Sign Up
Log In
Log In
or
Sign Up
Places
All Projects
Status Monitor
Collapse sidebar
openSUSE:Leap:15.5:Update
openssl-1_1.24560
0005-s390x-assembly-pack-add-KMAC-code-path-for...
Overview
Repositories
Revisions
Requests
Users
Attributes
Meta
File 0005-s390x-assembly-pack-add-KMAC-code-path-for-aes-ccm.patch of Package openssl-1_1.24560
From 39f5b069ac4b0ccd953f2237b7a6c2018230726d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 10:14:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] s390x assembly pack: add KMAC code path for aes-ccm Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5230) --- crypto/evp/e_aes.c | 536 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- crypto/s390x_arch.h | 2 + crypto/s390xcpuid.pl | 21 ++ 3 files changed, 549 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c index 0c717a800f..b70fc26e59 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c +++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c @@ -1003,6 +1003,58 @@ typedef struct { int tls_aad_len; } S390X_AES_GCM_CTX; +typedef struct { + union { + double align; + /*- + * Padding is chosen so that ccm.kmac_param.k overlaps with key.k and + * ccm.fc with key.k.rounds. Remember that on s390x, an AES_KEY's + * rounds field is used to store the function code and that the key + * schedule is not stored (if aes hardware support is detected). + */ + struct { + unsigned char pad[16]; + AES_KEY k; + } key; + + struct { + /*- + * KMAC-AES parameter block - begin + * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08) + */ + struct { + union { + unsigned long long g[2]; + unsigned char b[16]; + } icv; + unsigned char k[32]; + } kmac_param; + /* KMAC-AES paramater block - end */ + + union { + unsigned long long g[2]; + unsigned char b[16]; + } nonce; + union { + unsigned long long g[2]; + unsigned char b[16]; + } buf; + + unsigned long long blocks; + int l; + int m; + int tls_aad_len; + int iv_set; + int tag_set; + int len_set; + int key_set; + + unsigned char pad[140]; + unsigned int fc; + } ccm; + } aes; +} S390X_AES_CCM_CTX; + # define S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE ((OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.km[0] & \ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)) &&\ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmc[0] & \ @@ -1581,20 +1633,484 @@ static int s390x_aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, static int s390x_aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr); # define s390x_aes_xts_cleanup aes_xts_cleanup -# define S390X_AES_CCM_CTX EVP_AES_CCM_CTX -# define S390X_aes_128_ccm_CAPABLE 0 -# define S390X_aes_192_ccm_CAPABLE 0 -# define S390X_aes_256_ccm_CAPABLE 0 +# define S390X_aes_128_ccm_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE && \ + (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmac[0] & \ + S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128))) +# define S390X_aes_192_ccm_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE && \ + (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmac[0] & \ + S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192))) +# define S390X_aes_256_ccm_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE && \ + (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmac[0] & \ + S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256))) + +# define S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG 0x40 + +/*- + * Set nonce and length fields. Code is big-endian. + */ +static inline void s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *nonce, + size_t mlen) +{ + ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] &= ~S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG; + ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.g[1] = mlen; + memcpy(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, nonce, 15 - ctx->aes.ccm.l); +} + +/*- + * Process additional authenticated data. Code is big-endian. + */ +static void s390x_aes_ccm_aad(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, + size_t alen) +{ + unsigned char *ptr; + int i, rem; + + if (!alen) + return; + + ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] |= S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG; + + /* Suppress 'type-punned pointer dereference' warning. */ + ptr = ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b; + + if (alen < ((1 << 16) - (1 << 8))) { + *(uint16_t *)ptr = alen; + i = 2; + } else if (sizeof(alen) == 8 + && alen >= (size_t)1 << (32 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))) { + *(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xffff; + *(uint64_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen; + i = 10; + } else { + *(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xfffe; + *(uint32_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen; + i = 6; + } + + while (i < 16 && alen) { + ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = *aad; + ++aad; + --alen; + ++i; + } + while (i < 16) { + ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = 0; + ++i; + } + + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] = 0; + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] = 0; + s390x_kmac(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 32, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, + &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); + ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += 2; + + rem = alen & 0xf; + alen &= ~0xf; + if (alen) { + s390x_kmac(aad, alen, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); + ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += alen >> 4; + aad += alen; + } + if (rem) { + for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= aad[i]; + + s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16, + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); + ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++; + } +} + +/*- + * En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text. Compute tag from plaintext. Returns 0 for + * success. + */ +static int s390x_aes_ccm(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in, + unsigned char *out, size_t len, int enc) +{ + size_t n, rem; + unsigned int i, l, num; + unsigned char flags; + + flags = ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0]; + if (!