- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
  * No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
    details.

- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
  = Security
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
    so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
    Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
    limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
    protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
    encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
    immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
    would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
  * ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
    specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
    multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
    Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
    are unaffected.
  * ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
    metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
    LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
    user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
    an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
    could potentially perform command injection depending on what
    quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
  = Potentially incompatible changes
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
    a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
    can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this (forwarded request 1150500 from hpjansson)

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