0011029
+#define AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE	(_AC(1, ULL) << 1)
 
 #define MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK	0xc0011027
 #define MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK	0xc0011019

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File 5a5e3a4e-4-x86-AMD-set-lfence-as-Dispatch-Serialising.patch of Package xen (Revision 9d7eaa6fc9439e10ad84845d008268a5)

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