(flags & S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG)) { + s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, + ctx->aes.ccm.fc, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); + ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++; + } + l = flags & 0x7; + ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = l; + + /*- + * Reconstruct length from encoded length field + * and initialize it with counter value. + */ + n = 0; + for (i = 15 - l; i < 15; i++) { + n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i]; + ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0; + n <<= 8; + } + n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15]; + ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15] = 1; + + if (n != len) + return -1; /* length mismatch */ + + if (enc) { + /* Two operations per block plus one for tag encryption */ + ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += (((len + 15) >> 4) << 1) + 1; + if (ctx->aes.ccm.blocks > (1ULL << 61)) + return -2; /* too much data */ + } + + num = 0; + rem = len & 0xf; + len &= ~0xf; + + if (enc) { + /* mac-then-encrypt */ + if (len) + s390x_kmac(in, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); + if (rem) { + for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= in[len + i]; + + s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16, + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); + } -# define s390x_aes_ccm_init_key aes_ccm_init_key + CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k, + ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, + &num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt); + } else { + /* decrypt-then-mac */ + CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k, + ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, + &num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt); + + if (len) + s390x_kmac(out, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); + if (rem) { + for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= out[len + i]; + + s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16, + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); + } + } + /* encrypt tag */ + for (i = 15 - l; i < 16; i++) + ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0; + + s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[0]; + ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[1]; + + ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = flags; /* restore flags field */ + return 0; +} + +/*- + * En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written + * if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned. + */ +static int s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, size_t len) +{ + S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); + unsigned char *ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); + unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); + const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx); + + if (out != in + || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->aes.ccm.m)) + return -1; + + if (enc) { + /* Set explicit iv (sequence number). */ + memcpy(out, buf, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); + } + + len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m; + /*- + * Get explicit iv (sequence number). We already have fixed iv + * (server/client_write_iv) here. + */ + memcpy(ivec + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); + s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len); + + /* Process aad (sequence number|type|version|length) */ + s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, buf, cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len); + + in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + + if (enc) { + if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) + return -1; + + memcpy(out + len, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m); + return len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m; + } else { + if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) { + if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, in + len, + cctx->aes.ccm.m)) + return len; + } + + OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); + return -1; + } +} + +/*- + * Set key and flag field and/or iv. Returns 1 if successful. Otherwise 0 is + * returned. + */ static int s390x_aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc); -# define s390x_aes_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher + const unsigned char *iv, int enc) +{ + S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); + unsigned char *ivec; + int keylen; + + if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) + return 1; + + if (key != NULL) { + keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); + /* Convert key size to function code. */ + cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_128 + (((keylen << 3) - 128) >> 6); + memcpy(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k, key, keylen); + + /* Store encoded m and l. */ + cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = ((cctx->aes.ccm.l - 1) & 0x7) + | (((cctx->aes.ccm.m - 2) >> 1) & 0x7) << 3; + memset(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, 0, + sizeof(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b)); + cctx->aes.ccm.blocks = 0; + + cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 1; + } + + if (iv != NULL) { + ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); + memcpy(ivec, iv, 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l); + + cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 1; + } + + return 1; +} + +/*- + * Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional + * authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate + * plaintext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes + * written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned. + */ static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); -# define s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl aes_ccm_ctrl -static int s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr); + const unsigned char *in, size_t len) +{ + S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); + const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx); + int rv; + unsigned char *buf, *ivec; + + if (!cctx->aes.ccm.key_set) + return -1; + + if (cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len >= 0) + return s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); + + /*- + * Final(): Does not return any data. Recall that ccm is mac-then-encrypt + * so integrity must be checked already at Update() i.e., before + * potentially corrupted data is output. + */ + if (in == NULL && out != NULL) + return 0; + + if (!cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set) + return -1; + + if (!enc && !