Sign Up
Log In
Log In
or
Sign Up
Places
All Projects
Status Monitor
Collapse sidebar
openSUSE:Step:FrontRunner
openssl-1_1
openssl-1_1-seclevel.patch
Overview
Repositories
Revisions
Requests
Users
Attributes
Meta
File openssl-1_1-seclevel.patch of Package openssl-1_1
diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c --- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.seclevel 2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2020-06-05 17:16:54.835536823 +0200 @@ -3225,6 +3225,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *c } static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; +static const int minbits_digest_table[] = { 80, 80, 128, 192, 256 }; static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table); /* @@ -3276,6 +3277,11 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CT if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL)) return 0; - - return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1]; + /* + * Allow SHA1 in SECLEVEL 2 in non-FIPS mode or when the magic + * disable SHA1 flag is not set. + */ + if ((ctx->param->flags & 0x40000000) || FIPS_mode()) + return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1]; + return secbits >= minbits_digest_table[level - 1]; } diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod --- openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod.seclevel 2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod 2020-06-04 15:48:01.608178833 +0200 @@ -81,8 +81,10 @@ using MD5 for the MAC is also prohibited =item B<Level 2> -Security level set to 112 bits of security. As a result RSA, DSA and DH keys -shorter than 2048 bits and ECC keys shorter than 224 bits are prohibited. +Security level set to 112 bits of security with the exception of SHA1 allowed +for signatures. +As a result RSA, DSA and DH keys shorter than 2048 bits and ECC keys +shorter than 224 bits are prohibited. In addition to the level 1 exclusions any cipher suite using RC4 is also prohibited. SSL version 3 is also not allowed. Compression is disabled. diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c --- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c.seclevel 2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c 2020-06-05 17:10:11.842198401 +0200 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); +static unsigned long sha1_disable(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx); static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1; @@ -396,7 +397,7 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s)); /* Set suite B flags if needed */ - X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s) | sha1_disable(s, NULL)); if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data (ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) { goto end; @@ -953,12 +954,33 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback return 0; break; default: + /* allow SHA1 in SECLEVEL 2 in non FIPS mode */ + if (nid == NID_sha1 && minbits == 112 && !sha1_disable(s, ctx)) + break; if (bits < minbits) return 0; } return 1; } +static unsigned long sha1_disable(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx) +{ + unsigned long ret = 0x40000000; /* a magical internal value used by X509_VERIFY_PARAM */ + const CERT *c; + + if (FIPS_mode()) + return ret; + + if (ctx != NULL) { + c = ctx->cert; + } else { + c = s->cert; + } + if (tls1_cert_sigalgs_have_sha1(c)) + return 0; + return ret; +} + int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) { return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex); diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h --- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h.seclevel 2020-06-04 15:48:01.602178783 +0200 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h 2020-06-05 17:02:22.666313410 +0200 @@ -2576,6 +2576,7 @@ __owur int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PAC __owur int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s); __owur int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey); __owur int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd); +int tls1_cert_sigalgs_have_sha1(const CERT *c); __owur size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC __owur int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve); diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.seclevel 2020-06-04 15:48:01.654179221 +0200 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c 2020-06-05 17:02:40.268459157 +0200 @@ -2145,6 +2145,36 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int return 0; } +static int tls1_sigalgs_have_sha1(const uint16_t *sigalgs, size_t sigalgslen) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) { + const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs); + + if (lu == NULL) + continue; + if (lu->hash == NID_sha1) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + + +int tls1_cert_sigalgs_have_sha1(const CERT *c) +{ + if (c->client_sigalgs != NULL) { + if (tls1_sigalgs_have_sha1(c->client_sigalgs, c->client_sigalgslen)) + return 1; + } + if (c->conf_sigalgs != NULL) { + if (tls1_sigalgs_have_sha1(c->conf_sigalgs, c->conf_sigalgslen)) + return 1; + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid) { int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0; diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t --- openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t.seclevel 2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200 +++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t 2020-06-04 15:48:01.608178833 +0200 @@ -346,8 +346,8 @@ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "sslserver ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], ), "CA with PSS signature using SHA256"); -ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"), - "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 2"); +ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "3"), + "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 3"); ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"), "PSS signature using SHA256 and auth level 2");
Locations
Projects
Search
Status Monitor
Help
OpenBuildService.org
Documentation
API Documentation
Code of Conduct
Contact
Support
@OBShq
Terms
openSUSE Build Service is sponsored by
The Open Build Service is an
openSUSE project
.
Sign Up
Log In
Places
Places
All Projects
Status Monitor