File xsa433.patch of Package xen.31136

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File xsa433.patch of Package xen.31136

# Commit f91c5ea970675637721bb7f18adaa189837eb783
# Date 2023-07-24 17:07:14 +0100
# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
# Committer Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
x86/amd: Mitigations for Zenbleed

Zenbleed is a malfunction on AMD Zen2 uarch parts which results in corruption
of the vector registers.  An attacker can trigger this bug deliberately in
order to access stale data in the physical vector register file.  This can
include data from sibling threads, or a higher-privilege context.

Microcode is the preferred mitigation but in the case that's not available use
the chickenbit as instructed by AMD.  Re-evaluate the mitigation on late
microcode load too.

This is XSA-433 / CVE-2023-20593.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
 #include <asm/acpi.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/microcode.h>
 
 #include "cpu.h"
 
@@ -610,6 +611,72 @@ static void amd_init_spectral_chicken(vo
 		wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2, val | chickenbit);
 }
 
+void amd_check_zenbleed(void)
+{
+	const struct cpu_signature *sig = &this_cpu(ucode_cpu_info).cpu_sig;
+	unsigned int good_rev;
+	uint64_t val, old_val, chickenbit = (1 << 9);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're virtualised, we can't do family/model checks safely, and
+	 * we likely wouldn't have access to DE_CFG even if we could see a
+	 * microcode revision.
+	 *
+	 * A hypervisor may hide AVX as a stopgap mitigation.  We're not in a
+	 * position to care either way.  An admin doesn't want to be disabling
+	 * AVX as a mitigation on any build of Xen with this logic present.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has_hypervisor || boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17)
+		return;
+
+	switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+	case 0x30 ... 0x3f: good_rev = 0x0830107a; break;
+	case 0x60 ... 0x67: good_rev = 0x0860010b; break;
+	case 0x68 ... 0x6f: good_rev = 0x08608105; break;
+	case 0x70 ... 0x7f: good_rev = 0x08701032; break;
+	case 0xa0 ... 0xaf: good_rev = 0x08a00008; break;
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * With the Fam17h check above, parts getting here are Zen1.
+		 * They're not affected.
+		 */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, val);
+	old_val = val;
+
+	/*
+	 * Microcode is the preferred mitigation, in terms of performance.
+	 * However, without microcode, this chickenbit (specific to the Zen2
+	 * uarch) disables Floating Point Mov-Elimination to mitigate the
+	 * issue.
+	 */
+	val &= ~chickenbit;
+	if (sig->rev < good_rev)
+		val |= chickenbit;
+
+	if (val == old_val)
+		/* Nothing to change. */
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * DE_CFG is a Core-scoped MSR, and this write is racy during late
+	 * microcode load.  However, both threads calculate the new value from
+	 * state which is shared, and unrelated to the old value, so the
+	 * result should be consistent.
+	 */
+	wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, val);
+
+	/*
+	 * Inform the admin that we changed something, but don't spam,
+	 * especially during a late microcode load.
+	 */
+	if (smp_processor_id() == 0)
+		printk(XENLOG_INFO "Zenbleed mitigation - using %s\n",
+		       val & chickenbit ? "chickenbit" : "microcode");
+}
+
 static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u32 l, h;
@@ -889,6 +956,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 	if ((smp_processor_id() == 1) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ITSC))
 		disable_c1_ramping();
 
+	amd_check_zenbleed();
+
 	check_syscfg_dram_mod_en();
 }
 
--- a/xen/arch/x86/microcode_amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/microcode_amd.c
@@ -237,6 +237,8 @@ static int apply_microcode(unsigned int
     printk(XENLOG_WARNING "microcode: CPU%u updated from revision %#x to %#x\n",
            cpu, old_rev, rev);
 
+    amd_check_zenbleed();
+
     return 0;
 }
 
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
@@ -623,6 +623,8 @@ static inline uint8_t get_cpu_family(uin
 extern int8_t opt_tsx, cpu_has_tsx_ctrl;
 void tsx_init(void);
 
+void amd_check_zenbleed(void);
+
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif /* __ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */

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