File xsa286-4.patch of Package xen.16818

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File xsa286-4.patch of Package xen.16818

x86/mm: avoid using linear page tables in guest_get_eff_kern_l1e()

First of all drop guest_get_eff_l1e() entirely - there's no actual user
of it: pv_ro_page_fault() has a guest_kernel_mode() conditional around
its only call site.

Then replace the linear L1 table access by an actual page walk.

This is part of XSA-286.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.c
@@ -59,27 +59,6 @@ l1_pgentry_t *map_guest_l1e(unsigned lon
 }
 
 /*
- * Read the guest's l1e that maps this address, from the kernel-mode
- * page tables.
- */
-static l1_pgentry_t guest_get_eff_kern_l1e(unsigned long linear)
-{
-    struct vcpu *curr = current;
-    const bool user_mode = !(curr->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode);
-    l1_pgentry_t l1e;
-
-    if ( user_mode )
-        toggle_guest_pt(curr);
-
-    l1e = guest_get_eff_l1e(linear);
-
-    if ( user_mode )
-        toggle_guest_pt(curr);
-
-    return l1e;
-}
-
-/*
  * Map a guest's LDT page (covering the byte at @offset from start of the LDT)
  * into Xen's virtual range.  Returns true if the mapping changed, false
  * otherwise.
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.h
@@ -5,19 +5,19 @@ l1_pgentry_t *map_guest_l1e(unsigned lon
 
 int new_guest_cr3(mfn_t mfn);
 
-/* Read a PV guest's l1e that maps this linear address. */
-static inline l1_pgentry_t guest_get_eff_l1e(unsigned long linear)
+/*
+ * Read the guest's l1e that maps this address, from the kernel-mode
+ * page tables.
+ */
+static inline l1_pgentry_t guest_get_eff_kern_l1e(unsigned long linear)
 {
-    l1_pgentry_t l1e;
+    l1_pgentry_t l1e = l1e_empty();
 
     ASSERT(!paging_mode_translate(current->domain));
     ASSERT(!paging_mode_external(current->domain));
 
-    if ( unlikely(!__addr_ok(linear)) ||
-         __copy_from_user(&l1e,
-                          &__linear_l1_table[l1_linear_offset(linear)],
-                          sizeof(l1_pgentry_t)) )
-        l1e = l1e_empty();
+    if ( likely(__addr_ok(linear)) )
+        l1e = page_walk_get_l1e(current->arch.guest_table, linear);
 
     return l1e;
 }
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ int pv_ro_page_fault(unsigned long addr,
     bool mmio_ro;
 
     /* Attempt to read the PTE that maps the VA being accessed. */
-    pte = guest_get_eff_l1e(addr);
+    pte = guest_get_eff_kern_l1e(addr);
 
     /* We are only looking for read-only mappings */
     if ( ((l1e_get_flags(pte) & (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW)) != _PAGE_PRESENT) )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
@@ -128,6 +128,62 @@ l2_pgentry_t page_walk_get_l2e(pagetable
     return l2e;
 }
 
+/*
+ * For now no "set_accessed" parameter, as all callers want it set to true.
+ * For now also no "set_dirty" parameter, as all callers deal with r/o
+ * mappings, and we don't want to set the dirty bit there (conflicts with
+ * CET-SS). However, as there are CPUs which may set the dirty bit on r/o
+ * PTEs, the logic below tolerates the bit becoming set "behind our backs".
+ */
+l1_pgentry_t page_walk_get_l1e(pagetable_t root, unsigned long addr)
+{
+    l2_pgentry_t l2e = page_walk_get_l2e(root, addr);
+    mfn_t mfn = l2e_get_mfn(l2e);
+    struct page_info *pg;
+    l1_pgentry_t l1e = l1e_empty();
+
+    if ( !(l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ||
+         (l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PSE) )
+        return l1e_empty();
+
+    pg = mfn_to_page(mfn);
+    if ( !page_lock(pg) )
+        return l1e_empty();
+
+    if ( (pg->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_l1_page_table )
+    {
+        l1_pgentry_t *l1t = map_domain_page(mfn);
+
+        l1e = l1t[l1_table_offset(addr)];
+
+        if ( (l1e_get_flags(l1e) & (_PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_PRESENT)) ==
+             _PAGE_PRESENT )
+        {
+            l1_pgentry_t ol1e = l1e;
+
+            l1e_add_flags(l1e, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
+            /*
+             * Best effort only; with the lock held the page shouldn't
+             * change anyway, except for the dirty bit to perhaps become set.
+             */
+            while ( cmpxchg(&l1e_get_intpte(l1t[l1_table_offset(addr)]),
+                            l1e_get_intpte(ol1e), l1e_get_intpte(l1e)) !=
+                    l1e_get_intpte(ol1e) &&
+                    !(l1e_get_flags(l1e) & _PAGE_DIRTY) )
+            {
+                l1e_add_flags(ol1e, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+                l1e_add_flags(l1e, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+            }
+        }
+
+        unmap_domain_page(l1t);
+    }
+
+    page_unlock(pg);
+
+    return l1e;
+}
+
 void *do_page_walk(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr)
 {
     l3_pgentry_t l3e;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
@@ -580,6 +580,7 @@ int vcpu_destroy_pagetables(struct vcpu
 
 void *do_page_walk(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr);
 l2_pgentry_t page_walk_get_l2e(pagetable_t root, unsigned long addr);
+l1_pgentry_t page_walk_get_l1e(pagetable_t root, unsigned long addr);
 
 int __sync_local_execstate(void);

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File xsa286-4.patch of Package xen.16818

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