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openSUSE:Leap:15.4:ARM
xen.30824
xsa435-0-42.patch
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File xsa435-0-42.patch of Package xen.30824
From 511b9f286c3dadd041e0d90beeff7d47c9bf3b7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Date: Mon, 15 May 2023 19:15:48 +0100 Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Remove opencoded MSR_ARCH_CAPS check MSR_ARCH_CAPS data is now included in featureset information. Replace opencoded checks with regular feature ones. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c @@ -293,12 +293,10 @@ custom_param("spec-ctrl", parse_spec_ctr int8_t __read_mostly opt_xpti_hwdom = -1; int8_t __read_mostly opt_xpti_domu = -1; -static __init void xpti_init_default(uint64_t caps) +static __init void xpti_init_default(void) { - if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON) ) - caps = ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO; - - if ( caps & ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO ) + if ( (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) || + cpu_has_rdcl_no ) { if ( opt_xpti_hwdom < 0 ) opt_xpti_hwdom = 0; @@ -401,9 +399,10 @@ static __init int parse_pv_l1tf(const ch } custom_param("pv-l1tf", parse_pv_l1tf); -static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) +static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk) { unsigned int _7d0 = 0, _7d2 = 0, e8b = 0, max = 0, tmp; + uint64_t caps = 0; /* Collect diagnostics about available mitigations. */ if ( boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level >= 7 ) @@ -412,6 +411,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum in cpuid_count(7, 2, &tmp, &tmp, &tmp, &_7d2); if ( boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008 ) cpuid(0x80000008, &tmp, &e8b, &tmp, &tmp); + if ( cpu_has_arch_caps ) + rdmsrl(MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, caps); printk("Speculative mitigation facilities:\n"); @@ -586,7 +587,7 @@ static bool __init check_smt_enabled(voi } /* Calculate whether Retpoline is known-safe on this CPU. */ -static bool __init retpoline_safe(uint64_t caps) +static bool __init retpoline_safe(void) { unsigned int ucode_rev = this_cpu(cpu_sig).rev; @@ -604,7 +605,7 @@ static bool __init retpoline_safe(uint64 * Processors offering Enhanced IBRS are not guarenteed to be * repoline-safe. */ - if ( caps & (ARCH_CAPS_RSBA | ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL) ) + if ( cpu_has_rsba || cpu_has_eibrs ) return false; switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model ) @@ -824,7 +825,7 @@ static void __init ibpb_calculations(voi } /* Calculate whether this CPU is vulnerable to L1TF. */ -static __init void l1tf_calculations(uint64_t caps) +static __init void l1tf_calculations(void) { bool hit_default = false; @@ -912,7 +913,7 @@ static __init void l1tf_calculations(uin } /* Any processor advertising RDCL_NO should be not vulnerable to L1TF. */ - if ( caps & ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO ) + if ( cpu_has_rdcl_no ) cpu_has_bug_l1tf = false; if ( cpu_has_bug_l1tf && hit_default ) @@ -971,7 +972,7 @@ static __init void l1tf_calculations(uin } /* Calculate whether this CPU is vulnerable to MDS. */ -static __init void mds_calculations(uint64_t caps) +static __init void mds_calculations(void) { /* MDS is only known to affect Intel Family 6 processors at this time. */ if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL || @@ -979,7 +980,7 @@ static __init void mds_calculations(uint return; /* Any processor advertising MDS_NO should be not vulnerable to MDS. */ - if ( caps & ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO ) + if ( cpu_has_mds_no ) return; switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model ) @@ -1092,10 +1093,6 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations enum ind_thunk thunk = THUNK_DEFAULT; bool has_spec_ctrl, ibrs = false, hw_smt_enabled; bool cpu_has_bug_taa; - uint64_t caps = 0; - - if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS) ) - rdmsrl(MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, caps); hw_smt_enabled = check_smt_enabled(); @@ -1123,7 +1120,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations * On all hardware, we'd like to use retpoline in preference to * IBRS, but only if it is safe on this hardware. */ - if ( retpoline_safe(caps) ) + if ( retpoline_safe() ) thunk = THUNK_RETPOLINE; else if ( has_spec_ctrl ) ibrs = true; @@ -1287,13 +1284,13 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations * threads. Activate this if SMT is enabled, and Xen is using a non-zero * MSR_SPEC_CTRL setting. */ - if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL) && + if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !cpu_has_eibrs && hw_smt_enabled && default_xen_spec_ctrl ) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_IDLE); - xpti_init_default(caps); + xpti_init_default(); - l1tf_calculations(caps); + l1tf_calculations(); /* * By default, enable PV domU L1TF mitigations on all L1TF-vulnerable @@ -1314,7 +1311,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1D_FLUSH) ) opt_l1d_flush = 0; else if ( opt_l1d_flush == -1 ) - opt_l1d_flush = cpu_has_bug_l1tf && !