File xfsprogs-xfs_repair-allow-in-attribute-names.patch of Package xfsprogs

Overview Repositories Revisions Requests Users Attributes Meta

File xfsprogs-xfs_repair-allow-in-attribute-names.patch of Package xfsprogs (Revision e33efc763dfcf92cbcd9555d8e569471)

Currently displaying revision e33efc763dfcf92cbcd9555d8e569471 , Show latest

From 45571fd5885d00520a5c1d3bb743634267920c19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 13:03:03 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] xfs_repair: allow '/' in attribute names
Git-commit: 45571fd5885d00520a5c1d3bb743634267920c19
Patch-mainline: v4.20.0-rc1
References: bsc#1122271

For some reason, since the earliest days of XFS, a '/' character
in an extended attribute name has been treated as corruption by
xfs_repair.  This despite nothing in other userspace tools or the
kernel having this restriction.

My best guess is that this was an unintentional leftover from
common code between dirs & attrs in the "da" code, and there has
never been a good reason for it.

Since userspace and kernelspace allow such a name to be set,
listed, and read, it seems wrong to flag it as corruption.
So, make this test conditional on whether we're validating a name
in a dir, as opposed to the name of an attr.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@sandeen.net>
Acked-by: Anthony Iliopoulos <ailiopoulos@suse.com>

---
 repair/attr_repair.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
 repair/da_util.c     | 20 +++++++++++++-------
 repair/da_util.h     |  3 ++-
 repair/dir2.c        | 12 ++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/repair/attr_repair.c b/repair/attr_repair.c
index 1d04500f..5ad81c09 100644
--- a/repair/attr_repair.c
+++ b/repair/attr_repair.c
@@ -122,6 +122,14 @@ set_da_freemap(xfs_mount_t *mp, da_freemap_t *map, int start, int stop)
  * fork being emptied and put in shortform format.
  */
 
+static int
+attr_namecheck(
+	uint8_t	*name,
+	int	length)
+{
+	return namecheck((char *)name, length, false);
+}
+
 /*
  * This routine just checks what security needs are for attribute values
  * only called when root flag is set, otherwise these names could exist in
@@ -292,11 +300,9 @@ process_shortform_attr(
 			}
 		}
 
-		/* namecheck checks for / and null terminated for file names.
-		 * attributes names currently follow the same rules.
-		*/
-		if (namecheck((char *)&currententry->nameval[0],
-						currententry->namelen))  {
+		/* namecheck checks for null chars in attr names. */
+		if (attr_namecheck(currententry->nameval,
+						currententry->namelen)) {
 			do_warn(
 	_("entry contains illegal character in shortform attribute name\n"));
 			junkit = 1;
@@ -458,7 +464,7 @@ process_leaf_attr_local(
 	xfs_attr_leaf_name_local_t *local;
 
 	local = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, i);
-	if (local->namelen == 0 || namecheck((char *)&local->nameval[0],
+	if (local->namelen == 0 || attr_namecheck(local->nameval,
 							local->namelen)) {
 		do_warn(
 	_("attribute entry %d in attr block %u, inode %" PRIu64 " has bad name (namelen = %d)\n"),
@@ -513,7 +519,7 @@ process_leaf_attr_remote(
 
 	remotep = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, i);
 
-	if (remotep->namelen == 0 || namecheck((char *)&remotep->name[0],
+	if (remotep->namelen == 0 || attr_namecheck(remotep->name,
 						remotep->namelen) ||
 			be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) !=
 				libxfs_da_hashname((unsigned char *)&remotep->name[0],
diff --git a/repair/da_util.c b/repair/da_util.c
index 1450767f..c5e690c3 100644
--- a/repair/da_util.c
+++ b/repair/da_util.c
@@ -13,20 +13,26 @@
 #include "da_util.h"
 
 /*
- * takes a name and length (name need not be null-terminated)
- * and returns 1 if the name contains a '/' or a \0, returns 0
- * otherwise
+ * Takes a name and length (name need not be null-terminated) and whether
+ * we are checking a dir (as opposed to an attr).
+ * Returns 1 if the name contains a NUL or if a directory entry contains a '/'.
+ * Returns 0 if the name checks out.
  */
 int
-namecheck(char *name, int length)
+namecheck(
+	char	*name,
+	int	length,
+	bool	isadir)
 {
-	char *c;
-	int i;
+	char	*c;
+	int	i;
 
 	ASSERT(length < MAXNAMELEN);
 
 	for (c = name, i = 0; i < length; i++, c++) {
-		if (*c == '/' || *c == '\0')
+		if (isadir && *c == '/')
+			return 0;
+		if (*c == '\0')
 			return 1;
 	}
 
diff --git a/repair/da_util.h b/repair/da_util.h
index d36dfd0d..041dff74 100644
--- a/repair/da_util.h
+++ b/repair/da_util.h
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ typedef struct da_bt_cursor {
 int
 namecheck(
 	char		*name,
-	int		length);
+	int		length,
+	bool		isadir);
 
 struct xfs_buf *
 da_read_buf(
diff --git a/repair/dir2.c b/repair/dir2.c
index e67ec590..094ecb3d 100644
--- a/repair/dir2.c
+++ b/repair/dir2.c
@@ -44,6 +44,14 @@ _("malloc failed (%zu bytes) dir2_add_badlist:ino %" PRIu64 "\n"),
 	l->ino = ino;
 }
 
+static int
+dir_namecheck(
+	uint8_t	*name,
+	int	length)
+{
+	return namecheck((char *)name, length, true);
+}
+
 int
 dir2_is_badino(
 	xfs_ino_t	ino)
@@ -310,7 +318,7 @@ _("entry #%d %s in shortform dir %" PRIu64),
 		 * the length value is stored in a byte
 		 * so it can't be too big, it can only wrap
 		 */
-		if (namecheck((char *)&sfep->name[0], namelen))  {
+		if (dir_namecheck(sfep->name, namelen)) {
 			/*
 			 * junk entry
 			 */
@@ -781,7 +789,7 @@ _("\twould clear inode number in entry at offset %" PRIdPTR "...\n"),
 		 * during phase 4.
 		 */
 		junkit = dep->name[0] == '/';
-		nm_illegal = namecheck((char *)dep->name, dep->namelen);
+		nm_illegal = dir_namecheck(dep->name, dep->namelen);
 		if (ino_discovery && nm_illegal) {
 			do_warn(
 _("entry at block %u offset %" PRIdPTR " in directory inode %" PRIu64 " has illegal name \"%*.*s\": "),
-- 
2.16.4

Places

File xfsprogs-xfs_repair-allow-in-attribute-names.patch of Package xfsprogs (Revision e33efc763dfcf92cbcd9555d8e569471)

Places