File 619b7ac9-harden-assign_pages.patch of Package xen.23583

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File 619b7ac9-harden-assign_pages.patch of Package xen.23583

# Commit 143501861d48e1bfef495849fd68584baac05849
# Date 2021-11-22 11:11:05 +0000
# Author Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
# Committer Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
xen/page_alloc: Harden assign_pages()

domain_tot_pages() and d->max_pages are 32-bit values. While the order
should always be quite small, it would still be possible to overflow
if domain_tot_pages() is near to (2^32 - 1).

As this code may be called by a guest via XENMEM_increase_reservation
and XENMEM_populate_physmap, we want to make sure the guest is not going
to be able to allocate more than it is allowed.

Rework the allocation check to avoid any possible overflow. While the
check domain_tot_pages() < d->max_pages should technically not be
necessary, it is probably best to have it to catch any possible
inconsistencies in the future.

This is CVE-2021-28706 / part of XSA-385.

Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>

--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
@@ -2250,7 +2250,8 @@ gnttab_transfer(
          * pages when it is dying.
          */
         if ( unlikely(e->is_dying) ||
-             unlikely(e->tot_pages >= e->max_pages) )
+             unlikely(e->tot_pages >= e->max_pages) ||
+             unlikely(!(e->tot_pages + 1)) )
         {
             spin_unlock(&e->page_alloc_lock);
 
@@ -2259,8 +2260,8 @@ gnttab_transfer(
                          e->domain_id);
             else
                 gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO,
-                         "Transferee d%d has no headroom (tot %u, max %u)\n",
-                         e->domain_id, e->tot_pages, e->max_pages);
+                         "Transferee %pd has no headroom (tot %u, max %u)\n",
+                         e, e->tot_pages, e->max_pages);
 
             gop.status = GNTST_general_error;
             goto unlock_and_copyback;
--- a/xen/common/page_alloc.c
+++ b/xen/common/page_alloc.c
@@ -2280,17 +2280,26 @@ int assign_pages(
 
     if ( !(memflags & MEMF_no_refcount) )
     {
-        if ( unlikely((d->tot_pages + (1 << order)) > d->max_pages) )
+        unsigned int nr = 1u << order;
+
+        if ( unlikely(d->tot_pages > d->max_pages) )
+        {
+            gprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Inconsistent allocation for %pd: %u > %u\n",
+                    d, d->tot_pages, d->max_pages);
+            rc = -EPERM;
+            goto out;
+        }
+
+        if ( unlikely(nr > d->max_pages - d->tot_pages) )
         {
             if ( !tmem_enabled() || order != 0 || d->tot_pages != d->max_pages )
-                gprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Over-allocation for domain %u: "
-                        "%u > %u\n", d->domain_id,
-                        d->tot_pages + (1 << order), d->max_pages);
+                gprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Over-allocation for %pd: %Lu > %u\n",
+                        d, d->tot_pages + 0ull + nr, d->max_pages);
             rc = -E2BIG;
             goto out;
         }
 
-        if ( unlikely(domain_adjust_tot_pages(d, 1 << order) == (1 << order)) )
+        if ( unlikely(domain_adjust_tot_pages(d, nr) == nr) )
             get_knownalive_domain(d);
     }

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File 619b7ac9-harden-assign_pages.patch of Package xen.23583

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