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL); + opt_l1d_flush = cpu_has_bug_l1tf && !cpu_has_skip_l1dfl; if ( opt_branch_harden ) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_BRANCH_HARDEN); @@ -1336,7 +1333,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations "enabled. Please assess your configuration and choose an\n" "explicit 'smt=<bool>' setting. See XSA-273.\n"); - mds_calculations(caps); + mds_calculations(); /* * Parts which enumerate FB_CLEAR are those which are post-MDS_NO and have @@ -1348,7 +1345,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations * the return-to-guest path. */ if ( opt_unpriv_mmio ) - opt_fb_clear_mmio = caps & ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR; + opt_fb_clear_mmio = cpu_has_fb_clear; /* * By default, enable PV and HVM mitigations on MDS-vulnerable hardware. @@ -1378,7 +1375,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations */ if ( opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm || opt_fb_clear_mmio ) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_IDLE); - opt_md_clear_hvm &= !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL) && !opt_l1d_flush; + opt_md_clear_hvm &= !cpu_has_skip_l1dfl && !opt_l1d_flush; /* * Warn the user if they are on MLPDS/MFBDS-vulnerable hardware with HT @@ -1409,8 +1406,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations * we check both to spot TSX in a microcode/cmdline independent way. */ cpu_has_bug_taa = - (cpu_has_rtm || (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL)) && - (caps & (ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO)) == ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO; + (cpu_has_rtm || cpu_has_tsx_ctrl) && cpu_has_mds_no && !cpu_has_taa_no; /* * On TAA-affected hardware, disabling TSX is the preferred mitigation, vs @@ -1426,7 +1422,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations * plausibly value TSX higher than Hyperthreading...), disable TSX to * mitigate TAA. */ - if ( opt_tsx == -1 && cpu_has_bug_taa && (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL) && + if ( opt_tsx == -1 && cpu_has_bug_taa && cpu_has_tsx_ctrl && ((hw_smt_enabled && opt_smt) || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_IDLE)) ) { @@ -1451,15 +1447,15 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations if ( cpu_has_srbds_ctrl ) { if ( opt_srb_lock == -1 && !opt_unpriv_mmio && - (caps & (ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO|ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO)) == ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO && - (!cpu_has_hle || ((caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL) && !(opt_tsx & 1))) ) + cpu_has_mds_no && !cpu_has_taa_no && + (!cpu_has_hle || (cpu_has_tsx_ctrl && !(opt_tsx & 1))) ) opt_srb_lock = 0; set_in_mcu_opt_ctrl(MCU_OPT_CTRL_RNGDS_MITG_DIS, opt_srb_lock ? 0 : MCU_OPT_CTRL_RNGDS_MITG_DIS); } - print_details(thunk, caps); + print_details(thunk); /* * If MSR_SPEC_CTRL is available, apply Xen's default setting and discard --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h @@ -137,8 +137,15 @@ #define cpu_has_arch_caps boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS) /* MSR_ARCH_CAPS */ +#define cpu_has_rdcl_no boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDCL_NO) +#define cpu_has_eibrs boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_EIBRS) +#define cpu_has_rsba boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSBA) +#define cpu_has_skip_l1dfl boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SKIP_L1DFL) +#define cpu_has_mds_no boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MDS_NO) #define cpu_has_if_pschange_mc_no boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO) #define cpu_has_tsx_ctrl boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSX_CTRL) +#define cpu_has_taa_no boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TAA_NO) +#define cpu_has_fb_clear boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FB_CLEAR) /* Synthesized. */ #define cpu_has_arch_perfmon boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)
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