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set) + return -1; + + if (out == NULL) { + /* Update(): Pass message length. */ + if (in == NULL) { + ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); + s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len); + + cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1; + return len; + } + + /* Update(): Process aad. */ + if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set && len) + return -1; + + s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, in, len); + return len; + } + + /* Update(): Process message. */ + + if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) { + /*- + * In case message length was not previously set explicitely via + * Update(), set it now. + */ + ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); + s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len); + + cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1; + } + + if (enc) { + if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) + return -1; + + cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1; + return len; + } else { + rv = -1; + + if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) { + buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); + if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, buf, + cctx->aes.ccm.m)) + rv = len; + } + + if (rv == -1) + OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); + + cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0; + cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0; + cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0; + return rv; + } +} + +/*- + * Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control + * type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type. + * Code is big-endian. + */ +static int s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) +{ + S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, c); + unsigned char *buf, *iv; + int enc, len; + + switch (type) { + case EVP_CTRL_INIT: + cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 0; + cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0; + cctx->aes.ccm.l = 8; + cctx->aes.ccm.m = 12; + cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0; + cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0; + cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = -1; + return 1; + + case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: + if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) + return 0; + + /* Save the aad for later use. */ + buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); + memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); + cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = arg; + + len = *(uint16_t *)(buf + arg - 2); + if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) + return 0; + + /* Correct length for explicit iv. */ + len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + + enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c); + if (!enc) { + if (len < cctx->aes.ccm.m) + return 0; + + /* Correct length for tag. */ + len -= cctx->aes.ccm.m; + } + + *(uint16_t *)(buf + arg - 2) = len; + /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */ + return cctx->aes.ccm.m; + + case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED: + if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN) + return 0; + + /* Copy to first part of the iv. */ + iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c); + memcpy(iv, ptr, arg); + return 1; + + case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: + arg = 15 - arg; + /* fall-through */ + + case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L: + if (arg < 2 || arg > 8) + return 0; + + cctx->aes.ccm.l = arg; + return 1; + + case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: + if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16) + return 0; + + enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c); + if (enc && ptr) + return 0; + + if (ptr) { + cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1; + buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); + memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); + } + + cctx->aes.ccm.m = arg; + return 1; + + case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: + enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c); + if (!enc || !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set) + return 0; + + if(arg < cctx->aes.ccm.m) + return 0; + + memcpy(ptr, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m); + cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0; + cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0; + cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0; + return 1; + + case EVP_CTRL_COPY: + return 1; + + default: + return -1; + } +} + # define s390x_aes_ccm_cleanup aes_ccm_cleanup # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB diff --git a/crypto/s390x_arch.h b/crypto/s390x_arch.h index a5a9dee8d3..5744318231 100644 --- a/crypto/s390x_arch.h +++ b/crypto/s390x_arch.h @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ void s390x_km(const unsigned char *in, size_t len, unsigned char *out, unsigned int fc, void *param); +void s390x_kmac(const unsigned char *in, size_t len, unsigned int fc, + void *param); void s390x_kma(const unsigned char *aad, size_t alen, const unsigned char *in, size_t len, unsigned char *out, unsigned int fc, void *param); diff --git a/crypto/s390xcpuid.pl b/crypto/s390xcpuid.pl index ea95dd286d..5f6ffc66d6 100755 --- a/crypto/s390xcpuid.pl +++ b/crypto/s390xcpuid.pl @@ -275,6 +275,27 @@ s390x_km: ___ } +################ +# void s390x_kmac(const unsigned char *in, size_t len, unsigned int fc, +# void *param) +{ +my ($in,$len,$fc,$param) = map("%r$_",(2..5)); +$code.=<<___; +.globl s390x_kmac +.type s390x_kmac,\@function +.align 16 +s390x_kmac: + lr %r0,$fc + l${g}r %r1,$param + + .long 0xb91e0002 # kmac %r0,$in + brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion" + + br $ra +.size s390x_kmac,.-s390x_kmac +___ +} + ################ # void s390x_kma(const unsigned char *aad, size_t alen, # const unsigned char *in, size_t len, -- 2.20.1
Locations
Projects
Search
Status Monitor
Help
OpenBuildService.org
Documentation
API Documentation
Code of Conduct
Contact
Support
@OBShq
Terms
openSUSE Build Service is sponsored by
The Open Build Service is an
openSUSE project
.
Sign Up
Log In
Places
Places
All Projects
Status Monitor
